THE *Theory and Regulation* OF LOVE.

A MORAL ESSAY,

In TWO PARTS.

WITH

Some Motives to the Study and Practice of regular Love, by way of Consideration.

To which are added,

LETTERS Philosophical and Moral between the Author and Dr. *Henry More*.

By JOHN NORRIS, M. A. Rector of *Bemerton* near *Sarum*.

The SEVENTH EDITION.

LONDON:
Printed for *Edmund Parker* at the *Bible* and Crown in *Lombard-Street*. 1723.

Imprimatur,

GILB. IRONSIDE.

Vice-Cancellarius.

Jan. 2.
1688.

TO THE

LADY MASHAM

AT

OATES in ESSEX.

MADAM,

THE Esteem, where-with your Ladyship honour'd my former Writings, has at once *obliged* me to an high Measure of *Gratitude*, and *pointed* me out a way of *shewing* it. For I was hence led to conclude, That if any thing of mine could afford you Pleasure and Entertainment,

when you had no other Intereſt in it than in the *Common* Light of the Sun, much more would it be acceptable, if made yours by ſome *peculiar* Right and Property. The Difference of Advantage ſeeming to me much the ſame, as between taking a Turn in a *Common Walk*, and enjoying the Retirements of one's *own Private Garden.*

One only Objection ſtood in my way. I was a little ſcrupulous whether the *Oblation* were worthy the *Altar*, whether ſo mean a Performance could *Strike* the *Taſt*, much more *deſerve* the *Patronage* of a Perſon of ſuch nice and refined Senſe, and whom *Nature* and your own *unaſſiſted Curioſity* have conſpired to accompliſh beyond what

what the *Preſent Age* can *parallel*, or (unleſs your Ladyſhip will be perſuaded to bequeath ſome Monument of your extraordinary Genius to the World) the *Future* will ever *believe*. This Conſideration, I confeſs, did a little *arreſt* my Pen, till I confronted it with another, that your Ladyſhip is as eminent for Candour and Goodneſs, as for Parts and ingenious Attainments, and that you have Mildneſs and Sweetneſs enough to temper the *Severity* even of your *own Judgment*.

Theſe, Madam, were the Conſiderations that embolden'd me to entitle your Ladyſhip to this Work. Concerning which (whatever Faults it may be charged with) I have ſomething to boaſt,

which I am sure all Writers have not, that I make an Offering of that which is purely my *own*. Which, if your Ladyship please to accept, there will be much added, both to the *Happiness* and to the *Duty* of

Madam,

Your Ladyships most humble

and devoted Servant

All-Souls Coll.
March 26. 1688.

J. Norris.

TO

TO THE READER.

HAVING *accounted in the first Section for the general* Design *of this Undertaking, I have here no more to do than only to prepare the Reader, by giving him some few Advertisements concerning the* Manner *of its* Performance.

In the first place, I make no Apologies; *For I would not have exposed these Papers to the View of the World, if I thought they needed any. Neither do I desire any Favour or kind Allowances from my Reader; I only desire that he would be*

ſo kind *to* himſelf, *and ſo* juſt *to* me, *as to afford me his Cloſeſt and moſt unprejudiced* Attention, *that he would ſuſpend his Judgment till he has gone over the whole, and that then he would* Cenſure *no farther than he* Underſtands.

This Requeſt is at all times Reaſonable, *but now I think it in a manner* Neceſſary. *For I have here uſed great* Liberty *of* Thinking, *and accordingly could not avoid lighting upon ſeveral Notions, which are* remote *from common Obſervation, and ſome that are directly* contrary *to the Vulgar Sentiments. And theſe I have endeavoured to diſpoſe according to the greateſt Accuracy of Order and Method, and to carry on with a Thred of more than ordinary Connexion and Dependance. All which as it requires a great deal of Attention and Application of Mind in the* Compoſer, *ſo does it almoſt as much in the* Reader;

who can no more expect with an hasty and careless glance to comprehend the Recesses and Retirements of a nice Speculation, than a Man that Rides Post can discern the artful strokes and curiosities of a fine-wrought Picture.

Attention *therefore is the thing that I do again commend to him that shall find leisure to pursue these Meditations; Though for his comfort I must tell him, that I have endeavour'd to ease him of this trouble as much as I could, by expressing my Notions with all possible distinctness and Perspicuity. In order to which I found it necessary sometimes to use new Terms, and such as would raise more clear and distinct Ideas than those which had before obtain'd, which I hope will easily be excused by those who consider, that Words are purely in Order to Thoughts, and would therefore rather* think rightly, *than* speak Customarily.

And

And this I was the more neceſſitated to do, by reaſon of the Novelty *and* Singularity *of my Deſign. For I muſt further obſerve to the Reader, that this way of writing* Ethicks *is intirely New and unblown upon. For though the reduction of all Vertue and Vice to the various Modification of Love be Obvious enough to any one that will conſider, yet I do not know of any Moraliſt that ever drew up a Scheme of Morality upon this* Hypotheſis.

I hope the Reader will find it here done to his ſatisfaction, though I muſt tell him that I do not deſcend to a particular conſideration of Vertues and Vices, it being not my Deſign to inſiſt minutely upon Particulars, but only to lay down ſuch general Principles upon which a more particular Scheme of Morality may be erected, *or into which thoſe particular Morals which are already extant, may and ought to be ultimately* reſolv'd.

To the Reader.

The whole I have endeavour'd to comprize within as little Room as may be. I have set my self this Law, to write nothing but what is directly and Perpendicularly *to the Point in hand, and to express what is so in as few words as I could with* Perspicuity. *For I think it the Perfection of* Discourse *to come as nigh* Intuition *as may be, and that none are so far removed from the Measures of* Angels, *as prolix and voluminous Writers. It would have been more for my own ease to have been* Lax and Popular, *but I thought it of more concern to consult the* Patience, *the* Time, *and the* Purse *of the Reader.*

JOHN NORRIS.

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THE

THE Theory and Regulation OF LOVE.

PART I.

SECT. I.

The general Design of this Undertaking, and its great Usefulness to the whole drift of Morality.

1. THE Subject of these Contemplations is *Love:* A thing that has employ'd many curious Pens to little purpose, and has been perhaps the *most* and withal the *worst* written upon of any Subject in the World. 'Tis I confess, strange that Men should *write* so darkly and

and confusedly of that which they *feel* and experiment so intimately; But I must take the boldness to say, that what I have hitherto seen upon this Subject, has been so confused, ambiguous and indistinct, that I was thereby rather *distracted* than *inform'd* in my Notions concerning it.

2. Finding therefore no Satisfaction in advising with *Books*, I was fain to shut my Eyes and set my self a *Thinking*, without having any regard to what others had observ'd upon the same matter, so as to be in the least sway'd or determin'd in my Conclusions by it. A Method that would tend more to the Discovery of *Truth*, and to the Advancement of all *Notional Learning*, than that narrow strait-laced Humour of adhering to the Dictates of those, who have nothing more to recommend them, but only the *lurk* of being *born* before us.

3. My Design therefore here is to employ my Meditations about two things, 1*st*. The *Theory* of Love according to its full Latitude and Comprehension, and 2*dly*. The *Measures* of its *Regulation*. The Discharge of which double Undertaking will throughly exhaust the Subject, and answer the Ends both of *Speculation* and *Practice*.

4. I

4. I think it requiſite to begin with the *Theory* of Love. For ſince the *Phyſician* thinks it neceſſary to know the *Anatomy* of that Body which he is to *Cure*, and the *Logician* to open the Nature of thoſe Intellectual Operations which he is to *direct*, I know not why the *Moraliſt* ſhould not think himſelf equally concern'd to frame a juſt *Theory* of that Affection of the Soul, which he is to *regulate*.

5. The whole Work I conceive to be of great Uſefulneſs and general Importance to all the Purpoſes of Morality; nay, indeed to contain the whole Sum and Subſtance of it. For what is the grand Intendment and final Upſhot of Morality but to teach a Man to *Love regularly*? As a Man *Loves* ſo is he. Love is not only the *Fulfilling*, but alſo the Tranſgreſſing of the Law, and Vertue and Vice is nothing elſe but the Various Application and Modification of *Love*. By this a Good Man is diſtinguiſh'd from a Bad, and an Angel of Light from an Angel of Darkneſs. This is that which diſcriminates the Orders of Men here, and will conſign us to different Portions hereafter, according to that of St. *Auſtin*, *Faciunt Civitates duas Amores duo: Hieruſalem facit Amor Dei: Babylonem Amor Sæculi. In-* De Civ. Dei. l. 14. Cap. 28. Tom. 5.

terroget ergo se quisque quid Amet, & inveniet unde sit Civis. The two Loves make the two Cities: The Love of God makes Hierusalem, *the Love of the World* Babylon. *Let every one therefore ask himself what 'tis he Loves, and he will find to which City he belongs.*

6. He therefore that shall rightly state the Nature, and prescribe due Measures for the Regulation of Love, not only serves the Cause of Morality, but may be truly said to discharge the whole Province of a Moralist: This I take to be a sufficient Apology for the *Undertaking* it self; and if the *Performance* comes up to the Moment of the Design (whereof the World is to judge) I know of nothing wanting to render it both *serviceable* and *acceptable* to the Publick.

SECT.

SECT. II.

Of the Dignity and Nature of Love in general, and of the first and great Division of it.

1. *LET us make Man in our Image, after our own Likeness*, said God. Now among other Instances of Resemblance wherein Man may be likened to God, such as the Internal Rectitude of his Nature, or *Self-dominion*, and his *External* Dominion over the Creatures and the like; this I think may be consider'd as one, and perhaps as the Chiefest of all, that is, in the Divine Nature there are Two Processions, one by way of *Intellect* which is the λόγος or Word, and the other by way of *Love* which is the *Holy Spirit*, so likewise in the Human Nature there are as it were Two *Processions*, and that of the same kind too as in the Divine *Understanding* and *Love*.

2. These are the Two Noble Faculties that branch out from the Soul of Man, and whereby he becomes a little *Image* of

the *Trinity*. And altho' we generally valne our Selves moſt upon the *Former*, yet I know not whether there be not an Equality in *theſe* as there is in the *Divine* Proceſſions, and whether it be not as much the Glory of Man to be an *Amorous*, as to be a *Rational* Being.

3. Sure I am that in the Gentile Theology and in the moſt refined Phyloſophy of the Ancients, the Preheminence is given to *Love*. *Socrates* in *Plato's Sympoſion* ſays concerning Love, that it is πρεσβύτατος καὶ τιμιώτατος θεῶν, *the eldeſt and moſt honourable of the Gods*. And we know Love is made the firſt Hypoſtaſis in the Platonick Triad. The Holy Scripture goes yet higher, and does not only in ſeveral Places ſet forth Love as the *Flower* of the Divinity, and magnify the Divine Eſſence chiefly from that Excellence, but ſeems to reſolve all the Perfection of the Deity into this *one Point*. For when it defines God, it does not ſay he is *Wiſdom* or *Power*, no not ſo much as *Wiſe* or *Powerful*, but ſeems to overlook all his other Perfections, and ſays in the Abſtract, that he is *Love*. They are great Words of St. *John*, and
1. 4. 16. ſuch as make much for the great Dignity of this Divine Affection, *God is Love, and he that dwelleth in Love dwelleth in God*. So Noble a Thing is Love, and

and so deserving of our most intense Theory and Inspection.

4. And indeed it *needs* it, as well as *deserves* it. For there is nothing that darkens the Nature of things, and obscures the Clarity of our Conceptions more than Ambiguity of Terms, and I know nothing that is more Equivocal and full of Latitude than this Word, *Love*. It is given to things whose Ideas are Notoriously different, and Men seem to have agreed together not to detect the Fallacy, and from the Identity of the *Name*, to conclude the Indentity of the *Thing*. To give one Instance out of many. What is there that passes for an Axiom of a more simple, certain and uniform Signification than that Common Proposition in Divinity, that *we must love God for himself, and our Neighbour for God's sake*? But now when we come to examin what Ideas we have under these Words, 'tis plain that that Idea which is express'd by Love in the first part of the Proposition, is not the same with that which is express'd by Love in the Second. For Love in reference to God signifies *Simple Desire*, and in reference to our Neighbour, *wishing well to*; which Ideas are as different as East and West, and yet because of the Commonness of the Name, and the Gingling turn of the Propo-

Propoſition, this paſſes ſmoothly and unqueſtionably for one and the ſame Love.

5. But tho' this Word Love be uſed to ſignify Ideas ſo very different that they ſeem to have nothing in Common but the Name, yet I think there is one thing wherein they all agree, and whereof they all partake, and which may therefore be acknowledg'd as the *General* and *Tranſcendental* Notion of Love. And that is, *A Motion of the Soul toward good.* This I ſay is the firſt and moſt general Notion of Love, and which runs throughout all the Species of it. But then this includes Two things. For as in the Motion of Bodies we firſt conceive *Gravity* or a Connaturality to a certain Term of Motion, and then the Motion it ſelf which is conſequent upon it; ſo alſo in Love (which is the Motion of the Soul) Order requires that we firſt conceive a certain Connaturality or Coaptation of the Soul to Good, whence ariſes all the Variety of its *actual* Motions and Tendencies toward it. This I take to be that peculiar Habitude of the Soul to Good which the Schools call *Complacentia boni, a Complacence, a Liking or Reliſh of Good,* which I conſider as really diſtinct from, and antecedent to its actual Motion towards it. For as 'tis obſerv'd by *Ariſtotle* with more than Ordinary Niceneſs in his 3d *de Anima*:

The

The Motion of Love is in a *Circle*. First, Good moves and acts upon the Soul, and then the Soul moves and exerts it self towards Good, that so *there* may be the *End* whence was the *Rise* of its Motion. This first Alteration of the Soul from Good answers to *Gravity* in *Bodies*, and may be call'd for distinction sake, the *Moral Gravity of the Soul*; the Second to *Gravitation* or actual Pressure, and may as fitly be call'd the *Moral Gravitation of the Soul*.

6. I further consider that this *Moral Gravity* is impress'd upon the Soul primarily and originally by *good* in *general*, or by the universal good or Essence of good, that is, by God himself, who is the Sum and Abstract of all Goodness, and the Centre of all Love. So that this *Moral Gravity* of the Soul will be its *Connaturality* to all Good, or Good in general, that is, to God as its primary and adequate Object, and to particular Goods only so far as they have something of the common Nature of Good, something of God in them. Whence it will also follow, that the *Moral Gravitation* of the Soul does naturally and necessarily respect Good in Common, or God as the Term of its Motion and Tendency. So that upon the whole to speak more *explicitly*, the most general and comprehensive Notion of Love will be found to be, *A Motion of the Soul towards God*.

7. But

7. But now in this Motion there is great difference. For God having unfolded his Perfections in the Creation with almoſt infinite Variety, and as it were drawn out himſelf into a numerous Iſſue of *Secondary* Goods, our Love becomes alſo multiplied, and divides its Courſe among ſeveral Chanels; and tho' after all its Turnings and Windings we may at laſt trace it up to the πολὺ πέλαγος καλοῦ, as *Plato* ſpeaks, the *great Sea of Beauty* and Head Fountain of all Being and Perfection (for we love Particular Goods only as they carry ſome Impreſs of the univerſal; or to ſpeak more properly, we love the univerſal Good in the Particulars) yet it muſt be acknowledg'd that the *immediate Object* of our Love becomes hereby more various and multiplied, and conſequently our *Love* too, as receiving its Specification from it.

8. Nor does our Love receive leſs Variety and Diverſity from the *Manner* of its Motion or Tendency. Motion being Specify'd from the *Manner* of it as well as from its *Term*. And it may be alſo laſtly diverſify'd according to the Nature of the *Part* moved, whether it be the Superiour or the Inferiour Part of the Soul. From theſe Three, the *Term* of Motion, the *Manner* of Motion, and the Nature of the

the *Part* moved, ariſe all the different Kinds of Love, ſuch as Divine and Worldly, Spiritual and Carnal, Charity and Friendſhip, Love of Concupiſcence and Love of Benevolence, Intellectual and Senſitive, Natural, Animal and Rational Love, with ſeveral others which I ſhall not ſtand to enumerate.

9. But notwithſtanding this Variety I believe all will be comprehended under theſe Two in general, *Concupiſcence* and *Benevolence.* This I take to be the *Firſt* and *Great* Diviſion of Love, to which all the ſeveral Kinds of it may be aptly reduc'd. For when I conſider the Motion of Love, I find it tends to Two things, namely to the Good which a Man wills to any one, whether it be to himſelf or to another, and to him to whom this Good is will'd. So that the Motion of Love may be conſider'd either barely as a *Tendency* towards Good, or as a *willing* this Good to ſome Perſon or Being. If it be conſider'd in the firſt way, then 'tis what we call *Concupiſcence* or *Deſire*; if in the ſecond, then 'tis what we call *Benevolence* or *Charity.*

10. For there is the ſame Proportion in *Love* that there is in *Hatred*, which alſo involves a *double Motion.* Either a declining

ing or tending from Evil, which the Greeks call Ἀποφυγή, the Latins *Fuga*, in our own Language Averſion or Abhorrence; or elſe a willing Evil to ſome Perſon or other, which we call *Malice* or *Malevolence*. Concupiſcence or Deſire anſwers to the former of theſe, and Benevolence or Charity to the latter.

11. There is indeed this difference to be obſerv'd between the Motions of Love and the Motions of Hatred, that thoſe of Hatred are not *neceſſarily Concomitant*. For there may be a ſimple Averſion without any Malice or wiſhing ill to, tho' perhaps the latter can hardly be conceiv'd without the former. But now in Love theſe Motions are always concomitant and reciprocal. There is no *Deſire* without *Benevolence*, and no *Benevolence* without *Deſire*. For every thing that is deſired is deſired to ſome body; and ſo again, deſiring to ſome body implies and ſuppoſes *ſimple* Deſire. And this I ſuppoſe has been the occaſion of that great Confuſion which has been generally incurr'd in this matter, Men being very apt from *Union* and *Concomitancy* to infer *Indiſtinction* and *Identity*. But notwithſtanding this Connexion, the *Ideas* of Deſire and Benevolence are very diſtinct, as will eaſily and clearly appear to any cloſe and attentive Thinker.

SECT.

SECT. III.

The Analogy between Love and Motion, particularly with the Motion of the Heart, with a further Illustration of the First and Great Division of Love.

1. HAving in the foregoing Section fix'd the general Idea of Love in the *Motion* of the Soul towards *good*, and this being a Term somewhat Metaphorical, and withal not so often applied by Scholastick Writers to this Purpose, I thought it concern'd me to draw here a short Parallel between *Love* and *Physical Motion*, and to shew the admirable Agreement and Correspondency that is between them: Whereby 'twill appear that the general Idea of Love could not have had a more convenient Representation.

2. The excellent *Monsieur Malebranch* undertaking to describe the Nature of the Mind, and considering its Idea to be very abstract, and such as did not fall within the Sphere of Imagination, thought

Lib. 1. De Inquirenda veritate, p. 2.

thought it beſt to ſhadow it forth by the Two Eminent Properties of Matter, *viz.* that of receiving various *Figures*, and that of *Motion* or *Mobility*. To the Property of receiving various Figures he reſembles that Faculty of the Mind, which we call *Underſtanding*. And to Motion or Mobility he likens the *Will*. The firſt of theſe Parallels he purſues and illuſtrates in many Particulars; but when he comes to the laſt he gives only this one Inſtance of Reſemblance, that as all Motions Naturally proceed in a right Line, unleſs by the Interpoſition of external and particular Cauſes they are otherwiſe determin'd, ſo all the Inclinations which we have receiv'd from God, are *Right*, and would tend only to the true Good, were they not turn'd aſide to ill Ends by the impulſe of ſome *foreign* Cauſe.

3. This indeed is finely obſerv'd by this Ingenious and Learned *Theoriſt*; but for an Inlargement of the Parallel I conſider further, that as in the Motion of Bodies *Gravity* preceeds *Actual Gravitation*, that is, we neceſſarily conceive a certain Congruity or Connaturailty of a Body to a certain Term before its actual Tendency thither; ſo in the Soul there is a Natural *Complacency* or liking of Good, before its *actual exerting* it ſelf towards it; for we deſire

ſire nothing but what we like or reliſh as convenient and agreeable to us. But this I have touch'd upon already, and ſhall therefore no longer inſiſt upon it.

4. Further therefore, as this Affection call'd *Gravity* in Bodies, is nothing elſe but that *firſt Impreſſion* or Alteration made upon them by the various Actings of thoſe Effluviums or Streams of Particles which iſſue out from the Womb of that great Magnet, the *Earth*, ſo that if there were either no ſuch Magnetick Body, or a *Vacuum* to intercept its Influences, there would be no ſuch thing as Gravity; ſo in the like manner this radical *Complacency* and Connaturality of the Soul towards Good (which I call her *Moral Gravity*) is nothing elſe but that firſt Alteration or Impreſſion which is made upon her by the ſtreaming Influences of the Great and Supreme Magnet, *God*, continually acting upon her, and attracting her by his active and powerful Charms. So that if either there were no God, or this his Influence never ſo little a while intercepted, there would be no ſuch thing as this Complacency or *Moral Gravity* of the Soul.

5. Again, as this Phyſical Gravity cauſes in Bodies an actual Effort or Tendency toward the Centre, and that with ſuch

neceſſity that they cannot but tend thither, even while violently detain'd; and when at liberty haſten with all poſſible Speed to this laſt Term of their Motion; ſo by Vertue of this Moral Gravity the Soul actually puts forth and exerts her ſelf towards the *great Magnet*, Good in general or God, and that with as much Neceſſity as a Stone falls downwards. And tho' detain'd violently by the Interpoſition of her Body, yet ſhe ſtill endeavours towards her Centre, and is no ſooner ſet at liberty but ſhe haſtens away to it, and unites her ſelf with it. For the Will, notwithſtanding all her Sovereignty and Dominion, acts according to Nature and Neceſſity when ſhe tends to her Perfection. Nay I take this Neceſſity to be ſuch, that I think it abſolutely Impoſſible for God to create a Soul without this Tendency to himſelf, and that not only becauſe 'tis againſt Order and *Decorum* that he ſhould do ſo, but alſo becauſe this Moral Gravity of the Soul, whence proceed all her actual Tendencies, is cauſed by the continual acting of God upon her by his attractive and magnetick Influences: For God is the firſt Mover in Moral as well as in Natural Motions, and whatever he moves he moves to himſelf.

6. Again

6. Again I consider, that as the *Gravitation* or *actual Endeavour* of Bodies towards the Centre is always alike and uniform, however their *real Progress* may be *hinder'd*, or the swiftness of it *resisted* by accidental Letts and Impediments; so is this Moral Gravitation or actual Endeavour of the Soul towards Good in general, or God, always equal and uniform (for a Man does not desire to be Happy more at one time than at another, as I have elsewhere shewn) I say this Endeavour of the Soul towards Good is always equal, however her real advancing to it be hinder'd or resisted by the Interposition of the Body.

Contem. and Love. p. 296.

7. Again I consider, that as Natural Motion is a Tendency or Translation of a Body from an undue and incongruous Place, to a Place of Rest and Acquiescence, whereby it acquires as it were a *new Form* of Perfection; so Love is *Extatical*, and carries a Man out from himself as insufficient to be his own Good towards Good without him, which by Union he endeavours to make his *own*, and so to *better* and *improve* his Being, till at length his Desire be swallow'd up in the Fruition of the universal Good, and *Motion* be exchanged for *Rest* and *Acquiescence*.

8. This Parallel between *Love* and *Motion* in general might be carried on much further; but beſides that 'tis convenient to leave ſomething for the Contemplative Reader to work out by himſelf: I have alſo another Parallel to make between Love and a *certain Particular Motion*, namely, that of the *Heart*, wherein as there is as much Harmony and Correſpondency in other reſpects, ſo there is this peculiar in it, that this is a Motion perform'd *within* a Man's *ſelf*, and depending upon an *intrinſick* and *vital* Principle as well as the other.

9. Firſt, then we may conſider that the Heart is the great Wheel of the Humane Machine, the Spring of all Animal and Vital Motion, and the Head-fountain of Life, πηγὴ φύσεως, as *Hippocrates* ſomewhere calls it, and that its Motion is the Firſt and Leading Motion of all, that it begins as ſoon as the Flame of Life is kindled, and ends not till the *vital Congruity* be quite diſſolv'd. And thus 'tis in *Love*. This is the great Wheel of the *Intellectual* Frame as the other is of the *Natural*, this is the Spring and Ferment of the Soul, that gives her Life and Energy, and without which ſhe would be utterly torpid and unactive. Love is the firſt and *Mother* Motion that both

both prevents and actuates all the reſt. 'Tis from her that all the Inclinations and Paſſions of the Soul take their Riſe, and did we not firſt love we ſhould neither Hope nor Fear, nor Hate nor be angry, nor Envy nor be any other way affected. Nay we Love and Deſire before we can Apprehend, Judge, Reaſon or Diſcourſe; nay our Love is then commonly moſt impetuous and high-ſet; we love long before we know what 'tis to love, nay before we know whether we love or no, even as ſoon as we receive the Breath of Life. And as 'tis the *Firſt*, ſo it is alſo the *Laſt* Motion. 'Tis the *Ultimum Moriens* of the Intellectual, as the Heart is of the Natural Structure. This is the Motion that outlives and ſees the Funeral of all the other Operations of the Soul. For when either Age or Sickneſs by diſturbing the *Craſis* of the Body has alſo untuned and diſorder'd the Faculties of the Soul, when the Man can no longer underſtand, nor diſcourſe, nor remember, when all his Rational Faculties are as 'twere benumm'd and *death-ſtruck*, yet ſtill he *loves*, and inclines towards Happineſs with as much Weight as ever; *for Love is ſtrong as Death*, and as importunate as the *Grave*, Can. *many Waters cannot quench Love, neither can the Floods drown it.*

10. Again

10. Again we may consider, that as by the *Pulsation* of the *Heart*, the Arterial Blood is transmitted to the Brain, whereby are generated those Animal Spirits which are the Instruments of Motion throughout the Body, and which very Animal Spirits do again return and assist the Motion of the Heart by contracting its Muscular Fibres, and so straitning its Ventricles to expel the Blood contain'd in them into the Arteries; the same Reciprocation may we observe in the Motion of Love. That Moral Gravity and Gravitation of the Soul impress'd on her by the universal Good acting attractively upon her, and whereby she stands inclined to Good in general, first moves the Understanding, which as the Schools allow, is moved by the Will *quoad exercitium actus*, tho' not *quoad specificationem*. And then the Understanding moves the Will as to *particular* and actual Volitions concerning particular Goods. For as to these we will nothing but what we first know and judge, *pro hic & nunc*, fit to be will'd. Which by the way may give great Light to that intricate and perplex'd Controversy, whether the Will moves the Understanding or the Understanding the Will. For they both move one another, tho' in different Respects. Even as the Heart by its Motion

sends

ſends Spirits to the Brain, and is by thoſe very Spirits aſſiſted in her Motion. This indeed is a wonderful Inſtance of Reſemblance, and the more I conſider it the more ſtrange I think it, and full of Myſtery.

11. Again, as by the continual Reciprocation of the *Pulſe* there is cauſed a Circulation of the Blood, which is expell'd out of the Heart into the Arteries, out of theſe into the Parts which are to be nouriſh'd, from whence 'tis imbibed by the Capillary Veins, which lead it back to the *Vena Cava*, and ſo into the Heart again; the ſame may in proportion be applied to Love. This is the *Great Pulſe* of the *Body Politick*, as the other is of the *Body Natural*. 'Tis Love that begets and keeps up the great Circulation and mutual Dependance of Society, by this Men are inclined to maintain Mutual Commerce and intercourſe with one another, and to diſtribute their Benefits and Kindneſſes to all the Parts of the Civil Body, till at length they return again upon themſelves in the *Circle* and *Reciprocation of Love.*

12. And if we further meditate upon the Motion of the Heart, we ſhall find that it is not only an apt Emblem of *Love in General*, but that it alſo myſtically

points

points out to us the *Two great Species* of Love, *Concupiſcence* and *Benevolence*. The Motion of the Heart we know is Double, *Dilatation* and *Contraction*. Dilatation whereby it receives Blood into its Ventricles, and Contraction whereby it expels it out again. And is it not ſo alſo in this great Pulſe of the Soul, *Love*? Is there not here alſo the like double Motion? For we *deſire* Good, which anſwers to the Dilatation and Immiſſion of the Blood, and we alſo *wiſh well to*, which anſwers to the Contraction and Emiſſion of it.

13. I know not what ſome may think of this, and I know there are a ſort of Men in the World that never think themſelves, and look with Scorn and Contempt upon ſuch Notions as are not to be found out without more than ordinary Thinking; but for my part I muſt needs own that I ſtand amazed at this wonderful Harmony and Correſpondence, and that I am thereby the more confirm'd in that Celebrated Notion of the *Platoniſts*, that as the Soul is the Image of God, ſo the Body is the Image of the Soul, and that this Viſible and Material is but the *Shadow*, or (as *Plotinus* will have it) the *Echo* of the Inviſible and Immaterial World.

SECT.

SECT. IV.

Of the First Great Branch of Love, viz. *Love of Concupiscence or Desire, with the several Kinds of it.*

1. WE have consider'd the Nature of Love in general, and have shewn it to consist in a *Motion of the Soul towards Good*, whence we took occasion to represent the Analogy between Love and Physical Motion, which we find to be exact and Apposite even to Surprise and Admiration: We have also discover'd the double Motion of this mystical Pulse, and accordingly have branch'd out Love into two General Parts, Love of Concupiscence and Love of Benevolence. I come now to treat of each of these severally.

2. And first of Love of *Concupiscence* or *Desire*. The general Idea of which I conceive to be *A simple Tendency of the Soul to Good*, not at all considering whether it wills it to any Person or Being or no. Not that there is or can be any desire without

without wishing well to, (For, as I observ'd before, these are always inseparable Concomitants) but their Ideas being very distinct, I think I may very well abstract from the one, when my Business lies only to consider the other.

3. Concerning this Love of Desire I further consider, that the Primary and Adequate Object of it is the same that is of all Love, namely, *Good in general* or *God*. For we desire Good as Good, or Good in common, before we desire this or that Good in particular. And when we *do* desire any particular Good, 'tis still for the sake of the universal Good whereof it partakes, and according to the Degree of this Participation either real or apparent, so we measure out and dispence our Love. So that good in general is the Primary and Adequate Object of Desire.

4. But now this general or universal Good being variously participated by particular Beings, hence it comes to pass that our Desire has many Subordinate and Secondary Objects, which it tends to with more or less Inclination, according as the Marks and Footsteps of the universal Good appear in them more or less discernable: For the universal Good is so congenial and connatural to the Soul as always acting upon

upon it and attracting it to it ſelf, that we love every thing that carries the leaſt Image or Semblance of it.

5. There is this difference only between the Love of the univerſal, and the Love of particular Goods. Our Love to the univerſal Good is natural, neceſſary and unavoidable. We have no more Command over this Love than we have over the Circulation of our Blood or the Motion of our Pulſe. For God is the Centre of Spirits, as the Earth is of Bodies, and in our Love of him we are as much determin'd as Fire is to burn, or a Stone to deſcend. And the Bleſſed in Heaven love him with the higheſt Degree of Neceſſity and Determination. But now we are not thus determin'd to the Love of particular Goods. I ſay not *thus* determin'd: For it muſt be acknowledg'd that there is a ſort of Determination even *here* alſo. For Good being deſirable as Good, and conſequently in *every Degree* of it: So far as we conſider any thing as good we muſt needs love it with a *Natural Inclination*, that which the Schools term a *Velleity*, or *Voluntas Naturæ*, or a loving a thing, *Secundum quid*, *according to a certain reſpect*: But it being poſſible that this Leſſer particular Good may in ſome circumſtances come into Competition with a greater particular Good, or with the greateſt of all, the

the universal Good, and so upon the whole become evil; 'tis not necessary, nor are we determin'd to love it absolutely, throughly and efficaciously, but may nill and decline it *Absolutely*, tho' still we retain a *Natural Love* or *Velleity* towards it as before.

6. For the Case is the same here as 'tis in Evil. We necessarily hate Evil as Evil, and the greatest Evil we hate *Absolutely* as well as *Necessarily*. But for particular and lesser Evils, tho' we necessarily hate them too by a *Natural* Aversion as far as we consider them as *evil*, yet 'tis not necessary that we should always hate them *Absolutely*, but may in some Circumstances *Absolutely* will them as a means either to avoid a greater Evil, or to obtain a greater Good. And in the same proportion as any Evil less than the greatest tho' it be necessarily nill'd and declin'd in some *respect*, may yet be *Absolutely* will'd and embraced, so any particular Good, tho' it be in some *respect* necessarily lov'd, may yet *Absolutely* be nill'd and refused.

7. Indeed the Excellent *Monsieur Malebranch* in his Treatise of Nature and Grace, asserts this *non* Determination of our Love to Particular Goods in more large and unlimited Terms, when he tells us, that *the Natural Motion of the Soul to Good in general, is*

is not invincible in respect of any particular Good. And in this *non Invincibility* he places our *Liberty* or Free Will. But in my Judgment this Proposition of his must either be *corrected*, or *better explain'd*. For without this our Distinction, it will not hold true. Our Love to particular Good is Invincible, *Secundum quid*, or *as to a certain Respect*, but *Absolutely* and Simply speaking it is not Invincible. And if in this *Absolute non Invincibility* he will have our Liberty or Free Will to consist, I readily agree with him, and do think the Notion to be very sound and good.

8. And thus the Difference between our Love of the universal, and our Love of particular Goods is clear and apparent. Our Love to the universal Good is Primary and Immediate, but our Love to Particular Good Secondary and Mediate. Our Love to the universal Good is invincible *Absolutely* and *Simply*, we will it *necessarily*, and we will it *throughly*, but our Love to particular Good is invincible only in *some certain Respect*. We do not always love it throughly and effectually, tho' we must always love it. In short, our Love to the universal Good is like the Motion of our Blood within our Veins, which we have no manner of Empire or Command over, but our Love to particular Good is like the Motion of

Respiration, partly necessary, and partly free. We cannot live without Breathing at all, and yet we can suspend any one Turn of Respiration in particular, but yet not without a Natural Inclination to the contrary. And so in like manner we can't live without loving some particular Good or other, but when we point to this or that particular Good, there is not one but what we may nill and refuse *Absolutely and Simply*, tho' yet in some Respect we must love it too, with a *Natural Love*.

9. Thus far I have consider'd the general Nature of this First great Branch of Love, Love of Concupiscence or Desire. I come now to the *Kinds* of it. For the right Distribution of which I consider first that any Motion of the Soul is specify'd from the *Quality* of the *Object* or *Term* to which it tends. Now the Object of Desire being Good, it follows that the *Kinds* of *Desire* must receive their Distinction from the *Kinds* of *Good*. Now Good is *Relative*, and the Relation that it implies is a Relation of *Convenience*, either to the Soul or Body, that is, either to the Soul directly and immediately, or indirectly and by the Mediation of Bodily Sensations. So that all Good is either *intellectual* or *sensual*, and consequently the same Members of Division will be the adequate Distribution of

Desires

Desire. That is an intellectual Desire whose *Object* is an intellectual Good, and a sensual Desire is that whose *Object* is a sensual Good.

10. But I further observe, that this same Denomination of Intellectual and Sensitive may be taken from the *Nature* of the *Part moved* as well as from the *Quality* of the *Object*. The *Appetitive Faculty* in Man is double as well as the *Cognoscitive*, and consists of a Superiour and Inferiour, of a Rational and sensitive Part. For as in the *Cognoscitive* Part there is *Pure Intellect* whereby Ideas are apprehended without any Corporeal Image, and *Imagination*, whereby Objects are presented to our Minds under some corporeal Affection; so also in the *Appetitive* there is a pure and mere Act of Tendency or Propension to the agreeable Object, which answers to Pure Intellect, and is what we call *Will* or *Volition*, and there is also such a Propension of the Soul as is accompany'd with a Commotion of the Blood and Spirits, and this answers to Imagination, and is the same with what we usually term the *Passion* of *Love*. And 'tis in the divided Tendency or Discord of these Two wherein Consists that *Lucta* or Contention between the *Flesh* and *Spirit*. That which our Blessed Lord intimated when he said,

The Spirit truly is willing, but the Flesh is weak, and which St. *Paul* calls the *Law of the Mind and the Law of the Members.* I say in the *divided* Tendency of these Two. Because sometimes the intellectual and Sensitive Appetite may both point one way, and conspire in the same Object, as it does either in Men very wicked, who sin with *Unity* and *Intireness* of *Consent* without any Check or Remorse from the Superiour Part, or in Men Eminently good, who have reduced even their very *bodily* Inclinations to the *order of the Spirit*, and have attain'd to the highest Degree of *Mortification* and *Simplification* of Desire. Rom. 7.

II. And it may yet be observ'd further, that so far as this Denomination of Intellectual and Sensitive is taken both from the Quality of the Object, and from the Part moved, our Desire may be at the same time both Intellectual and Sensitive. For that Desire which is *Intellectual* in respect of the *Part* may be also *sensitive* in respect of the *Object*. (For we may *Will* a sensual Good as well as *Passionately* Desire it.) And so on the other side, that Desire which is *sensitive* in respect of the *Part* may be *Intellectual* in respect of the *Object*. For there may be a *Sensitive* Appetite of an *Intellectual* Good, and

and we may love even God himself *Passionately* as well as *Rationally*.

12. Thus, is Love of Desire divided in general into *Intellectual* and *Sensual*. But as for the particular Kinds under these they are almost infinite, and therefore I shall not offer at a distinct Recital of them. I shall only remark some few things concerning *Intellectual Love*, and by the way shall also briefly touch upon the *principal* and most eminent *Species* of *Sensual Love*, and so end this Section.

13. And first, concerning Intellectual Love, I consider that the general Object of it is τὸ καλὸν, or Beauty. For Intellectual Love is that whose Object is an Intellectual Good, and an Intellectual Good is that which pleases the Intellect, and the Intellect is pleas'd with nothing but as 'tis *Proportionable*, *Harmonious*, and some way or other *Beautiful*. Whence it follows that Intellectual Love has Beauty in general for its proper Object.

14. But then this Beauty which is the proper Object of Intellectual Love, is either the *First and Original Beauty*, or *Created and Derivative Beauty*; if the First and Original Beauty, then the Love of it is *Divine Love*, and if this be in a very high Degree,

Degree, such as is the Product of an intense Contemplation, then 'tis what we call *Seraphick Love*, which is the greatest Exaltation and Perfection of *Intellectual Love*, and withal the *greatest Happiness* the Soul of Man is capable of in this State, as I have shewn at large in another Treatise.

See Idea of Happiness.

15. But if it be *Created* and *Derivative* Beauty, then I consider that either we *Ascend* by and from the Love of it to the Love of the First and Originary Beauty, or else we *stick there*, or we *Descend* to the Desire of Corporal Contact, and the Deliget arising from it. If we take Occasion to ascend, then 'tis what we call *Platonick Love*, which (as I have elsewhere more at large explain'd the Notion) is the Ascent of the Soul to the Love of the Divine Beauty from the Aspect of Beauty in Bodies. But if we terminate and stick in this sensible Form of Pulchritude, tho' this Affection be not so noble and generous as that which ascends higher, yet still this is *pure Intellectual Love*, so long as 'tis free from all Desire of Corporal Application, and for distinction's sake may be call'd the Love of *Abstracted Beauty*.

16. And let not any one think it strange that I make this *Abstract Love* of sensitive Beauty

Beauty an *Intellectual Love.* For Beauty, let the Subject of its Inherence be what it will, conſiſts in *Harmony* and *Proportion*, which is the immediate Good of the Soul, that only being capable both of Underſtanding it, and of being *primarily* affected with it. And though we give it the name of *Senſible Beauty*, yet that is only becauſe the Senſes are the Inſtruments of *Conveyance*, not as being the Part *primely affected*, and to diſtinguiſh it from thoſe Beauties which are *immediately* Intelligible, ſuch as the Beauty of *Truth*, the Beauty of *Vertue*, and the like: But in reference to the Part directly and immediately affected, all Beauty, even Senſible Beauty is an Intellectual Good, and is one of the fainter Rays of the Divine Glory, one of the remoter Mirours that reflect the Supreme and Original Beauty.

17. The Sublime Platoniſt *Marſilius Ficinus* has a fine Notion to this purpoſe. He takes the Firſt Beauty to be nothing elſe but the Splendour of God's Glory, and of this he ſays there is a threefold Reflection. For he ſuppoſes Angelical Minds, Rational Souls, and Beautiful Bodies as Three Glaſſes of different Colours, which reflect this one and the

Lib. de Lumine Tom. 1. Cap. 14. p. 1006.

the ſame Light after different Manners. His Words are, *Ipſa certe Pulchritudo Prima nihil aliud eſt quam Splendor Gloriæ penes Patrem luminum, & Figura Subſtantiæ ejus. Unde triplex emicat Pulchritudo. Prima quidem per Angelicos Intellectus: Secunda vero per Intellectuales Animas: Tertia per Corpora ubique formoſa, quaſi lumen unum per Tria quædam Vitra Coloribus inter ſe varia, ideoque varium ex Primo Splendorem ſubinde reddentia. The Firſt Beauty certainly is nothing elſe but the Splendour of Glory with the Father of Lights, and the Figure of his Subſtance. Whence there ſhines forth a threefold Beauty. The Firſt through the Angelical Minds: The Second through Intelligent Souls: The Third through Beautiful Bodies, which reflect the ſame Light as it were through Three Glaſſes of different Colours, and accordingly they ſucceſſively reflect a different Splendour from the Firſt.* So that ſenſible and corporeal Beauty is one of the Glaſſes that reflect and repreſent the Firſt Beauty; and though it muſt be confeſs'd that we ſee through *this Glaſs darkly*, yet ſtill it repreſents according to its Proportion, and is only as a Picture remotely drawn after ſeveral Copies, a weaker and *further projected* Ray of God. And therefore it muſt needs be an Intellectual Good, and conſequently the Love of it, if abſtracted from

from Corporal Applications, must also be a pure Intellectual Love.

18. But if we do not stick and terminate here, but are by the Aspect of sensible Beauty precipitated down to the Desire of Corporal Contact, and the Pleasure thence arising, then this is *sensual Love*, that is, a Desire of a sensual Good. I may add of the *greatest* sensual Good, and consequently that this is the *most* sensual Love. And 'tis so common with Men thus to *descend*, rather than love *Platonically* or *Abstractedly*, that the Name of Love is almost wholly appropriated to *this* Affection, and *to be in love* signifies as much as to be inclined to *Corporal Contact* by the Occasion of Corporal Beauty. As if there were no other Good but *this* Kind of *sensual* Good, and no other Love but *this sensual Love*. And accordingly, *Plato* in his *Symposion*, distinguishing between his *Two Cupids*, Intellectual and Sensual Love, stiles the *Latter* by the Name of Ἔρως ὁ πάνδημος, the *Vulgar or Epidemical Love*.

19. Indeed this is a very strange Affection, and has so universally prevail'd as to turn all other Love almost out of the World. This is a Passion that has made more Slaves than the greatest Conquerours, more Stir and Disturbance in the World

than either *Ambition*, *Pride* or *Covetousness*, and has caused more Sin and Folly than the united force of all the Powers of Darkness. It has wounded almost as many as *Death*, and devour'd like a *Contagion* or the *Grave*. It makes no Distinction, the Wise Man is as little secure from it as the Fool, Age submits to it as well as Youth, the Strong as well as the Weak, the Hero as well as the Coward. In fine, this one Passion sets on fire the whole Course of Nature, rages and spreads with an unlimited Contagion, and is an Image of the *universal Conflagration*.

20. And that which increases the Wonder is the Vileness of that Structure which is made the Object of this Sensual Love. 'Tis not indeed much to be wonder'd that we should love Corporeal Pleasure, all Pleasure being in its Proportion lovely; but that the imbracing such poor Materials should afford any, *that's* the Wonder. Sould one Angel fall in love with the pure and refin'd Vehicle of another, tho' Matter even in its *highest* Exaltation is but a poor sort of Being, there would however be something of Proportion in this: But to see a Man idolize and dote upon a Mass of *Flesh* and *Blood*, that which the Phil. 3. Apostle calls *our Vile Body*: Or as 'tis

'tis in the Original more Emphatically, σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως ἡμῶν, *the Body of our Humiliation*, that is at preſent the *Reverſion* of Worms, and may the very next Minute be a *Carcaſe*, this is indeed ſo ſtrange to one that thoughtfully conſiders it, that one would think all Mankind were intoxicated with ſome general *Philtrum* or Love-Potion, that has thus charm'd them into this moſt ſtupid and wretched Degree of *Idolatry*. So that whether we conſider the *Greatneſs* of the *Effects*, or the *Slenderneſs* of the *Cauſe*, this Kind of ſenſual Love is of all the moſt wonderful and unaccountable.

21. One thing more I have to obſerve concerning this Kind of ſenſual Love, the Deſire of Corporal Contact occaſion'd by the Aſpect of ſenſible Beauty, and that is, that this is a Paſſion peculiar to *Man*. *Brutes* are *below* it, and *Angels* are *above* it. For Man being a middle ſort of Creature between an Angel and a Beaſt, 'tis requiſite he ſhould have ſomething to diſtinguiſh him from each, and that in his *Appetitive* as well as in his *Intellective* Part. And thus it is, in his *Intellective* Part he has *Reaſon* and *Diſcourſe*, which is above *ſenſible Knowledge*, and ſhort of *Intuition*. And ſo likewiſe in his *Appetitive* there is this Deſire of Corporal Contact ariſing from the Sight of

Beauty, which is a *mixt* Love, partly intellectual and partly ſenſual, and is thereby diſtinguiſh'd from the Love of *Brutes*, which is purely ſenſual (for they are not affected with *Beauty*) and the Love of *Angels*, which is purely intellectual. So great Harmony and Proportion is there in the Works of him who made all things in *Number*, *Weight*, and *Meaſure*.

SECT.

SECT. V.

Of the Second Great Branch of Love, viz. *Love of Benevolence; its Diviſion into Self-Love and Charity, where alſo 'tis enquired whether all Love be Self-Love.*

1. HAving diſpatch'd the Firſt great Branch of Love, Love of Concupiſcence or Deſire, with the ſeveral Kinds of it, I come now to conſider the Second, *viz.* Love of Benevolence. By this I underſtand a deſiring or willing of Good to ſome Perſon or Being that is capable of it. And herein 'tis differenc'd from Love of Concupiſcence. The Idea of Love of Concupiſcence is, *A ſimple Tendency of the Soul to Good,* not at all conſidering whether it wills it to any Perſon or Being or no. But the Idea of Benevolence is *a deſiring or willing this Good to ſome Being or other.* As far as 'tis a *Deſiring* or willing of Good, it agrees with Love of Concupiſcence, but is diſtinguiſh'd from it in that it *wiſhes well to.*

2. For as in Physical Motion a Body may be consider'd either as simply moving towards another, or as moving this other to some certain Body, so in Love which is a *Moral Motion*, the Soul may be consider'd either as simply desiring or willing Good (which is *Concupiscence*) or as desiring or willing it to some capable Being, and this is that Species of Love which we call *Benevolence*.

3. And I further Meditate, that as in Motion the Body that moves another may either move it towards it self as in *Circular* Motion, or towards some other Body as in *Direct* Motion. So in the Love of Benevolence, this wishing well to, may either be a willing of Good to *ones self*, or to some *other Being*. If to ones self, then 'tis that special sort of Benevolence which we call *Self-Love*. If to another, then 'tis what we call *Charity*.

4. Then again as to Charity, this may be consider'd either as extended to all Men in Common, grounded upon one Common Consideration, *viz.* Similitude of Nature, and a Capacity of being benefitted, which is *Common Charity*: Or as confined to One or Two, and as Mutual, and as Mutually known, and withal as in a Special Degree of Intensness and Application, and then

'tis

'tis *Friendship*, which differs not from Common Charity but as 'tis qualify'd by the preceeding Modifications.

5. But this our Division is in danger of being closed up again by some who contract all these Kinds of Benevolence into one, by telling us that *all Love* is *Self-Love*. Thus the *Epicureans* of old, who by this Plea thought to evade the Necessity of owning a Providence. For when you argue from the Perfections of God that the World is cared for and govern'd by him: No, say they, the quite contrary follows. For all Love is self-Love, and proceeds from *Indigency*. If therefore God be such a *Full* and *Perfect* Being as you suppose, he cannot be concern'd for any thing abroad, as having no Self-Interest to serve.

6. And indeed the *Conclusion* would be right, were the *Principle* so. For if all Benevolence did proceed from Indigence, it would certainly follow that the more perfect and self-sufficient any Being is, the less he must needs regard the Good of others, and consequently a Being that is *absolutely* perfect, must necessarily be *utterly* void of all Benevolence, or Concern for anothers Welfare.

7. But to hear our *Epicurean* maintain this Principle is no Wonder. Even *Plato* himself in some Places seems to look favourably towards it, particularly in his *Lysis*, where purposely treating of Friendship he concludes toward the End of the Dialogue that Friendship arises from Indigence, Necessity and Privation. The same he again insinuates in his *Symposion*, when he makes *Penia*, Indigence or Poverty to be the Mother of Love. But the *Roman Plato*, *Cicero*, in his Book of Friendship, will by no means allow this Notion, but contends that Love proceeds rather from *Nature*, than from Indigence or Imbecility.

8. There is in the other Opinion something of Truth, and something of Errour, or rather 'tis either true or false as 'tis understood. How far true and how far false, I shall determin in the following Conclusions. And first I do acknowledge that all Love of *Concupiscence* does proceed from Indigence, and ends in Self-Love. For all Desire is in order to further Perfection and Improvement, and did we not *want* something *within*, we should not *endeavour* towards any thing *without*. And accordingly God, the Self-Sufficiency of whose Nature excludes all Want of Indigency, is by no means capable of Love of *Concupiscence*.

9.

9. Again I acknowledge that even Love of Benevolence or Charity *may* be, (and such is our present Infirmity) is for the most part occasion'd by Indigence, and when unravel'd to the Bottom concludes in Self-Love. Our Charity not only *begins* at Home, but for the most part *ends* there too. For it must be confess'd that we generally love others with respect to our own Interest, and dispense Kindnesses upon the Consideration of common Infirmity, and that both the *Condition* and the *Relief* may be our own another Day.

10. I do also further acknowledge that things are so happily twisted and complicated together, that a Man cannot benefit another without doing some Kindness to himself, either in the *Consequence* and final Issue of things, or in the *very Act* of Benefaction, it being not only a Pleasure to do good to others, but perhaps one of the greatest Pleasures in the World. And this Pleasure is withal inseparable from Acts of Kindness; so that 'tis as impossible for a Man to bestow a Kindness to his Neighbour without having it some way or other redound to himself; as 'tis for the Sun to shine upon the Earth, without having his Light reflect back again toward his own Orb.

11. All this is true, and thus far I grant that Love proceeds from Indigence, and that all Love is Self-Love. But if the Meaning of the Assertion be that all Love of Benevolence does so *necessarily* depend upon Indigence and so necessarily point to self-Interest, that were not a Man indigent himself, and had an eye to his own Advantage, he could not possibly wish well or do well to another, in this Sense I deny that all Love is Self-Love: And I think not without just Reason. For first, there is nothing in the *Nature of the thing* to hinder but that there may be a *pure* and *disinteressed* Benevolence. For I consider, that the Good of another consider'd as *anothers* may be the Object of Volition as well as ones own. For the Object of Volition is good in common, or that which is agreeable to any Intellectual Being, whether one's self or any other. But now Good as anothers, or to another, is Good as well as one's own, and therefore may be the Object of Volition, and consequently we may will Good to another independently on our own Interest.

12. If it be objected that there is no such thing as *Pure Malice*, for when we wish ill to another we consider his evil as making for

for our own Good, and therefore why ſhould there be any ſuch thing as *Pure Benevolence*? I anſwer, the Difference lies in this: That in *Malice* the thing which we wiſh to another is *evil*. Now Evil being not any way deſirable whether to ones ſelf or another, as *evil*, it muſt in order to Eligibility be conſider'd under the Formality of *Good* in ſome reſpect or other. But now it cannot have the Formality of Good with reſpect to our *Neighbour*, for to *him* we wiſh it as *Evil*. It muſt therefore appear good with reference to *our ſelves*. That is, we conſider another's Evil as making for our Good ſome way or other, and ſo will it to him. But now in Charity or Benevolence the thing which we will to another being ſuppoſed to be good already, there is no Neceſſity that in order to the willing of it we ſhould further conſider it under the Formality of being *our own*. The Nature of *Good* in *Common* being ſufficient for that. And this I conceive to be the reaſon that although there cannot be a *Pure* and *Unintereſſed Malice*, yet there may be a *Pure* and *Unintereſſed Charity*.

13. Beſides, this Love of Benevolence is frequently exerciſed without any *Deſign* or Proſpect, nay ſometimes where there is no *poſſibility* of any Self-Advantage. This

This is plain in God; who, as he is the most *self-sufficient* and *unbenefitable*, so is he also the most *Beneficent* and *Communicative* Being. And I question not but that it may be so in Men also. For not to mention our doing Kindnesses to those, whom we are certain never to see again, to dying Persons, who cannot live to requite us, or to the living when we our selves are dying, and cannot live to be requited, and the like; I only consider, that we often rejoyce at the Happiness of those who are born and lived before us, and hear with Pleasure the Successes of good Men, with whom (as being of another Age) our Interest cannot be at all concern'd. Now what we rejoyce at we do implicitly and virtually will, for nothing can be matter of *Joy* which is not according to our *Will*.

14. Lastly, I consider, that if all Benevolence did necessarily spring from Indigence and Self-Love, then it would certainly follow, that our Inclination to do good would be continually abated as our Fortune arises, and we make nigher Advances to Fullness and Self-Sufficiency. But now I dare appeal to Common Observation and Experience, whether there be not many generous Spirits, who retain the same Propension to be beneficial, when

when they are ſet at the greateſt Diſtance from Poverty, as they had before when at the loweſt Ebb, which yet could never be, if Benevolence did neceſſarily depend on Indigence. More I might add, but this I think ſufficient to ſhew that all Love is not, as ſome pretend, reſolvable into Self-Love, or founded upon Indigence; and conſequently, that my Diviſion of Benevolence into *Self-Love* and *Charity* is ſufficiently accurate and contra-diſtinct.

THE



THE

THE SECOND PART OF THE DISCOURSE,

WHICH CONTAINS

The MEASURES whereby our LOVE is to be regulated.

Hitherto ſhalt thou come, but no further; and here ſhall thy proud Waves be ſtayed,
Job 38. 11.

THE

SECOND PART

OF THE

DISCOURSE,

WHICH CONTAINS

The MEASURES whereby our LOVE is to be regulated.

PART. II.

SECT. I.

That Love requires some Measures of Regulation; and why Love as Dirigible is made the Subject of Morality rather than Understanding.

1. HAving finish'd the *Theory of Love*, I come now to consider the *Measures* of its *Regulation*. A great and important Work this; for next to the *regulating* of our Love, I know nothing either more difficult or more useful and necessary, than to prescribe Measures how it *ought* to be regulated. Indeed it is very necessary, to fix the Bounds of regulating our Love; and that both because of the *Difficulty* of loving regularly, and because of the *Moment* and Consequence of it.

2. For the Difficulty, as 'tis impoſſible not to love at all, ſo is it one of the Hardeſt things in the World to love well. *Solus Sapiens ſcit amare*, ſays the Stoick, *The wiſe Man only knows how to love.* And there are very few of theſe wiſe Men in the World, and to love regularly is oftentimes more than the wiſeſt of us all can do. For firſt, the Appetite which we have to Good in general is ſo ſtrong and craving that it hurries us on to all Sorts and Degrees of particular Good, and makes us faſten wherever we can trace the leaſt Print or Footſtep of the univerſal Good. Now this promiſcuous and indefinite Proſecution of particular Goods muſt needs oftentimes engage us in Sin and Irregularity. For though theſe particular Objects of Love *ſeparately* conſidered are good, as being Participations of the univerſal Good, yet conſider'd as they ſtand in *relation*, either to *one another*, or to the *univerſal*, they may become evil, in as much as there may be a *Competition*, and the leſſer may hinder the greater. As for inſtance, The Pleaſure of Senſe (as indeed all Pleaſure) ſingly and ſeparately conſider'd is good, but the Enjoyment of it may in ſome Circumſtances be againſt a greater Good, the Good of Society, and then 'tis evil, as in *Fornication* or *Adultery*. But now we are ſo violently

puſh'd

push'd on to particular Good, by that General Thirst after Good in common, that we don't mind how things are in *Combination*, but only how they are *singly* and *separately* in themselves. For to observe how things are in *Combination* requires *Thought* and *Reflection*, which in this Hurry we are not at leisure to make; but to find how things are *singly* in themselves there needs nothing but *direct Taste* and *natural Sensation*. Whence it comes to pass that we more readily do the one than the other, and so are very apt to transgress Order, and to *love irregularly*.

2. This is one Ground of the Difficulty of loving well, and as I conceive a very considerable one, tho' no one that I know of did ever assign this as the Cause of this Difficulty. But there is also another. For as from the Love of Good in general we are eagerly carried out to particular Goods, so from the Original Pravity and Degeneracy of our Nature, among all these particular Goods, that which we most eagerly propend to, is *sensual Good*. The lower Life is now highly invigorated and awaken'd in us, *the Corruptible Body* (as the wise Man complains) *presses down the Soul*, and the Love, which we have to Good in general, does now by the Corruption of our Nature almost wholly display and exert it-

ſelf in the Proſecution of this one particular Good, the *Good of Senſe.*

4. Now though Good of Senſe be as truly good as Good of the Intellect, as being a Rivulet of the ſame Sea, and a Ray of the ſame Sun: Yet, (as I ſaid before) it may in ſome Circumſtances and Combinations croſs and thwart ſome higher Intereſt, and ſo become evil. And the ſtrong Inclination, which we now have to the Good of Senſe in general, will often betray us into the Love and Enjoyment of it in *thoſe particular* Circumſtances wherein it is evil, and againſt Order. And that oftentimes, even when we conſider it as Evil, that is, when we do not only mind it as it is *ſingly* in it ſelf, but as it is in a *certain Combination.* For this ſenſual Concupiſcence in us may be ſo ſtrong, that though we do actually conſider a ſenſual Pleaſure ſo circumſtantiated as *Evil*, yet we may for that time think it a *leſſer Evil* than to deny our ſelves the Gratification of ſo importunate an Appetite, and ſo chuſe it, and be guilty of an exorbitant and irregular Love.

5. And if we further conſider how we are perpetually ſurrounded with ſenſible Goods, which by Troops thruſt themſelves upon us, while thoſe that are Intellectual

lectual require our *Search* and Inquisition, how early they attack us, and what deep Impressions they make upon our then *tender* Faculties, how much the *Animal* Part is *aforehand* with the *Rational*, that we live the Life of *Plants* and *Beasts* before we live the Life of *Men*, and that not only in the Sense of *Aristotle*, while we are in the Womb, but long after we have beheld the Sun, that the *Seducer*, *Eve*, is form'd while *Adam sleeps*, and that Sensuality comes to be *Adult* and *Mature*, when our Discourses are but *young* and *imperfect*. So that by that time we arrive to some competent Use of our Reason, there has been laid in such a Stock of Animal Impressions, that 'tis more than work enough for our riper Age, even to *unravel* the Prejudices of our Youth, and *unlive* our former Life; I say if we consider this, the Difficulty of *Regular Love* will appear so great, that instead of admiring at the ill Course of the World, one should rather be tempted to wonder that Men love so regularly as they do. So great Reason had the Stoick to say, *The wise Man only knows how to love.*

6. But were it only a Piece of *Difficulty* to steer the Ship right, and were there not also *Danger* of splitting against Rocks, and of other ill Contingencies, the Pilot might yet be secure and unconcern'd, commit

commit *himself* to his *Pillow*, and his *Vessel* to the *Winds*. But 'tis otherwise, there is *Moment* and Consequence in loving regularly as well as *Difficulty*. No less a thing than Happiness depends upon it, private Happiness and publick Happiness, the Happiness of single Persons, and the Happiness of the Community, the Happiness of this World, and the Happiness of the next.

7. For as Motion is in the Natural, so is Love in the Moral World. And as the good state of the Natural World depends upon those *Laws* of *Regular Motion*, which God has establish'd in it, in so much that there would need nothing else to bring all into Confusion and Destruction, but the irregular Motion of those Bodies which it consists of, so does the Welfare and happy state of the Intellectual World depend upon the *Regularity* of *Love*. According as this Motion proceeds, so is the Moral World either an Harmonical Frame, or a disorderly Chaos, and there needs nothing but the Irregularity of Love to undermine the Pillars of Happiness, and to put the *Foundations of the Intellectual World out of Course*. And accordingly we see that God who loves Order, and takes care for the Perfection of *both* Worlds, has prescribed both *Laws of Motion* and *Laws of Love*.

And

And for the ſame Reaſon 'tis a thing of great Importance and Neceſſity to ſtate theſe Laws and Meaſures, the Welfare of the Moral World being as much concern'd in *Love*, as that of the natural is in *Motion*.

8. And this is the reaſon why *Love as Dirigible* is made the Subject of Morality rather than *Underſtanding*. For the Happineſs of Life is not ſo much concern'd in the Acts of our Underſtanding, as in the Acts of our Love; indeed not at all in our Underſtanding any further, than as our Underſtanding affects our Love, and Opinion influences Practice. And then indeed it is, which is the Ground of that Obligation to *Orthodoxy*, which we are under as to thoſe Articles of Faith which are call'd *Fundamental*. Otherwiſe in Matters of pure Speculation the Happineſs of Society is not at all concern'd in what we think; as for inſtance, in that celebrated Mathematical Problem, *Whether the perpetual Approximation of ſome Lines be conſiſtent with the Impoſſibility of their Concourſe*, what does it ſignifie to the good Eſtate of Society which way this be held? 'Tis indifferent therefore which Side we take. But now we can't advance one Step in the Motion of Love, but ſomething or other comes on't in relation to Political Happineſs, as there

there is not the leaſt Motion in Nature but what tends either to *Generation* or *Corruption*. For the Difference is this, the Acts of our Underſtanding are *Immanent*, and ineffective of any Alteration upon things without us, but the Acts of Love are *Tranſient*, and leave external and permanent Effects behind them in the Courſe of things; and for this reaſon Love, as Dirigible, is made the immediate and proper Subject of Moral Conſideration, and Underſtanding is here no otherwiſe concern'd than as it influences and determines our Love. What the Meaſures of regulating our Love are, I come now to define.

SECT.

Sect. II.

The Measures of Love of Concupiscence, all reduced to these Two general Heads, what we must desire, and what we may desire: The Measures of these, both in general and in particular. Whether sensual Pleasure be in its self evil, with an Account of the true Notion of Original Concupiscence and of Mortification.

1. BEING now to define the Measures of Love, I shall first begin with Love of Concupiscence. And here I consider that *Duty* and *Liberty* divide between them the Bounds of Morality, which ought wholly to be taken up in the Consideration of these Two things, what we *must* or *ought* to do, and what we *may* do without being *Peccant*. And accordingly I shall reduce all the Measures of Love of Concupiscence to these Two general Heads, what we *must* desire, and what we *may* desire.

2. Concerning the First, all that we *must* desire, will, I suppose, be comprehended under these Three, God, the Good of the Community, and all those things which have a Natural Connexion with it. God, as the greatest and last End *Absolutely* and *Simply*; the Good of the Community, as the greatest of *Subordinate* Ends; and all those things which have a Natural Connexion with it, as *Means* without which 'tis not to be obtain'd. Wherein is also comprehended the Obligation of not desiring, or avoiding whatever has naturally a contrary or opposite Tendency.

3. The First thing which we must love or desire is *God*. But now God may be loved two Ways, either *confusely* and *implicitly*, or *distinctly* and *explicitly*. The confuse and implicit Love of God is Natural and Necessary, for 'tis the same with the Love of Good in common, or Happiness, to which our Nature is originally and invincibly determin'd; and consequently, cannot be morally obliged. But that which we are here obliged to, is, to love or desire him distinctly and explicitly, that is, to contract and concenter that Natural and Original Love, which we have to Good in general or Hap-

Happineſs, upon God as being the true and only Cauſe of all that Happineſs, to which we ſo blindly and neceſſarily aſpire.

4. The Love of God therefore, to which we are obliged, includes Two things, a *Deſire*, and an *Explicit* Deſire of him. And this indeed is the only Love of him to which we can be Morally obliged. For as to loving him confuſely, that we can't be obliged to, becauſe 'tis *neceſſary* and unavoidable: And as to loving him with Love of Benevolence or wiſhing well to, *that* we cannot be obliged to, becauſe 'tis *unpracticable*: The former we cannot be obliged to, becauſe of the Condition of *our own* Nature; and the latter we cannot be obliged to, becauſe of the Nature of *God*.

5. I know very well that I am ſingular in this Point, and that nothing is more common among thoſe that treat of the Love of God, than to talk of it as of a Love of *Benevolence*, and accordingly they always expreſs our Love to God, and our Love to our Neighbour under the ſame common Appellation of *Charity*, as if they were both one and the ſame Love, whereby we love God, and whereby we love our Neighbour. But there is I re-

member, an old Rule, That *we may talk with the Many, but muſt think with the Few*; and I think 'tis very applicable in this caſe. For, however we may uſe the Word Charity in reſpect of God, to comply with popular Modes of ſpeaking, yet I cannot ſee how in Strictneſs and Propriety of Notion God may be lov'd with Love of *Benevolence*. For certainly, as Indigence in the *Lover* is the Ground of *his* loving with Love of Concupiſcence, ſo Indigence in the Perſon *lov'd* is the Ground of our loving him with Love of Benevolence. But now, what can we wiſh to God that he has not already? *My Good-*

Pſal. 16. *neſs extendeth not to thee, but to the Saints which are in the Earth,* ſays the Pſalmiſt; and to ſpeak truly, we can no more love God with Love of *Benevolence*, than he can love us with Love of *Deſire*. God is as much above *this* our *Love*, as he is above our *Underſtanding*: He can indeed *wiſh well* to *us*, but we can only *deſire him*.

6. And I obſerve that in Scripture our Love of God is ſet forth in ſuch Expreſſions as import not any *Benevolence* to him, but a *Deſire* of him. As when

Pſal. 42. the Pſalmiſt ſays, *like as the Hart deſireth the Water-Brooks, ſo longeth my Soul after thee O God*: And again, *My Soul*

Soul is a Thirst for God, when shall I come to appear before the Presence of God? Psal. 119. And again, *My Soul breaketh out for fervent Desire.* Psal. 73. Again, *Whom have I in Heaven but thee? And there is none upon Earth that I desire in comparison of thee.* And so again in the *Canticles*, which express the very Soul and Spirit of Divine Love, says the inamour'd Spouse, the Church, *Let him kiss me with the Kisses of his Mouth, for thy Love is better than Wine.* 1. 2. 1. 7. Again, *Tell me O thou whom my Soul loveth, where thou feedest.* But most emphatically of all, when She says, *I charge you O Daughters of Jerusalem, if ye find my Beloved, tell him, that I am sick of Love.* 5. 8. Thus again the Angel expresses the Seraphick Temper of *Daniel*, by calling him *A Man of Desires*: Dan. 10. For so the Hebrew Criticks chuse to read it. I shall mention but one Place more, and that is in the 2d of *Timothy*, where the Apostle describing a sort of wicked Men, says of them, that they are φιλήδονοι μᾶλλον ἢ φιλόθεοι, *Lovers of Pleasure more than Lovers of God.* Which plainly intimates that our Love of *God* is of the same sort with that Love wherewith we love *Pleasure*: But now we don't love Pleasure with Love of *Benevolence*, but only with Love of *Desire*;

and consequently *that* is the Love wherewith we love God.

7. If it be here objected, that though there be no room for wishing well to God *Formally* and *Directly*; yet we may rejoyce and take a *Complacency* in those Perfections of his, which make him uncapable of our more express Benevolence, which will amount (as was urged before) to an *implicit* and *virtual* willing them to him; I answer, that what we rejoyce at we do implicitly will, if it be in a Being, who either might not have had that Happiness, or holds it precariously and may hereafter be deprived of it: For here is still some *Indigence* in the Person to make him capable of our good Wishes: But now the *Happiness* of God is as necessary as his *Existence*; and consequently, however we may rejoyce in his being happy, we can no more will him to be *happy*, than we can will him to *exist*. For, to will him to be happy necessarily supposes, that he has not the perfect Possession of that Happiness which we will him; for if he has, why do we yet will it to him? Here therefore is no room for Benevolence. Nay, I do not conceive how we can wish well to God so much as *ex Hypothesi*, on supposition that he were not happy in that respect wherein we would

would wish well to him. For the Supposition is impossible, and takes away the very *Subject* of our Benevolence. For if God were not compleatly happy, he would not be what he is, but some other Being.

8. I would by no means streighten or retrench our Love to God, but am rather for inlarging and multiplying its Chanels as much as may be; and therefore if any think that God may be lov'd with Love of Benevolence, let them *enjoy*, and (if they can) *act* according to their Notion. For my part, I cannot bring my self to any clear Conception of it, and I am very scrupulous in venturing upon any thing whereof I have no distinct Idea. Which ought to be Apology sufficient for me, if I make *Love of Desire* to be the only Love, wherewith we are obliged to love God.

9. And that we are obliged thus to love him, I shall briefly make out from the Consideration of *our own* Nature, and from the Nature of *God*. As to our own Nature, I consider that our Thirst after Good or Happiness in general is so natural, so necessary, and so vehement, that as at present we can neither *suspend*, nor *moderate*, nor in the least *interrupt* it, so we

can never expect fully to *quench* or extinguish it, but in the Enjoyment of that Object, which has all that Happiness in it, on which the whole Bent of our Soul is so strongly set.

10. From the Strength and invincible Necessity of this our Inclination to Good in general, I conceive 'twill follow that 'tis highly reasonable, that that Being, wherein is all this Happiness, to which we *indefinitely* are inclined, ought to be lov'd and desired *expressly* by us; and not only so, but with the very same Love wherewith we love Happiness it self. For otherwise we should contradict our first and grand Appetite, and act against the very Frame and Constitution of our Nature.

11. This admitted, I consider secondly, that God is that full and rich Being, that has all this Happiness in him. He is not only the *Cause* of all Good, but the very *Essence* and *Nature* of it. He is (as the Divine Philosopher stiles him) Αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, καὶ τὸ ἐρασὸν, καὶ ἐρετὸν. *Good it self, Lovely it self, and Desirable it self.* He is indeed the *First Desirable* as well as the *First Intelligible*, and as we *see* and *understand* all things in him, so in him we *desire* all that we desire. In short, he is the Complement and Perfecti-

on

on of Good, the End and the Centre of the whole Intelligent Creation, and all that we can desire or enjoy; and consequently, as we cannot love *beyond* him, so we ought not to love *short of him*. St. *Austin* has Words to this purpose worth citing. *Summa Bonorum Deus. Neque infra remanendum nobis est, neque ultrà quærendum. Alterum enim periculosum, alterum nullum est.* Lib. De Mor. Eccl. *God is the Sum of all Good. We are neither to fix on this Side of him, nor to seek any thing beyond him, the former is dangerous, and the latter is nothing.*

12. And as we are obliged to love God, so ought we to love him beyond all other things whatsoever. We cannot indeed love him as he is *lovely* at all, nor can we love him to *our* utmost till we shall see him as he is, but we may and must now *prefer* him in our Love. *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy Heart, with all thy Soul, with all thy Mind, and with all thy Strength*; so runs the Commandment. And very just we should: For if even in particular Goods Order requires that the most lovely should be loved most, much more ought we to love him who is the very *Essence* of Good, *Good it self*, beyond all *Derivative* and *Secondary* Good. For there is here no Proportion or Comparison at all.

13. And

13. And for the same cause we can never love God *too much*. As Moderation has here no *Excellence*, so Excess has here no *Place*. An Infinite Desirable can never be too much desired. God is the Measure of all Love, every thing being lovely only so far as it participates of him; and consequently the Measure of loving him is to love him without Measure. The Philosopher says well in his Politicks, *that the Appetite of the End is always without End or Term, and that bounds and stints are only in those things that are in order to the End.* God therefore being our End we can never love him to excess, no nor the Angels in Heaven neither. Indeed the thing is *Absolutely* as well as *Relatively* impossible; for as the *Narrowness* of *our* Nature will hinder us from loving him *enough*, so the infinite *Fulness* of his *own* makes him uncapable of being lov'd *too much*.

Lib. 1. c. 6.

14. And thus much for the Love of God. The next thing that we are to desire is the Good of the Community. This, next to God is the greatest possible Good. For 'tis the Good of the *whole*, than which, nothing can be greater. The Good of the Community is the End, the Measure, the Accomplishment and the final Result of

of all private Goods. Hither they all point, and here they all conſpire and concentre. And conſequently, this is the greateſt Beauty, the greateſt Order, and the greateſt Harmony that can poſſibly reſult from the *Creature*, and is the very next Reſemblance of the Perfection of God, who is *all in all*.

15. This therefore being the greateſt Delectable Good in *it ſelf*, it ought to be ſo alſo to *us*, who are to love and deſire this Good of the Community beyond all private Good whatſoever. Nay, we ought to deſire private Good no further than as 'tis conducive to, or at leaſt conſiſtent with the Publick Intereſt. For I conſider Society as a Muſical Inſtrument, conſiſting of variety of Strings of different Sizes, and ſtrain'd up to different Pitches; ſome of whoſe Sounds, though ungrateful in ſome Junctures, are yet Muſical as they ſtand in relation to others, and in order to a Common Deſign. Now tho' 'tis Natural to deſire the grateful Sound of every String ſingly, were this equally conducing to the Harmony of the whole, yet certainly no body is ſo unreaſonably abſurd, as to deſire that this or that Diſcord ſhould be turned into a Sound ſingly more grateful, to the Prejudice of the general Harmony, which is of infinitely greater Conſequence, than

than the ſingle grateſulneſs of One or Two particular Strings.

16. And this is the caſe of us Men in Society, and this ought to be our Meaſure. We ought to conſider our ſelves as ſo many Strings of one great Inſtrument, any not to affect any *Pitch* or *Degree* more grateful to our ſelves, to the Prejudice of the common Harmony, the Good of the Community, which is the moſt *delectable* Good, and ought by us to be moſt cordially tender'd, and principally regarded. Eſpecially, conſidering that this is the Good which God himſelf chiefly propoſes, and principally regards, both in the *Creation* and *Government* of the Univerſe.

17. And now ſince the Deſire of the End neceſſarily includes the Deſire of the Means, the next Object of our Deſire muſt be all things which have a Natural Connexion with the Good of the Community. And here 'tis ſuppoſed in the firſt place, that there are ſome things that have this Natural Connexion with it. And 'tis neceſſary ſo to ſuppoſe. For as God cannot make a natural World according to any particular Syſtem whatſoever, but there will neceſſarily ariſe upon it ſome certain Relations and Habitudes of Agreement and Diſagreement; ſome Motions will

will naturally make *for* its Order and Perfection, and ſome *againſt* it. So is it impoſſible for God to make an Intellectual World, that is, to conſtitute Society in any particular Condition, Scheme or Poſture; but Relations of agreeable and diſagreeable will naturally and neceſſarily ariſe: Some things will naturally make for its Order and Convenience, and ſome things will be as naturally contrary to it. And this without any arbitrary Interpoſition of God, by the mere natural Reſult and Neceſſity of things. For to recur again to the Inſtance of a Muſical Inſtrument; let an Inſtrument be ſo and ſo made, ſo and ſo ſtrung, and ſo and ſo tuned, and ſome certain Strokes upon it will neceſſarily be harmonical, and other ſome as neceſſarily diſharmonical. But now let the Inſtrument be tuned another way, and the Relations of Convenience and Diſconvenience will alter; the ſame Strokes, that were before diſharmonical, may be now harmonical, and ſo on the contrary. But yet ſtill ſome Strokes will be naturally agreeable and ſome diſagreeable, let the Inſtrument be ſet which way you pleaſe. The Application of this to Society is too obvious to inſiſt upon.

18. To proceed therefore, It being ſuppoſed that there are ſome things, which have

have a natural Connexion with the Good of the Community, the next Obligation of our Love will be, that whatsoever has this natural Connexion, be will'd and desired by us. For as the Good of the Community is the greatest *Delectable* Good, so that which has a natural Connexion with it is the greatest *Profitable* Good, and is therefore to be lov'd with the same Love wherewith we love the Good of the Community it self, wherein is also implied that whatever has an opposite Relation is in the same manner to be hated and abhorred. For, this is the *general Reason* of Moral Good and Evil, of Vertue and Vice, and the *Prime Fundamental* Law of Nature; which never can cease or expire, however the particular Instances may change according to the Variation of the *Intellectual System*; As I have more fully shewn in another Discourse, and shall therefore here no further enlarge upon it.

Consid. upon the Nature of Sin.

19. And now because, with relation to the present Posture of the Intellectual World, there are some particular things, *in Specie*, which have this natural Connexion with the Interest of the Community; such as Justice, Temperance, Fortitude, Patience, Humility, Veracity, Fidelity, and the like: Hence it comes to pass,

pass, that these are to be lov'd and will'd by us, by virtue of that general Canon, That whatever naturally serves to the Good of the Community is to be loved, to which these are reduced as special Instances and exemplifications.

20. But I do not think my self obliged to descend to a *particular* Prosecution of these or any other Vertues, it being not my Design to insist upon *Particulars*, but only to lay down such *general Principles*, upon which a more Particular Scheme of Morality may be erected, or into which those Particular Morals which are already extant may and ought to be resolv'd. And besides, having brought the Reader into the *Road*, I think I may now be excused from attending him any further, and shall therefore advance to some other Theories of more remote and uncommon Observation.

21. Having therefore fix'd the general Bounds of *Duty*, by shewing what we *must* desire, I proceed to consider the Bounds of *Liberty*, by shewing what we *may* desire. Now the Measures of this are either *General* or *Particular*. The general Measures are Two. The First is, that we *may* desire any thing that is not contrary to what we *must* desire. From this arises the Second general

general Measure, which is, that we *may* desire any thing that is not contrary or prejudicial to the *Good of Society*.

22. Now as to the Particular Measures, there is too much Variety in them to be all minutely and punctually consider'd. And besides, it would be a *needless* as well as a *tedious* Undertaking. I shall therefore only touch upon the more considerable Instances, and such as have not been made the Subject of ordinary Speculation. And the first Instance of our Liberty which I shall consider, is, that we *may* desire *Pleasure*. First, because the Desire of it is *Necessary* and *invincible*, implanted in us by the Author of our Nature, and which we can no more devest our selves of, than we can of any the most essential Part of our constitution. Secondly, because Pleasure as such in the common Nature of it is singly and simply good, and in no respect or combination evil. It is singly and simply good, because convenient and agreeable, and in no respect or combination evil, because *as such*, not against the Good of the Community.

23. For if Pleasure, *as such*, were against the Good of the Community, then *every particular* Pleasure would be so, because every particular Pleasure partakes of the common

common Nature of Pleaſure, which would then be enough to render it evil, the leaſt Defect being a ſufficient Reaſon to make any thing ſo. But now this is ſo far from being true, that not only ſome Pleaſures are laudable and excellent; but on the contrary, no particular Pleaſure is evil ſo far as *Pleaſure*, but only by reaſon of ſome accidental Combinations and Circumſtances, wherein ſome higher Intereſt is oppoſed by it. Now this is ſo far from making againſt Pleaſure, that it makes ſtrongly for it. For if the Enjoyment of particular Pleaſures be then only and in ſuch Inſtances and Circumſtances reſtrain'd, when the Intereſt of ſome greater Happineſs is thereby croſs'd, it follows, that Pleaſure it ſelf is a thing principally regarded and provided for by God; and conſequently that it is good in it ſelf, and therefore *may* be deſired by us.

24. So much as to the Deſire of Pleaſure in general, or as ſuch. Now concerning Particular Pleaſures, I propoſe theſe *Two general Canons*, which I think will hold in all Inſtances whatſoever. Firſt, That that Pleaſure which has no Trouble or Pain annex'd, may, nay indeed, cannot but be embraced: As on the contrary, that Pain which has no Pleaſure annex'd

is to be avoided. The other Canon is, That that Pleasure which either hinders a greater Pleasure, or causes a greater Pain is to be nill'd and avoided: As on the contrary, that Pain which either takes off a greater Pain, or causes a greater Pleasure is to be will'd and embraced. By these Two general Canons we are to regulate our Desire of particular Pleasures.

25. But now of particular Pleasures, some are Intellectual and some are Sensual. As to Intellectual Pleasures there is no question to be made, but that any of them may be desired as to their Kind, only there are some Measures to be observ'd with reference to their Degree, Time, Place, and other Circumstances which are too numerous to define, and withal too obvious to need it; and may therefore be left to the Discretion of common Prudence to determin according to the two preceeding general *Canons*.

26. But now concerning sensual Pleasure, especially that eminent *Species* of it which we call *Venereal*, there is more difficulty. Of this it may be doubted, whether it be in its self Evil or no. Some we know among the Ancients have expressly thought so, and upon this Ground have

have condemn'd the Use of Marriage; as namely, the Sect of the *Essenes* among the Jews, *Tatianus*, *Marcion*, *Manichæus* and others. And though these were censured as *Hereticks*, yet nothing more common even among Orthodox and Approv'd Writers, than to let fall such Expressions, from which the same Conclusion will follow. For, when they tax the Immorality of some particular Instances of sensual Pleasure (suppose Adultery or Fornication) they don't ground their Charge wholly upon those Civil Inconveniencies, which either of them bring upon Society in their respective Circumstances, but resolve part of their Immorality into Sensuality as such, abstracted from those other ill Consequences. They condemn them not only as unjust, as injurious, as inconvenient to the Publick, *&c.* but also as *Sensual*: Now if any particular sensual Pleasure be evil as *sensual*, then it will unavoidably follow that sensual Pleasure *as such*, is evil.

27. And that it is so, a Man might be further induced to think, when he observes that in the Divine Writings (not to say any thing of our Common way of Discourse) such peculiar Epithets of Infamy are given to certain Instances of sensual Pleasure, which can belong to them on no other Score than as *Sensual*. Nay, and

as if here lay the very *Point* of the Immorality, they often receive a Denomination from the Senſual Pleaſure, but never from the Injuſtice, Unfaithfulneſs or the like. Thus is Adultery call'd the Sin of *Uncleanneſs*. And Adulterers are commonly call'd *unclean* Perſons, *Filthy*, *Brutiſh*, &c. In like manner, *David* in his Penitentials for that Sin inſiſts chiefly upon the *ſenſual Part* of it, and accordingly ſpeaks of *waſhing*, *cleanſing*, and *making clean*. From all which, a Man would be tempted to gather that the Moral Illneſs of Adultery were at leaſt *partly* to be reſolv'd into the *Senſuality* of it; and conſequently, that ſenſual Pleaſure is in it ſelf, or as ſuch, evil.

28. And this ſeems yet more probable from the Conſideration of a certain Inſtance of Senſual Pleaſure, wherein there ſeems to be nothing beſides the mere Senſuality. As namely, *voluntary Pollution*. And yet this is univerſally condemn'd as immoral; and conſequently, ſenſual Pleaſure ſeems to be in it ſelf evil.

29. As it does yet further from thoſe ſharp Invectives, which the Moral Writers of all Ages have ever uſed againſt it as a low, baſe, brutiſh and diſhonorable thing, and from that *Shame* which naturally

rally attends it, even in Circumstances professedly lawful, whereby Men seem naturally conscious of some *Moral Incongruity* in the thing purely as such.

30. But now to all this I need oppose but these Two things. First, that if sensual Pleasure were evil in it self, or as such, it would be so in all its Instances. This is an undeniable Consequence. But now, that it is not so in all its Instances, is plain from the Divine Institution of Marriage. And therefore it is not evil in it self. For, it must not be thought (as some seem to fancy) that Marriage makes that good, which was in it self evil. For if once evil in it self, it must eternally and universally be so; and consequently, even in Marriage it self, *that* as to *sensual Pleasure*, being the same with *Fornication* or *Adultery*. But sensual Pleasure is not evil in *Marriage*, therefore not in *it self* or as such. This is *Demonstration*.

31. To this I further add, that even the grossest Pleasure of Sense, is one of the remoter Participations of God. For it must be granted to be at least a *Natural Good*, and every particular Good, be it what it will, is a Ray and Emanation of the universal Good. But now, nothing of

of God can be *simply* and *absolutely* evil. And besides, I consider; that in the Human Frame God has prepared Organs and Instruments for the use of Sensual Pleasure, and that he has also given us natural Appetites and Inclinations to it. Whereby it appears, that God has provided for the gratification of the *Animal* as well as the *Divine* Life. And though this is to be *chiefly nourish'd*, yet the other is not to be *starv'd*. For it is a Tree of God's own planting, and therefore the Fruit of it may be *good* for *Food*, as well as *fair* to the *Eye*. For there can be nothing simply evil in the *Paradise of God*. As 'tis finely made out by the excellent *Doctor More* in several Places of his *Conjectura Cabalistica*, where the Reader may find this Argument copiously and very excellently managed.

32. I conclude therefore, that Sensual Pleasure is not in its own simple Nature evil; and consequently, that no Particular Instance of it is evil barely as being *Sensual* (for if so, then sensual Pleasure as such, would be evil) but only as it stands invested with some Circumstances, which make it inconsistent with some higher Good, the Good of Society. Thus involuntary Pollution there is a *Disordination* from the End of Nature, *Generation*; and herein consists its Evil, not in its being

sensual

ſenſual Pleaſure. And accordingly we find, that thoſe other *Pleaſures* of Senſe, which are not appropriated by Nature to any peculiar End, are in their Uſe wholly indifferent, as uſing rich Perfumes, drinking delicious Wines, *&c.* Thus again in Fornication, though the End of *Generation* may be here ſerv'd, yet the Ends of *Convenient Education* cannot. And herein lies the Evil of this, not in its being an Act of Senſuality or a ſenſual Pleaſure.

33. But becauſe there are ſome that are ready to call in queſtion the *natural Immorality* of ſimple Fornication, and thoſe that do allow it are ſcarce reſolv'd where to fix it, 'twill not be amiſs to proſecute this a little further. The beſt Account that I know of this Matter, is that which is given by *Thomas Aquinas*, and indeed I think it very full, rational and ſatisfactory. And becauſe I cannot do it in better Words, I will give it in his own. *It is to be conſider'd* (ſays he) *that in thoſe Animals in which the Female alone is ſufficient for the bringing up of the Young, the Male and Female after Copulation remain no time together, as in Dogs. But among thoſe Animals in which the Female is not ſufficient for the bringing up of the Young, the Male and Female after Copulation remain together, as long*

Lib. 3. congent. cap. 122.

as

as is necessary for the Education and Instruction of the Young. As it appears in some Birds, whose Young ones can't get their Living presently after they are brought forth. For, since Birds don't nourish their Young with Milk (which Nature has made ready at hand, as in Beasts) but are forc'd to go forrage abroad for Meat, and besides to cherish their Young while they feed them, the Female would not be sufficient alone for all this. And therefore by the Order of Providence, the Male among such Creatures is naturally inclined to abide with the Female for the Education of the Young. Now 'tis plain, that in Human Kind the Woman would by no means suffice alone for the Education of the Child, since the Necessity of Human Life requires many things which cannot be supplied by one only. It is therefore convenient according to Human Nature, that the Man after Conjunction should abide by the Woman, and not presently depart, and take up indifferently with any body, as 'tis among those that fornicate. Neither will the case be alter'd by the Womans being so rich as to be able to nourish her Child by her self. Because the Natural Rectitude of Human Actions, is not to be measured according to those things, which happen by Accident in one Individual, but according to those things, which follow the whole Species. Again, it is to be consider'd, that in Human Kind the Offspring does not only need Nourishment as to the Body, like other Animals, but also Instruction as to the Soul. For other Animals have

have Natural Instincts, by which they may provide for themselves. But now Man lives by reason, and must attain to Discretion by long Experience. Whence it becomes necessary, that Children be instructed by their experienc'd Parents. Nor are they capable of this Instruction assoon as they are born, but after a considerable time, and chiefly when they come to Years of Discretion. For, to this Instruction a great deal of Time is required, and even then too, by reason of the Violence of Passion, by which the Judgment is perverted, they will want not only to be instructed, but to be subdued. Now for this, the Woman alone is not sufficient, but this is rather to be the Work of the Man, whose Reason is better able to instruct, and his Strength to correct. 'Tis necessary therefore in Human Kind to take care of the Off-spring, not for a short time, as in Birds; but for a considerable space of Life. And therefore, whereas 'tis necessary in all Creatures, that the Male abide with the Female as long as the Office of the Male is requisite for the Off-spring, 'tis natural to Mankind, that the Man associate not for a little while, but always with one determinate Woman. And this Society we call Matrimony. Matrimony is therefore natural to Mankind. And Fornicarious Mixture, which is besides Matrimony, is against the Good of Man, and for this reason must of necessity be a Sin.

34. Thus this excellent and most exact *Theorist*, whose Words I should not have transcribed at length, were they not of more than Ordinary Weight and Moment. By this it appears, that Simple Fornication is naturally immoral, and wherein its Immorality lies. Not in its being a Sensual Pleasure, but in its being so circumstantiated as not to comport with the Good of Society. And what I observe here in particular of simple Fornication, the same may be said of any other forbidden Instance of Sensual Pleasure, that they are not evil as sensual, but upon the Consideration of some Accident or Circumstance, whereby they interfere with the Publick Interest.

35. To the Objections therefore on the other side, I answer, first, that it must be own'd, that nothing is more common, even among approv'd Writers, than when they tax the Immorality of some particular Instances of sensual Pleasure, to condemn them under the Formality of their being sensual. But herein is their *Mistake*, and if Men will talk confusedly of things, and assign *false* Causes for *true* ones, who can help it?

36. To

36. To the Second, I answer, that when the Scripture gives such peculiar Epithets of Infamy to some Instances of sensual Pleasure, that can belong to them on no other Score than as sensual, it must be confess'd that the sensual Part is then tax'd. But then this is not, must not be understood as to the *Kind*, but as to the *Degree*. Not the Degree of *Pleasure*, but the Degree of *Affection*, it being a plain Argument, that Men are too much *set* upon Sensual Pleasure, when for the sake of it they will adventure to transgress *Order*, and trespass against the *Good* of *Society*. And this indeed is a *culpable Sensuality*.

37. To the Third, I answer, that in that certain condemn'd Instance of sensual Pleasure wherein there seems to be nothing besides the mere sensual Perception, there is really something besides, tho' not according to a *Physical*, yet according to a *Moral Estimation*. For it is not barely a sensual Pleasure, but a sensual Pleasure *deordinated* from the End of *God* and *Nature*; namely, *Generation*, for which it was design'd. And in this *Deordination*, not in the *Sensuality* consists its natural Evil and moral Turpitude.

38. To the Fourth, I answer, that those severe Declamations which the Moralists of all Ages have made against sensual Pleasure in general, as a low, base, brutish and dishonourable thing, must either be understood *Comparatively*, with respect to the higher Character of Intellectual Pleasures, or they are *ill grounded* and *unreasonable*. And then as to the *Shame*, which naturally attends the acting of this sensual Pleasure in all its Instances, though it may in the first place be question'd whether this Shame be from *Nature* or no, and not rather from *Education* and *Arbitrary Usages*; yet for the present I will suppose it natural, and the Account of it, I conceive must be this, it being a thing of vast Consequence and Moment to the Interest of Sociable Life, that Man should be propagated in a decent and regular way, and not as Brutes are, God thought it convenient for this purpose to imbue our Natures with this Impression of Shame, with respect to venereal Pleasure *in general*. Not because this sensual Delectation is in its own Nature simply evil, but lest our Inclination to sensual Pleasure *in general* should betray us into *those Instances* of it which are so. Which this natural Impression was intended as a Curb to prevent. By all which it plainly appears, notwith-

ſtanding all the Intricacy, wherewith ſome confuſed Thinkers have entangled this Matter, that Senſual, even the groſſeſt ſenſual Pleaſure cannot be in its own nature and as ſuch, evil; and conſequently, that it *may* be deſired by us in ſuch convenient Circumſtances, wherein no higher Good is oppoſed.

39. Now from this Hypotheſis it will follow, Firſt, That *Original Concupiſcence* muſt be far otherwiſe ſtated than uſually it is. It is commonly underſtood to be a vicious Diſpoſition or Depravation of Nature, whereby we become inclined to *evil*. Now if you ask, what evil? They tell you, 'tis Carnal or Senſual Pleaſure. But now (as it has been abundantly demonſtrated) this is not *ſimply* and in its own Nature evil, but only as 'tis *Circumſtantiated*. And this original Concupiſcence is not ſo particular (as being a blind Appetite) as to point to ſenſual Pleaſure in this or that *Circumſtance*, but is carried only to ſenſual Pleaſure in *common*, or *as ſuch*. Which being not evil, neither can the Inclination that reſpects it be evil or ſinful, every Act or Inclination being ſpecified from its *Object*. It muſt not be ſaid therefore, that this Originary Concupiſcence, or natural Impreſſion toward ſenſible Good, is *formally evil* and *ſinful*;

the moſt we can allow, is, that it is an *Occaſion* of evil, the ſtrong Tendency we have to ſenſual Pleaſure in *common*, being very apt to betray us to conſent to the Enjoyment of it in *inconvenient Inſtances* and Circumſtances.

40. Another Conſequent from the Premiſes, is this, That the Duty and Vertue of Mortification does not conſiſt (as 'tis vulgarly apprehended) in removing and killing the natural Deſire of ſenſual Pleaſure. For the natural *Deſire* of ſenſual Pleaſure is not evil, its *Object* not being ſo; and conſequently, not to be eradicated. But that it conſiſts in ſuch a due Repreſſion and Diſcipline of the Body, that our *natural* Deſire of ſenſual Pleaſure in *Common* may not carry us to the *expreſs* willing of it in ſuch *Inſtances* as are againſt *Order*, and the *Good of Society*.

SECT.

SECT. III.

The Measures of Love of Benevolence, particularly of Self-Love.

1. HAving prescribed some general Measures for the Regulation of the First great Branch of Love, Love of *Concupiscence*; I come now to set Bounds to the other *Arm* of the same great *Sea*, Love of *Benevolence*. And because this is first divided into *Self-Love* and *Charity*, or wishing well to *ones self*, and wishing well to some *other* Being, I shall in the first place state the Measures of regulating *Self-Love*.

2. This sort of Love is generally the most irregular of any, and that which causes Irregularity in all the rest. We love our selves *First*, and *Last*, and *most* of all. Here we always *begin*, and here we most commonly *end*; and so immoderate are we in it that we prosecute our own private Interest, not only without any

respect to the Common Good, but oftentimes in direct Opposition to it, and so we can but secure to our selves a *Plank*, care not what becomes of the Vessel we sail in. This is the great *Sucker* of Society, and that which robbs the Body Politick of its due Nourishment, and drains the Common Fountain to feed our own lesser Streams. Nay, so foolishly immoderate and inordinate are we in the Love of our selves, that we prefer our own little Interests, not only before greater of the *Publick*, but before greater of our *own*, and love our Bodies better than our Souls, a lesser Interest that's present, better than a greater that's distant, tho' equally sure, and infinitely greater. In short, 'tis from the Inordinateness of this one Principle, Self-Love, that we ruin the Good of the Community here, and our own selves both here and hereafter. Here there is great need of Regulation.

3. Now I suppose the Measures of Self-Love may all be reduced to this one in general, viz. *That Self-Love is never culpable, when upon the whole matter all things being taken into the Account, we do truly and really love our selves.* It is then only culpable, when we love our selves by *halves*, and in some particular respects only to our greater Disadvantage in others of more Importance. And because this we generally

rally do; hence it comes to pass, that *Self-Love* is commonly taken in a bad Sense, as if 'twere a thing evil and irregular in it self. But that's a Mistake, Self-Love is a Principle and Dictate of Nature, and the Instrument of attaining to that Happiness, which is the End of our Creation, and consequently, can never be faulty; when upon the whole matter, all things consider'd, it is a *true* Love of our selves.

4. Now to make it so, Three things are required. First, That we do not mistake our *true selves* by wishing well to, or consulting the Welfare of our worser Part in prejudice to our better, by feeding the *Brute* and starving the *Man*. This would be to love our selves in a little, and to hate our selves in much, and would therefore upon the whole, better deserve the Name of *Self-Hatred* than *Self-Love*. If therefore we would love our selves truly and regularly, we must learn, in the first place, not to mistake our *true selves*.

5. The next requisite, is, That we do not mistake our *true Interest*, by willing to our selves a lesser Good, when the having it will cost us the Loss of a greater. This is properly that *Foolish Exchange* condemn'd by our Beleſſed Saviour: 'Tis to gain a

World,

World, and loſe a *Soul*: And what Gain's that? This is indeed the Bargain of Fools and Madmen, and yet ſuch Bargains we uſually make, and what adds to the Folly, think that we *love* our *ſelves* all the while. But this is not to love our ſelves *truly*, and therefore not *Regularly*.

6. The Third and Laſt Requiſite for the Regulation of Self-Love, is, That we do not will any Good to our ſelves that is not conſiſtent with the Good of the *Community*. And that not only becauſe the Publick Good is of greater Conſequence than any Private Good can be, but alſo becauſe that which is againſt the Good of the Community, cannot be upon a final Conſideration of things really for the Good of any particular Perſon in it. For the Good of the *whole* is the Good of the *Part*, and the Evil of the whole is the Evil of the Part; and all private Intereſt is ſo twiſted, complicated and imbarqued with the Publick, that there is no prejudicing this without prejudicing that. This indeed may not be the preſent and immediate Effect, but 'twill prove ſo in the Conſequence and final Upſhot. For, Society is like an *Arch* in a Building, where one Stone ſupports another; and in ſupporting others, they ſupport themſelves. And ſo on the contrary, ſhould they undermine one another,

they

they would at length, by consequence, undermine themselves. He therefore that out of love to himself prosecutes any private Interest to the Prejudice of Society, trespasses against his own Good as well as that of the Community; and when all is computed, cannot be said truly and really to love *himself*. The Sum is, to make our Self-Love Regular and according to Order; we must take care not to mistake our *true selves*, nor our *true Interest*, and that we don't prejudice the *Publick* Welfare, and then we can never love our selves too much.

SECT.

SECT. IV.

The Measures of Common Charity.

1. CONcerning *Common Charity*, I consider that the Measures of it may all briefly be absolv'd in these Two, the *Object* of it, and the *Order* of it. As to the *Object* of Charity, 'tis of a very great and diffused Latitude, and takes in first *all Men*, whether good or bad, Friends or Enemies, Neighbours or Strangers, and in all respects, whether as to Soul or Body, Name or Goods, &c. It extends also, in some Measure, to the very *Irrational Creatures*; it being one of the Characters of a good Man in Scripture to be merciful to his Beast. Nay, *Angels*, to the *Angelical Natures* themselves; and indeed to the whole Intellectual, Rational and Sensitive World, that are capable of the least Degree of Benefit.

2. In

2. In all this there is no Difficulty, only it may be here question'd, whether the Devils and Damn'd Spirits are to be comprehended within the Sphere of our Charity; to which I answer, That there are Two things that may render any Being uncapable of being an Object of our Charity or wishing well to. Either *Perfect Fulness*, or *Perfect Indigence*. Now, 'tis the *Perfection* of Indigence to be reduced to such a Degree of Want, as not to be in a *Capacity* of ever being reliev'd. The former is the Condition of *God*, which makes him uncapable of being made the Object of our Benevolence, as was observ'd before; the latter is the Case of *Devils* and *Damn'd Spirits*: And for this reason, we cannot will any Good to them, as not being capable of any. For we cannot exert any Act of Love, which we know to be in vain and to no purpose at all; let the Incapacity proceed either from extream Fulness or extream Indigence: For, what is there that should excite any such Act? And besides, if we could possibly wish well to such Beings, yet I don't see how we may do it *Lawfully* and *Regularly*. For our Will would not be then conformable to God's, but directly opposite to it; and besides, we should disapprove, at least, tacitly and interpretatively, the *Justice* of his

his Ways, by thus loving them whom he *extreamly* hates, and blessing them whom he curses and abandons for ever.

3. Thus far of the *Object* of our Charity. Now concerning the *Order* of it, let these general Measures be observ'd. First, That we wish well to him most, who is most likely to be serviceable to the Publick; supposing the Good which we will him, to be such, that by the having it, he becomes more capable of serving the Publick. Thus, had I the Disposal of an *Ecclesiastical Benefice*, which is a thing, wherein the Good of the Publick is highly concern'd, I ought certainly to bestow it upon him, who I thought would do most good in it. Tho' at the same time I had never so many Friends or Relations that wanted it. For, this is a sure and never failing Rule, That the Good of the Publick is always to be preferr'd before any Private Interest whatever.

4. Secondly, that of Two that are equally serviceable to the Publick, we will this Good, wherein the Publick is concern'd, to him that is most *Indigent*; for, after the Publick Exigence is provided for, private Necessity comes in to be regarded. But if both equally *Serviceable* and equally *Indigent*, then we are to will it to him

him that is moſt our Neighbour, Friend, or Relation, or any other way indear'd to our Affection.

5. But Thirdly, ſuppoſing the Good to be ſuch, that the Intereſt of the Publick is not concern'd who has it, then I am only to conſult the Good of the *Perſon* to whom I will it; and conſequently, here Equity will require, that the Preference be given to thoſe that are near me before Strangers, and among thoſe that are near to thoſe that are neareſt, whether by Nature, Choice, or Place, or in any other Reſpect. And among Strangers, 'tis equitable, that the Indigent be preferr'd in our Charity before the Rich, the Good before the Bad, and the more Good before the leſs Good, and the like. But, ſtill with this neceſſary Reſerve, that all other things be equal between them.

6. For, Fourthly, 'tis utterly unreaſonable, that I ſhould prefer the *Convenience* of my *Friend* before the *Neceſſity* of my *Enemy*. No, I ought to do the contrary, and prefer the *Neceſſity* of my *worſt* Enemy before the *Convenience* even of my *Deareſt* Friend. Thus I would leave my Friend in the Mire, to ſave my Enemy from drowning. For, in this and ſuch like caſes, the greatneſs

neſs of the *Neceſſity*, compenſates for the *Want* of *Merit* in the Perſon.

7. The laſt general Meaſure that I ſhall preſcribe, is, That as we ought not to prefer any Man's Convenience before *another* Man's Neceſſity; ſo neither ought we to prefer any Man's own Convenience before his *own* Neceſſity. My Meaning is, that we ought to conſider our Neighbours true and beſt Intereſt, will and do him that Good which he ſtands moſt in need of, and not do him a little Kindneſs which will end in a greater Miſchief. Hence it follows, That we ought to tender the Intereſt of his Soul, more than the Good of his Body, the *Direction* of his Conſcience, more than the *Eaſe* and *Security* of it; that we ſtick not to *prick* and *launce* him in order to his *Cure*; and (when both can't be done) that we chuſe rather to *profit* him than to *pleaſe* him. For this is *true* Charity, tho' a *ſeverer* ſort of it; and he is a Fool, who, when ſaved from drowning, complains of being pluckt out of the Water by the Hair of his Head.

SECT.

SECT. V.

The Measures of Friendship.

1. I Am now come to my last Stage, where I am to give Measures to the greatest *Rarity*, and the greatest *Excellency* in all the World. *For indeed, among all Human Enjoyments, nothing is so rarely acquired, so dearly possess'd, and so unhappily lost, as a True Friend.*

2. Indeed, true Friendship is so great a Rarity, that I once thought it hardly worth while to prescribe Measures to a thing that so *seldom* happens, and when it does those few excellent Persons, that are fit for so Sacred a Union, can never want to be instructed how to conduct it. But then, considering withal, the great Excellency, and Usefulness of it to Human Life, I could not forgive my self so considerable an Omission, as the passing by the Regulation of so noble a Charity.

3. I call it *Charity*, for 'tis a special Modification of it, and differs no otherwise from common Charity, than as 'tis qua-

lify'd by ſome particular Modifications and Circumſtances, as was above deſcribed. It is a *Sacred Incloſure* of that Benevolence, which we owe to all Mankind in *Common*, and an *Actual* Exerciſe of that kindneſs to a *few*, which we would willingly ſhew to all, were it practicable and conſiſtent with our *Faculties*, *Opportunities* and *Circumſtances*. 'Tis indeed, a Kind of *Revenging* our ſelves upon the *Narrowneſs* of our Faculties, by exemplifying that extraordinary Charity upon One or Two which we both owe, and are alſo *ready* and diſpoſed, but by reaſon of the Scantineſs of our Condition, are not ſufficiently *able* to exerciſe towards all. We are willing that even *this* our Love ſhould be as extenſive and diffuſed as the Light, (as for *Common* Charity, that muſt and ought to be ſo) but then finding that the Rays of it would be too faint and weak, to give any body any conſiderable Warmth, when ſo widely ſpread and diffuſed, we are fain to contract them into a little compaſs to make them burn and heat, and then our *Charity* commences *Friendſhip*.

4. Now, as to the Meaſures of Friendſhip, theſe have been already ſo amply and excellently ſtated by the Seraphick Pen of a great Prelate of our Church, in a juſt Diſcourſe upon this Occaſion, that there needs nothing to be further added;

not

nor ſhould I offer to write an *Iliad* after ſuch an *Homer*, did I not think it more neceſſary to the Intireneſs of this Work in *general*, than to make up any Defect in this *Particular* Part, which that excellent Author has not ſupplied. I ſhall therefore be the more brief and ſparing in this Account.

5. Now I ſuppoſe, all that is neceſſary for the Regulation of Friendſhip, may conveniently be reduced to theſe Three general Conſiderations. Firſt, What Meaſures are to be obſerv'd in the Contracting of Friendſhip. Secondly, What Meaſures are to be obſerv'd in the conducting or maintaining it. Thirdly, What Meaſures are to be obſerv'd in the diſſolving of it.

6. In the contracting of Friendſhip, our firſt Care muſt be to make ſuch a Choice as we ſhall never have cauſe to *repent* of. For, whenever we ceaſe to *love* a Friend, 'tis great odds if we do not *mortally hate* him. For, 'tis hard to maintain a *Mediocrity*; and nothing can reflect more upon our Prudence and Diſcretion, than to *hate* him whom we once thought worthy of our *higheſt* Love.

7. Now, That we may not repent of our Choice, the Meaſures to be obſerv'd are theſe. Firſt, That the Perſon whom we

we mark out for a Friend, be a *good* and *vertuous* Man. For, an ill Man can neither long *love*, nor be long *belov'd*. Not by a *good* Man to be ſure, nor indeed by one as *bad* as *himſelf*. For, this is a true Obſervation, That however Men love Evil in *themſelves*, yet no Man loves it in *another*; and tho' a Man may be a Friend to *Sin*, yet no body loves the *Sinner*. And accordingly, we find that the Friendſhips of wicked Men are the moſt *temporary* and *ſhort-liv'd* things in the World, and indeed are rather to be call'd *Conſpiracies* than *Friendſhips*. And beſides, their Intereſts will draw them ſeveral ways, and ſo diſtract and divide their Union. For Vice is full of *Variety* and *Contradiction*, ſets one and the ſame Man at odds with *himſelf*, much more with *another*. But now, Vertue is a thing of *Oneneſs*, *Simplicity* and *Uniformity*; and indeed, the only ſolid Foundation for Friendſhip.

8. The next Meaſure is, That we chuſe a Perſon of a *ſweet*, *liberal* and *obliging Humour*. For, there are a Thouſand little Endearments and Compliances in the Exerciſe of Friendſhip, that make *good Nature* as neceſſary as *rigid Vertue* and *Honeſty*. Strict Vertue in Friendſhip, is like the exact Rules of *Mathematicks* in Muſical Compoſitions, which indeed are neceſſary

to make the Harmony *true* and *regular*; but then there must be something of *Ayre* and *Delicacy* in it too, to *sweeten* and recommend it, or else 'twill be but flat and heavy.

9. The next Measure to this purpose, is, that we chuse a Person of a Humour and Disposition as nigh our *own* as we can. This will make our friendly Communications both more *pleasant* and more *lasting*. The other Qualities are as the *Materials* in Building; this answers to *Figure* and Shape. And, unless the Materials be of an agreeable and correspondent *Figure*, tho otherwise never so good, the Structure will neither be sightly to the Eye, nor hold long together.

10. One thing more I would have remember'd in the contracting of Friendship, and that is, that we don't make our selves over to too *many*. Marriage, which is the strictest of Friendships, admits but of *one*, and indeed, inferiour Friendship admits not of many more. For besides, that the Tide of Love, by reason of the Contractedness of our Faculties, can't bear very high when divided among several Channels, 'tis great odds, but that among many we shall be deceived in some, and then we must be put upon the Inconvenience of *Repentance* and *Retractation of Choice*;

Choice; which in nothing is so uncomely and inconvenient as in *Friendship*. Be *kind* therefore to *all*, but *intimate* only with *a few*.

11. Now, the Measures of conducting and maintaining Friendship may be such as these. 1. That we look upon our Friend as another self, and treat him accordingly. 2. That we love him fervently, effectually and constantly. 3. That we *use* his Conversation *frequently*, and *always prefer* it. 4. That we trust him with our Secrets and most important Concerns. 5. That we make use of his Help and Service, and be not shy of being obliged to him. 6. That we don't easily entertain any Jealousies or Suspicions of him. 7. That we defend his Reputation when we hear it wrongfully charged. 8. That we wink at those small Faults which he *really* has. 9. That we take the Freedom to *advise*, and if need be, to *reprove* him; and that we be well contented to take the same Usage from him again. 10. That we freely pay him that Respect and just Acknowledgment that's due to his Merits, and that we shew our selves pleased when the same is done by others. 11. That we do not *envy* him when advanced above us, nor *despise* him when fallen beneath us. 12. That we relieve him plentifully and liberally when reduc'd to any Streights or

Exi-

Exigencies. And lastly, That we always prefer the Good of his Soul before any other Interest of his, and make it our strictest Concern to promote his Happy Condition in the other World. This indeed, is the most excellent and necessary Office of Friendship, and all without this is but of little signification.

12. And thus much for the *Conducting* of Friendship. I proceed now to the Measures that are to be observ'd in the *Dissolution* of it. And here Two things come to be consider'd; the *Cause*, and the *Manner* of dissolving it. And first, 'tis supposed that there may be a Cause for the *Dissolution* even of *Friendship*. The wise Man tells us, that for some things every Friend will depart; and Marriage, which is the strictest Friendship, has its *Divorce*. For, it's with the Union of Two Friends, as with the Union of Soul and Body. There are some Degrees of Distemperature, that, although they weaken and disturb the Union, yet however, they are consistent with it; but then there are others again, that quite destroy the *Vital Congruity*, and then follows *Separation*.

13. Now as to the Cause, that may justify a Dissolution of Friendship, it can be no other than something that is directly contrary to the very Design and Essence

Essence of Friendship, such as a notorious Apostacy to Vice and Wickedness, notorious Perfidiousness, deliberate Malice, or the like. To which (were I to speak my own Sense) I would add, a desperate and resolv'd continuance in all this. For, I think, as long as there is any hopes of Amendment, the Man is rather to be *Advised* than *Deserted*.

14. But, if hopeless and irreclaimable, we may and must desert him. But, let it be with all the Tenderness imaginable, with as much Unwillingness and reluctancy as the Soul leaves her *over-distemper'd* Body. And now, our greatest care must be, that our former Dearness turn not to inveterate Hatred. There is great danger of this, but it ought not to be so. For, tho the *Friend* be gone, yet still the *Man* remains, and tho he has forfeited my *Friendship*, yet still I owe him *common Charity*. And 'twere well if we would rise a little higher, and even yet pay him some little Respect, and maintain a small *Under-current* of Affection for him, upon the Stock of our former Dearness and Intimacy. For so the deceased Ghost loves to hover for a while about her old Companion, though by reason of its *utter Disengridge*, it be no longer fit for the mutual Intercourses of *Life* and *Action*.

MO-

MOTIVES
TO THE
Study and Practice
OF
REGULAR LOVE
By way of Consideration.

1. CONsider, O my Soul, that the very *Essence* of the most *Perfect* Being is *Regular Love*. The very same *Apostle* that says, *God is Love*, says also in another place, that *God is Light*, and that in him *there is no Darkness at all*, John 1. 5. God therefore is both *Love* and *Light*; Light invigorated and actuated by Love, and Love directed and regulated by Light: He is indeed a Lucid and bright Act of Love, not Arbitrary Love, but Love

regulated by the exacteſt Rules and Meaſures of *Eſſential* Perfection. For, how Regular a Love muſt that needs be, where the ſame Being is both *Love* and *Light*!

2. Conſider again, my Soul, that the Material World, the Offspring and Emanation of this *Lucid Love*, is altogether conformable to the *Principle* of its Production, a perfect Sample and Pattern of Order and Regularity, of Beauty and Proportion, the very *Reflection* of the firſt Pulchritude, and a moſt exact Copy of the *Divine Geometry*. And if thou could'ſt but ſee a Draught of the *Intellectual* World, how far more Beautiful and delightſom yet would that *Orderly Proſpect* be? And, wilt thou, my Soul, be the only Irregular and diſorderly thing among the Productions of God? Wilt thou diſturb the Harmony of the Creation, and be the only jarring String in ſo compoſed and well-tuned an Inſtrument? As thou wilt certainly be if thou doſt not *Love Regularly*. For,

3. Conſider, My Soul, that 'tis *Regular Love* that makes up the Harmony of the *Intellectual* World, as *Regular Motion* does that of the *Natural*. That, Regularity of the *Underſtanding* is of no other Moment or Excellency, than as it ſerves to the Regu-

Regulating of *Love*. That, herein lies the Formal Difference between good and bad *Men* in *this* World, and between the good and bad *Spirits* in the *other*. Brightneſs of *Underſtanding* is common to both; and for ought we know, in an equal Meaſure; but one of theſe *loves Regularly*, and the other does not, and therefore one we call an *Angel*, and t'other a *Devil*. For, 'tis Regular Love, upon which the Welfare and Civil Happineſs of Society depends. This is, in all reſpects, the ſame to the *Moral* World, as *Motion* is to the *Natural*. And, as this is maintain'd in its Courſe by *Regularity* of Motion, ſo muſt the other be upheld by *Regularity* of *Love*. And therefore further,

4. Conſider, O my Soul, that the God of *Order*, he that is both *Light* and *Love*, has preſcribed Two Sorts of Laws, with reſpect to the Two Worlds, *Laws* of *Motion*, and *Laws* of *Love*. Indeed, the Latter have not their Effect as *Neceſſarily* and determinately as the former; for the Laws of *Motion* God executes by himſelf, but the Laws of *Love* he has committed to the execution of his Creatures, having endow'd them with Choice and Liberty. But, let not this, my Soul, be uſed as an Argument to make thee leſs Studious of loving Regularly, becauſe thou art not

irresistibly determin'd and necessitated to love according to Order, but art left to thy own Choice and Liberty. Neither do thou fancy God less concern'd for the *Laws* of *Love*, than for the *Laws* of *Motion*, because he has not inforced those, with the same *Necessity* as he has these. For,

5. Consider yet further, my Soul, that God has taken as much care for the Regulation of Love as is consistent with the Nature of *Free Agents*. For has he not prescribed Laws of Regular Love? And, has he not furnish'd thee with a Stock of *Natural Light* and Understanding, of Reason and Discourse, to discern the *Antecedent* Equity and Reasonableness of these Laws? And, lest thou should'st be negligent in the Use of this *Discursive Light*; has he not, as a farther Security of thy Regular Love, against the Danger either of *Ignorance* or *Inconsideration*, furnish'd thee with certain *Moral Anticipations* and *Rational Instincts*, which prevent all thy Reasonings and Discoursings about what thou oughtest to love, and point out the great Lines of thy Duty, before thou art able, and when thou dost not attend enough to see into the Natural Grounds of it. And lest all this should prove in-

insufficient or ineffectual, has he not bound thy Duty upon thee by the most weighty *Sanctions*, and most prevailing *Ingagements* of *Rewards* and *Punishments*, of Eternal Happiness, and Eternal Misery? And to make all this efficacious, does he not assist thee by the Graces of his Spirit, in the Regulation of thy Love? And what can God do more with the Safety of his *own Wisdom*, and of *thy Liberty*? And, lest thou should'st fancy that 'tis either *in vain*, or *unnecessary* to apply thy self to the Study of Regular Love,

6. Consider yet further, my Soul, that the great *Mystery of Godliness* is nothing else but a *Mysterious Expedient for the Promotion of Regular Love.* As it proceeded from Love, so does it wholly tend to the Regulation of it. 'Twas to attone for the Irregularities of Love, that the Son of God became a Sacrifice to his Father. To attone for it so far, that all the Lapses and Misapplications of our Love should be forgiven, provided we return to the Regularity of Love for the future. Had he not done *so much*, to return to Regular Love had been *in vain*, and had he done more, it had been *Needless*. But, herein is the *Mystery of Godliness*, that by

the wise Dispensation of God the Matter is so order'd, that Happiness is attainable by the *Order* of *Love*, and not without it. And can there be a stronger Ingagement, O my Soul, to perswade thee to the Study of Regular Love, or to convince thee, that God is not less concern'd for the Harmony of the *Moral*, than of the *Natural* World; for the *Order* of *Love*, than for the *Order* of *Motion*? Be wise then, O my Soul, and consult the *Ends* of *God*, the *Harmony* of the *World*, and thy *own Eternal Happiness*. And, that these thy Considerations may be the more Effectual, apply thy self with all possible Elevation of Spirit to the God of *Light* and *Love*.

THE

The PRAYER.

O GOD *of* Order *and* Beauty, *who ſweetly diſpoſeſt all things, and haſt eſtabliſh'd a Regular Courſe in the viſible World, who haſt* appointed the Moon for certain Seaſons, *and by whoſe Decree the* Sun knoweth his going down, *let the Moral World be as Regular and Harmonious as the Natural, and both conſpire to the Declaration of thy Glory. And to this End, grant that the Motion of our Minds may be as orderly as the Motion of Bodies, and that* we *may move as regularly by* Choice *and* free Election, *as* they *do by* Natural Inſtinct *and* Neceſſity.

O God of Light *and* Love, *warm and invigorate my Light, and direct and regulate may Love. In thy Light let me ſee Light, and in thy Love let me ever love. Lord, I am more apt to err in my Love than in my Underſtanding, and one Errour in Love is of worſe Conſequence than a Thouſand in Judgment: O do thou therefore watch over the Motions of my Love with a peculiar Governance, and grant that I my ſelf may keep this Part with all Diligence, ſeeing hence are the* Iſſues of Life and Death.

O Spirit of Love, who art the very Essence, Fountain and Perfection of Love; be thou also its Object, Rule, *and* Guide. *Grant I may love* thee, *and* what *thou lov'st, and* as *thou lov'st. O Clarify and refine, inlighten and actuate my Love, that it may mount upward to the Center and Element of Love, with a steddy, chast, and unsullied Flame; make it unselfish, universal, liberal, generous and Divine, that loving as I ought, I may contribute to the Order of thy Creation here, and be perfectly happy in loving thee, and in being lov'd by thee eternally hereafter.* Amen.

LETTERS
Philosophical and Moral,
TO
Dr. HENRY MORE,
WITH THE
Doctor's ANSWERS.

Advertisement to the Reader.

THE Publication of this Correspondence was almost extorted from me by the importunity of some Friends, who would not endure to think that any Remains of so great and extraordinary a Person should be lost. And truly when I consider'd, how curious and busie some Men are in recovering a few broken Fragments of some Old dull Author, that had scarce any thing to Recommend him, but only that he *lived a great while ago*, I began to

to think there was some force in the Argument, and that I should be unkind to the *World*, as well as to the *Memory* of my *deceased Friend*, should I detain in Obscurity such Rich Treasures of excellent Theory as are contain'd in these Letters.

To the publishing of which I was yet the less unwilling to Consent, because of that near Relation which some of them have to the Matter of some part of this Book, which may receive some further Light from what is herein contain'd.

But there is more in the business yet. I had formerly in a Discourse, at first Printed by it self, and dedicated to the Doctor, but now inserted in my Collection of Miscellanies lately publish'd, laid down an Hypothesis concerning the *Root of Liberty*, which whether for its novelty and singularity, or because not well understood, underwent a great deal of Censure at its first appearing: And the Excellent Doctor himself was pleased to Animadvert upon it; and I think has urged all that can be said against it. But I think I have sufficiently vindicated the Truth of the Notion, and was therefore willing it should now appear to the World in its full strength and evidence, which could not have been more abundantly confirm'd to me, than in its being able to stand the shock of so severe a Speculatist.

Epistola

EPISTOLA PRIMA

Ad Clarissimum Virum HENRICUM MORE.

VIR EXIMIE,

QUUM Eruditionem tuam & Humanitatem ex scriptorum tuorum genio pari passu ambulare animadvertam, & insuper in ipso Libri tui Vestibulo te Coram profitentem audiam, *te non tibi soli laborare, sed etiam pro omnibus iis qui exquirunt sapientiam*, eousque mihi nativus exolevit pudor, ut ad te (ignotum licet) Oraculi vice de quibusdam Arduis scisitatum mitterem.

Duo igitur sunt (ut apud virum horarum quam parcissimum Compendio agam) quæ animum meum suspensum tenent. In *Enchiridio tuo Metaphysico* demonstrare satagis immobile quoddam extensum à Mobili materia distinctum existere; Quod demonstrationum

ſtrationum tuarum nervis adductus non ſolum Concedere paratus ſum, ſed etiam firmiſſime Credo. Illud tantum me male habet, quod dimenſionem iſtam incorpoream (quam *ſpatii* nomine deſignare ſolemus) in infinitum porrigas, & undequaque immenſam ſtatuas. Hoc equidem ut admittam nondum à facultatibus meis impetrare potui. Quum enim ſpatium illud ſit *Quantitas permanens*, cujus omnes partes, quotquot ſunt vel eſſe poſſunt, *ſimul* exiſtunt, contradictoria mihi videtur affirmare quiſquis illud *infinite* extenſum dixerit. Infinitum enim eſſe & tamen ſecundum omnes partes actu exiſtere repugnant. Nam ſecundum omnes partes actu exiſtere eſt certis limitibus claudi. Eodem modo ac quilibet numerus (quantuſcunque aſſignetur) continetur ſub certa ſpecie numeri, proindeque finitus concludi debet. Fateor aliter ſe rem habere in *quantitate ſucceſſiva*, cujus partes exiſtunt aliæ poſt alias, quæ quoniam poſt quantamcunque appoſitionem incrementi ulterius capax eſt, ſuo modo cenſeri poſſit infinita. Cujus vero partes omnes coexiſtunt (cujuſmodi eſt *ſpatium*) finitum ſit neceſſe videtur, quum partes ejus (prout etiam innuit Terminus ille incluſivus *(Omnes)* ſub certam numeri ſpeciem cadant.

Altera

Altera quam ejusdem *Enchiridii* tui lectio mihi suggerit Difficultas est de *Penetrabilitate Spiritus*. Dicis Spiritus non obstante illorum extensione posse se mutuo penetrare, hoc est, idem ubi occupare. Quod tamen explicas per *sui Contractionem*, & illustras exemplo Ceræ in minus spatium convolutæ. Quod innuere videtur, te per spirituum *Penetrationem* nihil aliud intelligere, quam quod duo spiritus per situs mutationem in pressiorem formam reducti, eundem illum locum occupare possint quem situ non mutato unus illorum forsan impleret. Itane? Sed hæc non est Penetratio illa in scholis adeo decantata, scilicet, *Coexistentia Dimensionum in eodem ubi*, sed solum *juxta positio* in eodem loco communi, quæ non minus corporibus quam spiritibus competit.

Hæc forsan à me non adeo dilucide prolata sunt, verum tu tam meæ quam propriæ mentis facilis esse potes Interpres. Rogo igitur ut in tenebris hisce (modo per alia majoris momenti non stet) facem mihi accendere non graveris. Non *Oppugnatoris* sed *Quæsitoris* personam gero, nec ut te insciliæ arguam hæc scribo, sed ut propriæ ignorantiæ Medelam quæram. Opera tua omnia tribus voluminibus latine edita studiose perlegi, & ob summam illorum eruditionem

eruditionem ut in Bibliotheca nostra stationē donarentur, curavi. Utinam *Metaphysicam* quam exorsus es, pertexeres. Scire vehementer aveo quodnam tibi de ista re sit consilii. Dolendo profecto res esset, si tam admirandum opus mancum semper maneret & imperfectum. Maneat vero necesse est, nisi te Authore ad exitum perducatur. Quis enim *alter* erit *Apelles*, qui dimidiato operi manum ultimam admovere sustineat? Noli igitur Curiosos speculatores spe tanta in æternum frustrari. Quod supereſt, Deum ex animo precor ut te lucidissimum in orbe literato sidus diu ab occasu præservet, & post decursum stadium beatorum choro immiscеat, & ex ipso sapientiæ fonte immensam tuam cognoscendi sitim tandem expleat. Sic exoptat

Devotissimus Tui & tuorum

Scriptorum Cultor

Johannes Norris.

Dabam Oxon. ex
Coll. Om. An.
Jan. 8. 1684.

Dr.

Dr. More's *Answer.*

SIR,

I Have received your very Civil and Elegant Latin Letter, but answer you according to my constant use to our own Country-men, in English. You have therein such significations of your Kindness and Esteem for Me and my Writings, that you have thereby obliged me to a profest readiness to serve you in any thing that lies in my power. And therefore without any further Ceremony I shall endeavour, as touching those two difficulties you propound, to give you the best satisfaction I can. The first difficulty, if I understand you aright, is this: How that *Immobile Extensum* distinct from matter, which in my *Enchiridium Metaphysicum* I demonstrate to Exist, can truly be said to be infinite, whenas it has *all* its parts that are, or can be *coexistent at once.* Because to Exist according to *all* its parts at *once*, is to be *included* within certain limits, as any number how big soever is contained under some certain Species of Number, and therewithal conceived

ceived finite, as the term [*All*] also implies. And therefore *successive Quantity* seems more capable of being infinite than *permanent Quantity*, because there may be still more parts coming on; whenas in Permanent Quantity all the parts are at once, and that term [*All*] includes an actual bounding of the whole. This I conceive is the full scope of the first difficulty propounded.

To which I briefly Answer, First, That that *Immobile Extensum* distinct from matter, being really a substance Incorporeal, I do not conceive that the Term [Parts] in a Physical sense does properly belong thereto, every Incorporeal Substance or Spirit, according to my Notion of things, being *Ens unum per se & non per aliud*, and therefore utterly indiscerpible into Parts, it implying a contradiction, that this of the Substance or Essence should be divided from that, the entire Substance being *Ens unum per se & non per aliud*. But understanding by Parts, only *Notional* or *Logical* Parts, which will consist with this Indiscerpibility, we'll admit the Phrase in this sense for more easy and distinct Discourse sake, and also of *Totum* and *Omne*, and whatever is akin to them. And the same Caution I premise touching the Word [Quantity] that we take it not in that crass Physical

Sense,

Senſe, ſuch as belongs to Matter and Bodies, but meerly in that notional and Logical Senſe, which is ſo general, that it clashes not at all with the *Sacroſanctity*, as I may ſo ſpeak, of incorporeal Subſtances.

And now Secondly, to come nearer to the point, if we mind closely and distinctly what Senſe we have of thoſe terms, *Totum* and *Omne*, we ſhall certainly diſcern, that they may ſingnify either the *Entireneſs-Indefectuouſneſs* or *Perfection* of the thing they are pronounced of, or meerly that there is nothing left out of that Subject they are ſpoken of, or elſe they imply alſo a *Comprehenſibleneſs*, *Limitableneſs*, or *Exhauſtibleneſs* of the Number of thoſe Parts which are ſaid *all* to be there. In this Senſe is *Totum* plainly uſed in *ſumma totalis*, at the *Foot of a Reckoning*. But, for thoſe that hold Infinity of Worlds at once, and infinite Matter, when they will eaſily acknowledge, That *omnes Partes Materiæ ſunt diviſibiles*, underſtanding by *Materia*, a Congeries of Atoms: *Omnes Mundi generabiles, & corruptibiles*, and *Tota Materia Mundana impenetrabilis*, without the leaſt Suſpicion that they thereby imply, that there is only a finite Number of Worlds, or Parts of Matter; or that all the Matter of the Univerſe taken together, is but finite; it is plain, that, to them the former Senſe is

as eaſie and natural of *Totum* and *Omne* as the latter: And indeed, to ſpeak my own Mind, I think it is the moſt natural and proper of all, and the only true Logical Senſe of *Omne* and *Totum*; which ſuſpends its ſelf from making the Subject, of which it is pronounced, either finite or infinite, but declares only whatever it be, that there is no Part left out of that Subject it pronounces of. So that if *Totum*, or *Omne*, or *Omnes Partes*, be pronounced of a Subject infinite, it leaves nothing of that infinite Subject out, nor omits any Parts, and conſequentially implies the perfect Infinity thereof. So far is it from curbing or terminating it, it reaching as far as that abſolute Infinity it is pronounced of. So that it is the Subject of which *Omne & Totum* are pronounced, when it is finite that makes them have a finite Signification, and not the intrinſick Senſe of thoſe Terms themſelves. Whence, I think we may diſcern, that there is no Repugnancy to aſſert, that all the Parts of that *Immobile Extenſum*, diſtinct from Matter do exiſt together at once, though it be infinite, and that [*All*] in this *Enunciation* does not curb the Immenſity of this *Extenſum*, but rather neceſſarily implies it according to the true Logical Notion thereof, that Term being always commenſurate, when it is truly uſed to the Subject it is ſpoken of.

And

And lastly, it is only *permanent Quantity*, and *Spiritual*, and *indiscerpible*, whose Parts are all at once, that is, capable of *absolute Infinity*. But, as for *successive Quantity*, it is not capable of being infinite, neither *à parte ante*, nor *à parte post*. But, your Fancy seems unawares to have transferred the Property of *successive Quantity* to the Permanent, and so because, so soon as we can say of successive Quantity there is *all of it*, it implies certainly, there is an *end of it*, and so it is finite: So you seem unawares to have imagined, because it is true of the Parts of permanent Quantity, that there is *all of them at once*; therefore they are now *exhausted*, as the Parts of successive Quantity were, and therefore are finite. This, I think, is the Sophism you put upon your self. But, you are the best Judge of your own meaning.

Now, as for the Second Difficulty, it seems such to you, from your missing my Meaning, in my bringing in that Instance of Wax drawn out an Ell long. And after reduced into the Form of a Globe, suppose no bigger than of an ordinary Nutmeg: An heedless or Idiotick Spectator of this Change, may haply imagine the Dimension of Longitude quite lost thereby, whenas there is not one Atom of the Quantity

thereof loſt by this Change of Sight, no more than there is of the *Subſtance* of the Wax. But what ſeems loſt in Longitude, it is compenſated in Latitude and Profundity. So ſay I of the contraction of a created Spirit, ſuppoſe from a Seraphical Form, (for we muſt take ſome Figure or other) of half a Yard Diameter, to a Sphear of a quarter, by the Retraction of it ſelf into ſo much as an *Ubi* (eight times leſs than before) for as much as nothing of its Subſtance is annihilated thereby, nothing of its Dimenſions is, but what ſeems to be loſt in Longitude, Latitude, and Profundity, is gained or compenſated in *Eſſential Spiſſitude*, which is that *Fourth Dimenſion* I ſtand for, that it is in *Rerum Natura*. Which, tho' it is more particularly belonging to the Contraction of one and the ſame Spirit into it ſelf, yet it is alſo truly found, when any Two Subſtances whatever adequately occupy the ſame *Ubi*: As ſuppoſe, a Spirit occupied a *Cube* of Matter of ſuch a *Side* or *Diameter*. The Spirit and the *Cube* have their proper Dimenſions, each of them in the ſame *Ubi*, and therefore are an Inſtance of a real *eſſential Spiſſitude* in that *Ubi*. And if there were another Spirit, in like manner, occupying the ſame *Cube*, there would be ſtill a greater *eſſential Spiſſitude*. And, he that will not grant this *eſſential Spiſſitude*, he muſt either liſt himſelf with

with that ridiculous Sect of the *Nullibiſts*, or that wretched Sect of the *Materialiſts*, or *Atheiſts*, that hold there is nothing but Matter in the Univerſe, which I conceive I have again and again demonſtrated to be falſe in this *Enchiridium* of mine. But I ſuppoſe, out of what has been ſaid, you ſee plainly now, that by the Contraction of a Spirit, I mean that of the ſame Spirit, whereby it may occupy a leſs *Ubi* than before, and not of ſeveral Spirits ſo contracted, that they may take up no more Space than any one of them did before Contraction. And theſe Hints, I doubt not, are ſufficient to one of ſuch quick Parts as yours, to make you throughly and diſtinctly underſtand the meaning of the Seventh Section of the 28th Chapter of my *Enchiridium Metaphyſicum*.

To ſatisfy your Deſire of knowing my Intention touching the finiſhing the ſaid *Enchiridium*, I muſt confeſs to you freely, that I have no purpoſe of ſo doing. I am now of a great Age, above Threeſcore and Ten, and have other Deſigns alſo. And beſides, this Firſt Part, which I have finiſhed, is the moſt uſeful, the moſt aſſured, and yet I add, the moſt difficult of all; and having throughly made out the main Truths of the Exiſtence of Spiritual Subſtance, and what its Nature and Eſſence

is,

is, intelligibly and demomstratively, I make account, the greateſt Buſineſs is done, and I may leave the reſt to others; eſpecially, there being laid in ſo much already in other Treatiſes of mine, as you may obſerve in reading the *Scholia* upon the 21 Sect. of the 28th Chapter of the *Enchiridium*. Where, yet I have left out what is conſiderable, my *Cabbala Philoſophica*, and Expoſition of the *Jewiſh Mercava*, or *Ezechiels Viſion*, the right Underſtanding whereof, contains the choiceſt Secrets of the *Jewiſh Theoſophy* or *Metaphyſicks*.

This is all for the preſent, but the repeating of my Thanks for the great Kindneſs you ſeem to have for

Worthy Sir,

Your affectionate Friend to ſerve you,

Henry More.

C.C.C. Jan. 19. 168⅔.

THE

THE SECOND LETTER TO Dr. MORE.

SIR,

THE Civility and profound Subtilty of your Letter are both so very extraordinary, that I know not which most to admire. Indeed I cannot but look upon it as an infinite Obligation, that a Person of your Age, Worth and Character in the World, should vouchsafe an Answer (and that so Candid a one) to such a green Student as my self; one that just begins to climb that *Tree of Knowledge*, upon whose utmost Bough you sit, and is so far from spreading his Name (like you) far and near, that he has scarce Lustre enough to enlighten the little Orb wherein he moves.

This

This great Condeſcention of yours beſpeaks you to be a Perſon of an excellent Spirit, as well as Underſtanding, and ingages me (if poſſible) to honour and eſteem you more than I did before, and to ſay of you as *Cicero* in his Book *De Legibus* does of *Plato*; *Quem admiror, quem omnibus antepono, quem maxime diligo.*

Sir, I have conſidered and digeſted your Letter, and I find my Satisfaction increaſes with my peruſal of it. Which gives me Incouragement to trouble you with another Inquiry; eſpecially, ſince I find you *willing* as well as *able* to inform, and that you do not ſend away thoſe that enquire of you, as the Sullen Oracle did *Auguſtus*, asking concerning his Succeſſor, with

——Τίνα δὲ σιγῶν τὸν βασιλῆ ἡμετέρων.

The thing then is this: I am not well reſolv'd concerning the Moral Turpitude of Senſuality. Not of ſuch Species of it as are complicated and accompany'd with *Civil Incommodities*, ſuch as *Adultery*, *Fornication*, &c. (concerning which 'tis eaſy to account from thoſe Miſchiefs, which, conſidering the preſent Syſtem of the intellectual World, they neceſſarily bring upon Mankind) but of Senſuality as ſuch. Now, con-

concerning this, I enquire, 1. Whether there be any Moral Turpitude in it or no. And 2ly, ſuppoſing there is, wherein it lies. For my own part, I am ſo divided betwixt Arguments on both ſides, that I know not what to reſolve. For, firſt, That there is ſome Moral, or intrinſick Turpitude, in Senſuality, as ſuch, I am tempted to ſuſpect, from the Authority of many great Moraliſts (eſpecially among the Antients) who, when they lay open the Immorality of Adultery or Fornication, do not fetch their Arguments wholly from thoſe ill Effects, which either of them has upon the welfare of Society, but reſolve *part* of their Immorality into *Senſuality, as ſuch*, abſtracted from thoſe other ill Conſequences. Beſides, I obſerve, that in the Divine Writings (not to ſay any thing of our Ordinary Oral Diſcourſes) ſuch peculiar Epithetes and Adjuncts of Infamy are given to Adultery, which can belong to it on no other Score, than as 'tis an Act of Senſuality. Nay, and as if that were the principal Ingredient, it oftentimes receives a Denomination from the Senſuality, but never from the Injuſtice, Infaithfulneſs, or the like. Thus, it is call'd the *Sin of Uncleanneſs*. And, Adulterers are ſaid to be *unclean* Perſons, *filthy*, *brutiſh*, &c. In the like manner, *David*, in his Penitentials for that Sin, inſiſts much

upon its *Senſuality*, and accordingly, ſpeaks of *waſhing* and *cleanſing*, and *making clean*. All which ſeems to imply, that the Immorality of Adultery is not *wholly* to be deriv'd from thoſe miſchievous Effects it has upon *Society*, but does alſo *partly* (if not *chiefly*) conſiſt in the *mere Senſuality*; and conſequently, that Senſuality, as ſuch, is immoral.

Again, 2ly, (to proceed from *mental* Abſtraction to *real* Separation) there are ſome Acts of Senſuality (ſuch as voluntary Pollutions, &c.) which are really ſeparated from ſuch ill Effects, and yet theſe by the Conſent of all Nations were ever condemn'd as diſhonourable and immoral, and yet there is nothing in them beſides the *Senſuality*, and conſequently, there ſeems to be a Moral Turpitude, even in *Senſuality, as ſuch.*

Again, 3ly, That there is ſome natural Turpitude in Senſuality, as ſuch, I am apt to believe, when I conſider how unanimouſly 'tis vilify'd and decry'd by thoſe, who were mere Strangers to Revelation, and ſo could not derive this Notion from the Prohibition of *ſome certain Species* of it. Sir, I need not tell you, what a continual Topick for Invectives this has been to the *Platoniſts* and *Stoicks*. Now, how theſe Men, who

who follow'd the mere Conduct of Nature, ſhould all conſpire in ſuch abject and diſdainful Thoughts of Senſuality, unleſs it were ſome way or other diſagreeable to the unſophiſticate and *genuin Reliſh* of the Soul, I cannot comprehend.

Again, 4ly and laſtly, That there is ſome natural intrinſick Turpitude in Senſuality, as ſuch, ſeems to receive no ſmall Confirmation from that *natural Shame*, which attends the acting of it, and that, not only in Circumſtances profeſſedly lawful, but alſo in thoſe which are otherwiſe reputed, whereby Men ſeem conſcious to themſelves of ſome Incongruity in the *thing, as ſuch.*

From this, and more that might be alledg'd, it ſeems to me, that there muſt be ſome Moral Turpitude in Senſuality, as ſuch. But now, wherein this Immorality ſhould lye, I am ſtill to ſeek. As alſo, I am how to unwind my ſelf from the Difficulties of the other ſide. For, firſt, I find that the more Modern Maſters of Morality (ſuch as *Grotius*, Dr. *Cumberland*, *Puffendorf* with many others) reſolve the Immorality of Adultery wholly into thoſe pernicious Effects it has upon Society, without bringing in the *Senſuality, as ſuch*,

into any Part of the Account, which they could not do, did they apprehend any moral Turpitude in Senſuality, as ſuch.

Agin, 2ly, That there is no moral Turpitude in Senſuality, as ſuch, ſeems to appear from hence, that if there were, it would be ſo in all its Inſtances; and conſequently, even in *Marriage* it ſelf. But, 'tis ſaid, Τιμᾶ ὁ γάμος. So that hence ariſes a conſiderable Difficulty. For, if there be *no* Moral Turpitude in Senſuality, as ſuch, then all abſtracted Acts of it (as Voluntary Pollutions, &c.) muſt be held *lawful*, which are yet *condemn'd*. And, if there *be*, then Marriage muſt be *condemn'd*, which yet is held *lawful*.

Again, 3ly, I can ſee no reaſon why that Sort of *Corporal Indulgency*, which is emphatically call'd *Senſuality*, ſhould be charged with any moral Turpitude, when as *other Pleaſures* of Senſe (and thoſe perhaps equally intenſe) are not ſo. Such as uſing choice Perfumes, eating delicious Sweetmeats, &c. 'tis plain, theſe all agree in this, that they are Gratifications of Senſe, and therefore why ſhould there be a Moral Turpitude in one and not in another? I am yet to learn.

Again,

Again, 4ly and laſtly, to argue from the ſimple an abſolute Nature of the thing, I cannot imagine how it ſhould be a Moral Incongruity for a Man to *pleaſe* himſelf. What Malice is there in it either againſt God, himſelf, or his Neighbour? For, that there is in ſome particular Inſtance (as in Adultery) or in Degree, as in (Intemperance) is purely accidental, and therefore ought not to be charged upon Senſuality, as ſuch.

Theſe Conſiderations do prevail with me, to think, that there is no Moral Turpitude in Senſuality, as ſuch, that all the Pleaſures of Senſe are in *themſelves* equally indifferent, like the *Trees of Paradiſe*. So that if that, which we here treat of, only be evil, it muſt be (as the forbidden Fruit) becauſe *made ſo* by a *Poſitive* Law (which yet I know not of) as an Inſtance to try our Obedience. But, how to reconcile this, with the former Difficulties, I profeſs I know not. And here, Sir, I deſire your unerring Hand to lead me out of this Labarynth, and that at your own Leiſure, (for I am not in haſt, and would by no means be troubleſome to you) you would be pleaſed to give me a Reſolution

of this whole matter, and that you would not only *satisfy* the *Doubts*, but also *pardon* the *Boldness* of

Most Worthy Sir,

Your most real Friend and

Most Humble Servant,

J. Norris.

All-souls Coll.
Jan. 28. 1684

Dr.

Dr. More's *Answer.*

SIR,

YOU may very well judge me more than ordinarily rude and uncivil, that I have not all this time answered your so friendly and affectionate Letter. But I have such Abundance of Business lying upon my Hands, that I could not find Time till now; and foreseeing, that I shall be suddenly more busy than before, in this strait of Time that I am in, I have chosen, rather than to be still silent, to write, though but *briefly*; and it may be *brokenly* to the Point you propound, viz. concerning the *Moral Turpitude of Sensuality*. You have shewed a great deal of not only Wit and Eloquence, but Solidity of Reason in pleading *pro* and *con* in the Case. But, you had proceeded more clearly, if you had first defined what you meant by *Sensuality*, (which, according to the ordinary Acceptation of the Word, signifies *immorally*, and insinuates an irregular and ungovernable Indulgence of the Pleasure

of the groſſer Senſes) and ſo the Buſineſs had been leſs difficult. But, conſidering the whole matter of your arguing on both ſides, I perceive you mean no more by Senſuality, than the Pleaſure of what *Jul. Scaliger* in his *Exercitations* calleth the *Sixth Senſe*. For, ſo he counts *that Tactus Venereus*, which ſome are ſo taken with. And therefore, if you will, we will ſtate the Queſtion according to his Phraſe, and it ſhall be, whether the Pleaſure of the *Sixth Senſe* have any Moral Turpitude in it? Wherein I will adventure to pronounce, that it has not, as ſuch. But, to be captivated to that Pleaſure, ſo as to make us leſs capable of that, which is better, or to break the Laws of what is juſt and decorous, this is the Turpitude that is contracted therein, and argues him, that is thus captivated, to be brutiſh and ſenſual in the ordinary Senſe of the Word. And therefore it is no wonder ſuch Perſons are ſtiled filthy, brutiſh, and unclean in the holy Scriptures, becauſe the *Goatiſh* Nature has got Dominion over them. You have urged excellently well for the Turpitude of Senſuality, hitherto taken in the uſual Senſe, though preſcinded from the conſequent Inconveniencies thereof. But now, that *Platoniſts* decry without Revelation, the Delight of corporeal Pleaſures, and that there is a *natu-*

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ral Shame of having to do with thoſe Pleaſures of the *Sixth Senſe*, this looks like a ſhrewd Argument for an *innate Turpitude* in thoſe very Pleaſures themſelves, though in lawful Circumſtances: But yet, I conceive this Inſtinct of natural Shame, if rightly interpreted, does not ſo much intimate any *Moral Turpitude*, in having to do with the Pleaſures of the *Sixth Senſe*, as admoniſhes us; that though theſe things rightly circumſtantiated, have no Moral Turpitude in them, yet ſuch is the Nobleneſs of the Soul of Man, that ſuch groſs Enjoyments are exceedingly below her, who is deſigned for an *Angelical Life*, where *they neither marry, nor are given in Marriage*, and therefore, even Nature has taught her to *ſneak*, when, ſhe being Heaven-born, demits her noble ſelf to ſuch *earthly Drudgery*. If this Paſſion of Venereal Shame be rightly interpreted, I ſuppoſe this is all it ſignifies, and not that there is any *intrinſick Immorality* or Turpitude in the Pleaſures of the *Sixth Senſe*.

But for Senſuality, taken in the ordinary Senſe, of which, Adultery is a *Specimen*; moſt certainly there is a Foulneſs and Uncleanneſs in it, diſtinct from what it ſins againſt *Political Society*, which by no means is the *adequate Meaſure* of ſound Morality, but

but there is a *Moral Perfection* of humane Nature, *antecedent* to all Society. I pray read what I have writ on this Argument, in my *Scholia* on the 3 Sect. of the 4 Chapter of the Firſt Book of my *Enchiridium Ethicum*. Which will ſave me the Labour of adding any thing more here. But, when the Matter is *ſimply*, the Perception of the *Sixth Senſe*, there Τιμὸς ὁ χάμος. This rightly phraſing the Point in Queſtion, takes away all the Difficulties, that would infer *no* moral Turpitude, where there *is* ſuch, or *any* moral Turpitude, where there is *none*. To your Third Plea, for no moral Turpitude, I anſwer, that corporeal Pleaſures in eating and drinking, &c. If they be *irregular*, or *exceſſive*, have a moral Turpitude in them. Viz. if they are ſo much as to hinder and leſſen the better Enjoyments of the Soul, and obſtruct the Deſign of living κατὰ τὸ κρέπτον ἐν ἡμῖν, as *Ariſtotle* ſomewhere ſpeaks, and makes our Bodies a leſs commodious Temple for the Spirit of God to dwell in. And to your Fourth and laſt, wherein you ſay you cannot imagine how it ſhould be a moral Incongruity for a Man to *pleaſe* himſelf. *What malice is there in it either againſt God, himſelf, or his Neighbour?* You ſay right, he may mean no ill to *himſelf*, but he may *miſtake* himſelf, and out of Ignorance of the Dignity of his

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own Nature, take that to be *chiefly himself*, which is leaſt of all himſelf, or the meaneſt Part of him, I mean that Part which is common to him with the Brutes, the Pleaſures of which Life the more he endeavours to ſhun, as far as is conſiſtent with the Health of his Body, and diſdains to be captivated with the Gratifications of the Fleſh, the more ſurely will he ariſe into the Enjoyment of ſuch a Life, as is unexpreſſibly above all the Pleaſures this mortal Fleſh can afford. But he that lays his Hand to the Plough, and looks back, is not fit for the Kingdom of God. There muſt be Aſſiduity, Conſtancy, and a perpetual Guard and Watchfulneſs over a Man's Ways, over the Inclinations of his Mind and outward Words and Actions, and devotional Addreſſes to God for further *Illumination* and Strengths, to carry on the Work of *real Regeneration*, and the Iſſue will at laſt be ineffably pleaſing and glorious. And he, that gives himſelf up to ſuch a *Diſpenſation* of Life, will not miſs of meeting with the *Clearneſs* of all *uſeful Truths*. And when his *true ſelf* is *awakened* in him, it will be a *Moral Congruity* to pleaſe himſelf, that is, that intellectual and Godlike Life and Senſe *raiſed* in him. And all the *Trees of Paradiſe*, which God has planted, the *Pleaſures of all the Six Senſes*, he may taſt of,

of, ſo long as he keeps in the Life aforeſaid, and makes that the Meaſure of all his inferiour Enjoyments, that he is not *leſſened above*, by being captivated by any thing *below*. Then the Pleaſure of the Sixth Senſe is not forbid, nor is there any thing forbid in the *Paradiſe of God* but the irregularity of our own Luſt and Will. I hope out of this you will pick out my Meaning, though this Pinch of Time that I am in, has made me but huddle up things together with leſs Order than I uſually endeavour to do. Thus, in ſome Haſte committing you to God's gracious keeping, I take leave and reſt,

Dear Sir,

Your affectionate Friend to ſerve you,

Hen. More.

C.C.C. April. 13. 1685.

The

THE *THIRD LETTER* TO *Dr.* MORE.

SIR,

SUddainly after my receiving your laſt, I withdrew into the Country, whence I am but lately return'd. I had no manner of Conveniency of writing to you there, but now I have, I think my ſelf obliged to uſe it forthwith, leſt you ſhould ſuſpect that I am forgetful of *you*, or of the *Thanks* I owe you for your laſt excellent Letter. It gave me ſuch Satisfaction in ſeveral things, and I read it (as indeed I do every thing of yours) with a *peculiar* Pleaſure. But, ſince I have begun to move a Queſtion, and you have been ſo kind as to communicate to me your Thoughts concerning it, I hope you will not take it amiſs, if, in order to the clear-

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ing up the whole matter, I here re-aſſume it, and deſire from you ſome further Satiſfaction about it.

The Sum of the Determination which you give to the Difficulty I propoſed, is (if I underſtand you right) in ſhort this. You diſtinguiſh of Senſuality as it ſignifies *Concretely* and *Immorally*, either as to *Meaſure* or *other Circumſtance*, or as 'tis *Simply* the *Perception* of the *Pleaſure* of the *Sixth Senſe*. Which laſt (that which I meant in my Inquiry) you acquit from all Moral Turpitude. Now I confeſs I am, and ever was perfectly herein of your Judgment, and that (among other Reaſons) becauſe of the *Divine Inſtitution of Matrimony*. Only, there is one thing that ſtill ſticks with me. I find my ſelf ſtill intangled in one of my Difficulties, which, though in your Anſwer you take no notice of it, appears to my Apprehenſion the moſt conſiderable of all. 'Tis this, that if there be no Moral Turpitude in the ſimple Perception of Venereal Pleaſure, then all *Abſtracted* Acts of it, ſuch as voluntary Pollutions, laſcivious Embraces, *&c.* muſt be accounted lawful, which are yet condemned by all Moral and Divine Writers. The Reaſon of the Conſequence is, becauſe there ſeems to be nothing in ſuch abſtracted *Acts*, beſides the

ſimple

ſimple Perception of the Pleaſure of the Sixth Senſe. For, as for Exceſs, Captivation of Spirit, too ſenſitive Applications, and the like, theſe are merely *accidental*, and equally incident to the ſame Acts in all other Circumſtances.

This is the ſhort of the Difficulty, which I need not purſue in more Words to a Perſon of your exquiſite Conception. Sir, I humbly crave your Senſe in this Point, (the only thing not clear'd in your Anſwer) which if you pleaſe to vouchſafe me, you will no leſs *ingage* the *Affections* than *inform* the *Judgment* of

Moſt worthy Sir,

Your moſt real and highly obliged

Friend and Servant,

J. Norris.

Dr.

Dr. MORE's *Answer.*

SIR,

IT is now above a Month since I received yours. But, Indisposition of Body, and several unexpected Occurrences have hindred me from writing till now. If my Memory fail me not, I intimated to you in my last, that I would read over again that Sermon, which you was pleased to dedicate to me, and signify to you more of my Mind touching it. Wherefore, to be as good as my Word, I will take notice of a Passage or Two, before I answer this Present Letter.

You fall, *Pag.* 10. upon a very *subtile Subject*, viz. What it is, in which our Pretence to free Agency may be safely grounded, whether in the *Will* or *Understanding*. And in order to decide the Point in hand, you do with good Judgment, declare against talking of the Will and Understanding, as Faculties *really distinct* either from *one another*, or the *Soul her self*. But, tho' you begin thus hopefully, yet me-

methinks you run your ſelf into an unneceſſary Nooze of Fatality, by granting the Soul neceſſarily wills as ſhe underſtands; you know that of the Poet,

——Video meliora proboque;
Deteriora ſequor.——

And for my Part, I ſuſpect there are very few Men, if they will ſpeak out, but they have experienced that Truth. Elſe they would be in the ſtate of *Sincerity*, which over-few are.

But now, that you would ſalve the *Phenomenon* of free Agency, *Pag.* 11. by making it depend upon the Degrees of *Advertency* or *Attention* which the Soul uſes, and which to uſe either more or leſs, is fully and immediately in her own Power, this is an Invention ingeniouſly excogitated, to eſcape the Difficulty you have caſt your ſelf into, by admitting the Soul neceſſarily wills as ſhe *underſtands*, and neceſſarily underſtands as the *Object appears* to her. For, thus indeed, we were *frozen up* in a *rigid Fatality* and *Neceſſity*. But this does not caſt the Ground of free Agency upon the Soul as *Intelligent*, more than as *Volent*, if ſo much. For, unleſs ſhe *will* exert her Advertency or Attenti-

on, how can she to any Degree advert or attend to the Object? So that the Ground of free Agency will be still resolved into the Soul, not as *Intelligent*, but as *Volent*, and *willing* to understand the Nature of every Object she is concerned to speculate.

Moreover, though the Soul be willing to exert her Advertency or Attention to the *Object*, this *alone* seems but a defective Principle as to the redeeming us into the Ability and freedom of closing with what is best, as discerning it to be so. For, as the Eye, let it *endeavour* never so much, if it be vitiated in it self, cannot rightly discern the Condition of the visible Object it fixes its Sight upon; so the Mind of Man, let him set himself never so diligently to contemplate any *Moral* or *Intelligible* Object, if she be made dim by Moral Corruptions and Impurities, will not be able or free to close with what is best in the Circumstances that lye before her, being held captive by the Vices the Party has not yet purified himself from. Wherefore, the true Ground of our being able and free to chuse what is best, consists rather in the *Purity* of the Soul from Vice, than in *Advertency* and *Attention* to the Object, while the Mind is

is vitiated and obſcured for want of due *Purification*. Which the beſt *Philoſophers* and *Chriſtians* have always declared to be requiſite to true *Illumination*.

And that notable *Inſtance* of *Martyrdom*, which you bring in to illuſtrate the Caſe, methinks, may be made rather to illuſtrate and confirm what I drive at, *viz.* that there is ſomething of greater Weight than *Advertence* or *Attention*, that will enable a Man to witneſs to the Truth with his Blood. For, notwithſtanding the mere being *notionally convinced*, that Sin, or ſuch a Sin as the denying of Chriſt, is the greateſt Evil in the World, though he never ſo cloſely attend to this Truth in the *Notion* thereof, if the Old Man or Carnal mind be ſtill alive in him, that crafty Serpent will not fail to ſuggeſt ſuch Evaſions or Tergiverſations, as will excuſe him from ſuffering, and that, it may be, though he do firmly believe the Torments of Hell, and Joys of Heaven after this Life. For, the *Mercy of God*, and *future Repentance*, and *Violence* of the *Temptation*, or *Pretence of making amends ſome other Way*, and I know not how many other ſuch ſlim Inſinuations, may befool the unregenerate Man from ever adventuring to ſuffer Martrydom.

But he that is to a due degree Regenerate, and made, as St. *Peter* ſpeaks, *Partaker of the Divine Nature*; The Spirit of Life in the New Birth being *awakened* in him, and the Love of God in him perfected; this *New Nature* in him into which he is Born from above, having rather *quicker Senſations* than the *Animal Nature* it ſelf, this is the thing indeed that will ſecure the Crown of Martyrdom to him, nor will he be liable to be impoſed upon by the Carnal Mind, to liſten to ſuch Evaſions and Tergiverſations as I mentioned before, but had rather dye a Thouſand Natural Deaths, than *wound* and *pain* that *Life* and *Spirit* into which he is regenerate. Wherefore no fear of pain from Man can ſhake him; the Love of the Lord Jeſus and of his Life, into which he is regenerate, being *ſtronger than Death*, and all pains of the *natural life* more tolerable by far to him, than to *wound* and *pain*, and *grive* that *Life* and *Spirit* in him, which is *ſupernatural* and *Divine*.

And this is that which the beloved Apoſtle St. *John* witneſſes, 1 John. 4. 18. That *there is no fear in Love, but perfect love caſteth out fear. Becauſe fear hath torment. He that feareth is not perfected in love.* And towards

towards the beginning of that Chapter he ſays, *Greater is he that is in us, than he that is in the World.* Speaking of the Spirit of *Chriſt*, and the Spirit of the *World*. Theſe things I hint to you, to let you underſtand, that ſometimes more than the *notional attending* to the hainouſneſs of ſin is required to furniſh out a Martyr. And that our being redeemed into an ability or freedom of chuſing what is beſt, is not from *mere attention* to the Object, but from *Purification*, *Illumination*, and *real Regeneration* into the *Divine Image*. But I cannot inſiſt largely on any thing. *Verbum ſapienti ſat eſt.*

I will only take notice of one place more in your ingenious Diſcourſe, and that is, *pag.* 15. where I ſtumbled a little at your ſeeming ſeverity towards the *ſevere Maſters*, as you call them, of *Spiritual Mortification*. I confeſs ſome paſſages in them lye fair for your laſh. But the High and Hyperbolical Expreſſions of Holy and Devout Men are not to be tryed by the rigid Rules of *Logick* and *Philoſophy*, but to be interpreted candidly, according to the Scope they aim at. Which is a *perfect exinanition* of our ſelves, that we may be filled with the *ſenſe* of God, who worketh all in all, and *feelingly* acknowledge what

ever

ever good is in us to be from him, and so be no more *elated* for it, than if we had none of it, nor were conscious to our selves we had any such thing. And to be thus *self-dead* and *self-annihilated*, is the only sure safe passage into *Eternal Life*, *Peace* and *Glory*: And is the most safe and lovely condition of the Soul that possibly can be attained to. All knowledge to this is but vain fluttering, a Feather in a Man's Cap tossed with the Wind. Here is *firm Anchorage*, *Rest*, and *such a Peace* as passes all *understanding*. This is the proper Character of Christ and his followers; *Learn of me, for I am humble and meek, and you shall find rest for your Souls.* And *blessed are the poor in spirit; for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven.* This *Mystical Death or spiritual Annihilation*, whereby all *self-wishing* is destroy'd, is the peculiar transcendency of the Christian State above that of the noblest Heathen Philosophers that ever were. And whoever feels it will find it so. For these are *Divine Sensations*, and lye deeper than *imaginative Reason* and *Notion*. Nor is there any *mistake* in this state devoid of all *self-attribution*. For tho' the Soul attribute not to her self what good she has in possession, yet she denies not but that she has it. Like that profession of St. *Paul*, Gal. 2. 20. *I am crucified with Christ, nevertheless I live,*

yet

yet not I, but Christ liveth in me; namely, by his Spirit. And being this Christian state is the most perfect state the Soul of Man is capable of, we are obliged by way of Duty to endeavour after it as much as we can, according to that of the Stoick, Τὰ βέλτιστον φαινόμενον ποιῶ καὶ ἔστω ἀπαρέγκλητα. But I have dwelt upon this point also longer than I intended. And I know you will pardon my freedom in thus descanting upon these two passages of your Learned and Elegant Discourse. I will pass now to your Letter, and endeavour to finish the point betwixt us there, and make up what you think defective in my other Letter.

We are both agreed in this, that the simple perception of the pleasure of the sixth Sense hath no Moral Turpitude in it. But you say hereupon that there is one difficulty still you are entangled in, which though I took no notice of in my Letter, yet seems to you the greatest and most considerable of all, namely, If there be no Moral Turpitude in the simple perception of Venereal Pleasure, then all abstracted Acts of it, such as voluntary Pollutions, lascivious Embraces, *&c.* must be accounted lawful, which are yet condemned by all Moral and Divine Writers. And the reason of the Consequence, you say is, because

cause there is nothing in such abstracted Acts besides the simple perception of the pleasure of the sixth Sense. For as for Excess, Captivation of Spirit, too sensitive Applications, and the like, these are merely Accidental, and equally incident to the same acts in all other Circumstances. I suppose you mean in the State of Matrimony, where the perception of this pleasure is lawful and allowed.

There was in my former Letter what might answer this difficulty, tho' you took no notice of it. But here I will answer more fully and gradually.

First therefore, though we should admit, that the perception of the pleasure of the *sixth Sense* in such Circumstances as you describe, had nothing in it immoral, yet certainly it were a thing *Dis-angelical*, if I may so speak, and *Undivine*; when as we, being Born to that high Condition of Angels, we ought to breath after that State, and as *Aristotle* somewhere adviseth (against that vulgar Proverb, τὰ ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἀνθρώπους ὄντας) we ought ὡς ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀπαθανατίζειν, to affect the Life of the immortal Angels, who neither marry nor are given in marriage, and therefore to have nothing to do

do with that Pleaſure farther than Neceſſity requires, not for the *mere Pleaſures ſake*, which Nature has ſtigmatized with the Senſe of Shame accompanying it, on purpoſe to remind us of that immortal and Angelical Condition we are called to, where *that* Pleaſure is *perfectly ſilent*; though at the Reſurrection, we then having *Organized* Bodies, it were hard to conceive, that we ſhould be like the *Idols* of the *Heathen*, have Eyes and ſee not, Ears and hear not, Noſes and ſmell not; no, not ſo much as the *fragrant Odors of Paradiſe*, nor taſt of the *Food of Angels*, as the Pſalmiſt ſomewhere expreſſes it. Which *Philoſophical Hypotheſis*, if it be true, there is an obvious Reaſon why the Sixth Senſe has the Stamp of Shame upon it, and the other Five not; and is no contemptible Argument of the immortal State of the Soul, out of this earthly Body: So handſomely are theſe things complicated together.

Secondly, It being apparent to any, that has but the leaſt Sagacity in interpreting Nature, that the Pleaſure of the Sixth Senſe, is in order to that weighty End of Propagation, it is moſt manifeſtly a groſs *Abuſe* of the Pleaſure of the Sixth Senſe, to affect it, and excite it, merely for the Pleaſure's ſake, the End of God and Nature

being fruſtrated at the ſame time, and the *due Uſe* of that Senſation groſly *perverted*. If this be not παρὰ φύσιν, an *unnatural Act*, or the Tranſgreſſion of the Law of Nature, what is? So that it cannot be ſaid that this is *the ſimple Perception* of the Pleaſure of the Sixth Senſe, but is the Perception thereof in *ſuch Circumſtances*, as make it abominable. And here are broken the Laws of what is *fit* and *decorous*, as I intimated to you in my former Letter, and which might have afforded an Anſwer to this Scruple you now again raiſe in this.

But, Thirdly and laſtly, There is an Analogy betwixt the Pleaſure of the *Sixth Senſe*, and the Pleaſure of *Taſt*. The former, as it is in order to the Propagation of the *Species* of living Creatures, ſo the latter is in order to the Suſtentation of the *Individuals*. The Pleaſure of the Taſt is to engage the Animal to eat ſufficiently to nouriſh him and to renew his Strength. Now, ſuppoſe any Man had found ſome Art or Trick, to enjoy the Pleaſure of the Taſt of Meats and Drinks all the day long in a manner, and from Day to Day, though he eat no more for Strength and Suſtenance than others do, were not this Man moſt wretchedly ſenſual and gluttonous? How then can the

the exciting of the Venereal Pleasure by Voluntary Pollutions, *&c.* be thought to be any other than the Foulest Act of Lust that may be, thus to indulge to this Carnal Pleasure meerly for the Pleasures sake, against the Law of God and Nature? Wherefore, you see that the Reason of your Consequence is very infirm, and that there is something in those *Abstract Acts*, as you call them, besides the *simple Perception* of the Pleasure of the *Sixth Sense*. For the very *Abstractiveness* of this Pleasure from the natural End and Use of it, is its *Essential Filth* or *Moral Turpitude*, to be abhorred of all holy Souls, and abominated for the Reasons I have mentioned. Nor is the Pleasure of the Sixth Sense lawfully enjoyed, but in the State of Matrimony. But Excess, Captivation of Spirit, *&c.* are lawful in no State that I know of.

And thus, you have as full a Resolution of this Point as I can give, and if it may have the Success to prove satisfactory to you, I shall think my Pains well bestow'd. But, if upon a deliberate Perusal of what I have writ, and an impartial Improvement thereof to your best Satisfaction you can, there should chance

to remain any further Scruple, I shall, if you write me word of it, readily endeavour to ease you thereof, as it becomes

Dear Sir,

Your faithful and affectionate

Friend to serve you

Henry More.

C.C.C. Jan. 16. 168½.

The

THE FOURTH LETTER TO Dr. MORE.

SIR,

THERE was no need of an Apology, either for the *Lateneſs* of your *Anſwer*, or your *Freedom* in deſcanting upon ſome Paſſages in my *Sermon*. I can very eaſily be contented to ſtay for what, by its Excellency, will reward my *Patience*, and can eaſily *forgive* him that will make me *wiſer*. For, I am concern'd for no Opinion any farther than I think it *true*, and ſo far I am; and therefore, as I profeſs my ſelf heartily obliged to you for your kind and excellent Endeavours to reſcue me from an *Error*, ſo I muſt beg your leave to return ſomething in Defence of my *Hypotheſis*. Which, I queſtion not but you will readily grant,

eſpecially when I aſſure you that I argue only to be better inform'd. And, that your Authority is ſo ſacred with me, that nothing leſs than the Deſire of *Truth* ſhould ingage me to oppoſe it.

Preſuming therefore, upon your Pardon, I ſhall firſt offer ſomething in Confirmation of my Opinion, and then conſider what you alledge to the contrary. And in the firſt place 'tis agreed betwixt us that there muſt be a Τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, *ſome Principle of free Agency in Man.* All that does or can fall under debate, is what is the *primary* and *immediate ſubject* of this free Agency. Now this being a *Rational* perfection, muſt be primarily ſubjected either in the *Underſtanding* or in the *Will*, (or to ſpeak more accurately) either in the Soul as *Intelligent*, or in the Soul as *Volent*. That the latter cannot be the *Root of Liberty* will be ſufficiently clear, if this one Propoſition be fully made out, *viz.* That the Will neceſſarily follows the Dictate of the Underſtanding, or that the Soul neceſſarily Wills as ſhe Underſtands.

Now for the Demoſtration of this, I ſhall deſire but this one *Poſtulatum*, which I think all the Schools of Learning will allow me, *viz.* That the Object of the Soul as *Volent* is *Apparent good*, or that the Soul can-

or

not Will *Evil* as *Evil*. Now Good *Apparent*, or Evil *Apparent*, is the same in other terms with that, which is *apprehended* or *judg'd* to be Good or Evil respectively. (For to appear thus or thus does not *ponere aliquid in re*, but is an *Extrinsical Denomination* of the Object in reference to the *Faculty*.) If therefore Good *Apparent* be the Object of the Will, Good *Apprehended* will be so too, and Consequently the Soul necessarily *Wills* as she *Understands*, otherwise she will chuse Evil *as Evil*, which is against the *supposition*.

This I take to be as clear a *Demonstration* of the Soul's necessarily *Willing as she Understands*, upon the supposition that our *Postulatum* be true, as can be afforded in the *Mathematicks*. But for more Illustration, we will bring it to an example. And for the present let it be that of St. *Peter's* denying of his Master. Here I say that St. *Peter* judged that part *most eligible* which he chose, that is, he judged the sin of denying his Master, at that present juncture, to be a *less evil* than the *danger* of not denying him, and so chose it. Otherwise, if he had then actually thought it a *greater evil*, all *that* whereby it *exceeded* the other, he would have chosen *gratis*, and consequently would have will'd *evil as evil*.

There was therefore undoubtedly an errour in his *understanding*, before there was any in his *will*. And so it is in the case of every sinner, according to those trite Sayings, *Omnis peccans ignorat*, and *Nemo malus gratis*, &c. And therefore 'tis that in Scripture, *Vertue* is expressed by the Names of *Wisdom* and *Understanding*, and *Vice* goes under the Names of *Folly* and *Error*. All, who commit Sin, think it, at the Instant of Commission, all things consider'd, a *lesser Evil*, otherwise 'tis impossible they should commit it. But, *this* (as the Psalmist expresses it) *is their Foolishness*, and in another place, *have they Understanding that work Wickedness?* From all which I conclude, that the Will is necessarily determin'd by the Dictate of the Understanding, or that the Soul necessarily wills as she understands, so that in this Sense also, that of the Stoick is verify'd, Τὸ βέλτιστον φανὲν ἕπεται τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ.

The Soul therefore, *as Volent*, cannot be the *immediate Subject* of *Liberty*. If therefore, there be any such thing as *Free Agency*, the Seat of it must be in the Soul *as Intelligent*. But does not the Soul *necessarily understand* as the Object *appears*, as well as she *necessarily wills* as she *understands*? She does

does ſo, and therefore I do not place the Seat of Liberty in the Soul, *as judging*, or forming a Judgment, for *that* I confeſs to be determin'd by the *Appearance* of things. But, though it be neceſſary that the Soul *judge* as things appear, yet 'tis not neceſſary (except only in *ſelf-evident Propoſitions*) that things ſhould *appear* thus or thus, but *that* will wholly depend upon the Degrees of *Advertency* or *Attention*; *ſuch* a Degree being requiſite to make the Object appear *thus*, and *ſuch* a Degree to appear *otherwiſe*. And this *Advertency* is, that wherein I place the Seat of Free Agency. *Lower* than this, I diſcern not the leaſt Glimps of it, and *higher*, I cannot go. Here therefore, I conceive I have good reaſon to fix, and to affirm that the only Αυτεξούσιον of the Soul conſiſts in her having an *immediate Power* to *Attend* or not *Attend*, or to attend *more* or *leſs*. I ſay, an *immediate* Power; for if you will have an *expreſs* Act of the *Will* interpoſed, that Act of the Will muſt have a *Practical Judgment*, that Judgment an *Objective Appearance*, that Appearance *another Attention*, that Attention *another Will*, and ſo on *ad Infinitum*. I think it therefore reaſonable to ſtop at the Firſt.

I ſhall now apply my ſelf to your *Objections*. And firſt, againſt the Neceſſity of the

the Soul's willing as ſhe underſtands you alledge that of the *Poet*, concerning *Medea*,

——Video meliora proboque,
Deteriora ſequor.——

I anſwer by diſtinguiſhing the *Antecedent*; a thing may be judg'd good, either by a *ſpeculative* or *univerſal* Knowledge, and that I do *not* always follow; or by a *practical* Knowledge, when I look upon it and pronounce it *pro hic & nunc*, as cloath'd with all its Circumſtances, and that I *do* always follow.

But you farther urge, that if ſo, then there would be no ſuch thing as Sin againſt *Knowledge*. Or (which is the ſame otherwiſe worded) that then Men would be in a State of *Sincerity*. To this I anſwer, that a Sinner, according to this *Hypotheſis*, may be ſaid to ſin both *knowingly* and *ignorantly* too in different reſpects. He ſins *knowingly*, in as much as he knows in the *Theory* or by an *Habitual* Judgment, that ſuch a Fact is a Sin; and yet he ſins *ignorantly* too, in as much as either he does not *actually attend* to that *ſpeculative* and *habitual* Judgment of his, that ſuch a thing is a Sin, or if he does, yet he thinks it upon the whole Mat-

ter

ter to be a *leſſer Evil*; which indeed is *implicitly* and *confuſedly*, though not *explicitly*, that 'tis not a Sin; becauſe that which is *truly* a leſſer Evil cannot be a Sin, for a Sin can never be *eligible*, but a *leſſer Evil may*.

And whereas you ſay that *Advertency*, or *Attention* to the Object is a *defective Principle as to the redeeming us into the Ability of cloſing with what is diſcern'd beſt*, I confeſs I can eaſily conceive how a Man may be defective *in his Attention*, but not how Attention it ſelf, if duly applied, can be defective towards *true Illumination*, though in the midſt of *Moral Corruptions*. All that can be ſaid is, that theſe moral Corruptions may divert the Soul from ſufficiently *attending* to the *Beauty of Holineſs*, and this I take to be the true and ultimate Ground of all Sin, and here 'tis I fix the neceſſity of *Grace and Divine Aſſiſtance*.

And, whereas you ſay, that the *Inſtance of Martyrdom*, which I alledge for my Opinion, does rather confirm that there muſt be ſomething of a more weight than *Advertency* to inable a Man to die for the Truth; and that though a Man be *notionally* convinc'd, that the denying of Chriſt is the greateſt Evil in the World, and attend never

ver ſo cloſely to this Notion, he may yet find ſuch Evaſions as will excuſe him from ſuffering: For, you ſay the *Mercy of God*, and *future Repentance*, and *Violence of the Temptation*, or *Pretence of making amends ſome other way*, may do it.

To this I reply; that he who is *notionally* convinc'd, that the denying of Chriſt is the greateſt Evil in the World, cannot poſſibly chuſe it ſo long as he continues that Judgment, or Notional Conviction, there being, according to his *then Apprehenſion*, no greater Evil, for the avoiding of which, he ſhould think it eligible. If therefore, he ſhould *then* chuſe it, he muſt chuſe it *as a greater Evil*, that is, *ſimply as Evil*, than which, I think there can be no greater Abſurdity. As for thoſe Conſiderations therefore, which you ſubjoyn, *the Mercy of God*, *future Repentance*, &c. theſe cannot prevail with him to chuſe the denying of Chriſt, *while* he judges it the greateſt Evil, any more than they can induce him to chuſe Evil, as ſuch. They may indeed prevail with him in the preſent juncture, *not to think it the greateſt Evil*; nay, to pronounce it a leſſer Evil than the Evil of Pain, and then no wonder if he chuſe it. But, this I do not conceive to make any thing

againſt

againſt my Hypotheſis, but to be rather *according to it.*

As to what you remark concerning *Humility* and *Spiritual Mortification*, I think I may be perfectly of your mind without retracting or altering any thing of my Sermon, for I don't find, if the buſineſs be ſifted to the bottom, that we differ any thing at all.

Your Determination concerning the Pleaſure of the Sixth Senſe, I ſubmit to as very full and ſatisfactory. And I have only one thing more to move concerning it. Which is, that ſince you make the *Abſtractedneſs* of this Pleaſure from the *natural End* of it, that of Propagation, to be its *Eſſential Turpitude*, whether this does not conclude againſt all thoſe who marry in ſuch an Age, when 'tis impoſſible, according to the Courſe of Nature, that this End ſhould be ſerv'd? And, whether there be any Difference, according to your Meaſures, between the Enjoyment of the *Sixth Senſe* in ſuch Circumſtances or the like, and Voluntary Pollutions. I would willingly know your Senſe in this Matter.

And now (Sir) all I have to do is to return you extraordinary Thanks for your many

many and great Civilities, to desire a long Continuance of your Health and Welfare, and favourable Construction of the Defence which I make against your Reflections. That 'tis not in the least, from a Design of wrangling and Opposition, but from a Perswasion of my being at present in the right, and an earnest Desire of being wiser. I am truly indifferent which Side of the Question be true, all that I am concern'd for, is, to *know which is so.* And being so indifferent, as I am the more likely to *find the Truth*, so I hope I am so to *obtain Pardon* from you who are so great a Friend to it. Which, yet you will be the more ready to grant when you consider how much your Judgment (tho' not in this particular fully assented to) is yet admired and esteemed by

(Most honour'd and Dear Sir)

Your most obliged Friend and Servant

J. Norris.

Dr.

Dr. MORE's *Answer.*

SIR,

I Have received yours, and reading the Confirmation of your Hypothesis (which I took the Boldness a little to vellicate) and your Answer to my Objections against it, I could not but observe your ingenious Dexterity therein with Pleasure. And yet I must ingenuously confess, that I still stick where I was, nor can conceive but that the free Agency we are conscious to our selves of, is placed in the Soul as *Volent* as much as *Intelligent*, because this *Volency*, as I may so speak, is *implied* in her *Attention* or Advertency, and is a necessary requisite thereof. The thing therefore that I affirm being this, *viz.* That this ἀυτεξούσιον is placed in the Soul as *Volent* as well as *Intelligent*, the Volency of the Soul being required to make those free Attentions or Advertencies on the Object, let us see how you demonstrate that it cannot be seated in the Soul as *Volent*.

Your

Your argument in Brief is this, (for I intend to anſwer your Letter with all poſſible brevity I can) That ſince the Soul cannot Will Evil as Evil, ſhe muſt neceſſarily Will and Chuſe according as the *betterneſs* of the Object appears to her Underſtanding, otherwiſe ſhe will chuſe Evil as Evil, which is againſt the ſuppoſition. To this I Anſwer, that though ſhe does not chuſe according as the betterneſs of the Object appears to her Underſtanding, it does not thence follow, that ſhe will chuſe Evil as Evil, but that ſhe will chuſe a Natural Good, and prefer it before the Moral. So that the abſurdity of chuſing Evil as Evil here vaniſheth, and the demonſtration falls to the Ground. And this was the caſe of St. *Peter* in denying Chriſt. The Object of his Choice was that Natural Good, his ſecurity from pain and puniſhment, which he preferred before that Moral Good, the faithful and profeſſed adheſion to his Lord and Maſter Chriſt Jeſus. Nor could the *Underſtanding* of St. *Peter* err ſo groſly as not in the *Notion* to think, that faithfulneſs to his Lord Chriſt was better abſolutely than the ſecuring himſelf from pain and puniſhment (as indeed there is no compariſon betwixt the Moral or Divine Good and

and the Natural) but there was wanting in this Act the *Exertion of his Will* towards the *Divine Good*; or else the *Divine Nature* or *Grace* was wanting, whence he slipt into this Choice of the meaner Good.

And as for that Maxim, *Omnis peccans ignorat*; If it be true in that *Universality*, the Sense is, that whoever sins, it is out of defect of either *Notional Knowledge* or *inward sense*, such as accompanies *Real Regeneration*; in which sense the ἀναίσθητοι *Insensati* in Scripture are to be understood; and on the contrary the *Pythagorick* εὐαισθησία. Those that want this εὐαισθησία, though they have a *Notional Knowledge* of the thing, yet they may sin, and that from the want of this *sensibility of Spirit*. But he that is born of God sins not, because the seed remains in him, this *life* or *sensibility* in the New Birth, which is an higher and more effectual Principle than *Notional Knowledge*. Which alone is not able to determine the choice of the Soul to a Moral or Spiritual Object without the accession of the other. For *Life* and *Sense* can only counterpoise *Life* and *Sense*, not *mere Notion*. Whence the τὸ βέλτιστον μὴ αἱρούμενον, i. e. the Moral or Divine Good is not followed, but what is pleasing and grate-

ful to the *Animal Nature*. So that the Soul here Wills or Chuses against the dictate of her Understanding, which is the sin against *Conscience*, otherwise there would be no such thing.

The chief Pith of the last Paragraph of your Confirmation is this. Though it be necessary the Soul Judge as things appear, yet 'tis not necessary (except only in self-evident Propositions) that things should *appear* thus or thus, but *that* will wholly depend upon the degrees of *Advertency* or *Attention*. And in this, say you, I place the seat of free Agency, viz. in *an immediate power in the Soul of attending or not attending, or of attending more or less to the Objects that occur*. I demand therefore, is this any thing more than what is couched in that of the Poet,

Quid verum atque bonum quæro & rogo
& omnis in hoc sum,

Viz. A sincere Inquisition (and Sincerity is immediately in our power, that is, it is in our power to do as well as we can) after that Truth and Good in which humane Happiness consists. Which if it be done in a *mere Notional way*, there will still remain that liberty I mentioned above, of

the

the Soul chusing contrary to the dictates of her Understanding. So that there will be more liberties than you conclude for in this Paragraph. But if this diligent and sincere Inquisition, or sincere desire of knowing *what is man, and whereto serveth he, what is his Good, and what is his Evil*, be it absolutely sincere, it cannot fail to inquire what is the most safe and effectual way to have Objects duly represent themselves to the Understanding, as the Objects of sight to a pure and clear Eye. And what can this be but the *Purification* of the Soul, as I intimated in my last to you, which is by *Mortification* and *real Regeneration*, that the *Divine Principle* may be more fully awakened in us, and so become Life and Sense to us, in Virtue whereof the Soul will be free and able to chuse what is absolutely the better, that is, to prefer the Moral or Divine Good before that which is Animal or Natural; and if this state advance to the highest, never to chuse any, if they stand in Competition, with the Moral or Divine, according to that of St. *John* above-mentioned, *He that is born of God sinneth not*, &c. Wherefore so far as I see, it may be but a κοσμομαχία betwixt us as to this point where you place the αὐτεξούσιον of the Soul in her immediate power of using the best means she can to find

find out what is her best Good, or readiest means to true Happiness, and riddance of sin and error. Which taken in the full sense thereof, as I have intimated, is, as I conceive, a sound and useful Theorem, and well adapted for the chastising of the World for their Sloth and Laziness in these things.

We come now to your Answers to my Objections. And to that of *Video meliora proboque*, you answer indeed learnedly and scholastically, by saying, a thing may be judged Good either by a *Speculative* or *Universal* Knowledge, or by a *practical* Knowledge, when it is look'd upon, and pronounced of *pro hic & nunc*, as cloathed with all its Circumstances, the former is not always followed, but the latter is. But is there any thing more in this, but that the *Eligent* (whenas both these knowledges are speculative or universal, the former already *granted*, the other plainly *implyed* by the choice of the Eligent, who in such Circumstances judges the choice is *universally* to be made, else how is he obliged to make it?) but that the Humour of the Eligent only, has made this latter practical by putting it into practice instead of the former, it being cloathed with the circumstances of *Jucundum* or *Utile*, when the other

other recommends it self only upon the account of *Honestum*; which though he sees (as *Medea* says, *Video meliora proboque*---- and that *hic & nunc*, for she speaks of the *present* case and time, yet *deteriora sequor*) notwithstanding he declines that which is *absolutè & simpliciter melius*, according to his own Judgment, and closes with that which seems *melius*, that is, *Utilius* and *Jucundius* to himself, to his Animal Nature against the Dictate of the Divine. This is the clear case of the Controversie, freed from the *Clouds* of the *School*. And therefore notwithstanding what you have answered, it is plain that the Soul may *understand Notionally* and *Actually* better than she *practices*, and not follow the dictate of her Understanding but of her Animal Appetite.

To my Objection against your Hypothesis, That thence every Man would be *sincere*, nor any sin against *knowledge*, you answer, That a sinner may be said to sin both knowingly and ignorantly; he may know in Theory or Habitual Judgment such a Fact is a sin, and yet be ignorant by not *actually attending* to his *Habitual Knowledge*; or by judging the sin upon the whole matter, to be the *lesser evil*, and thence implicitly to be no sin, and so not sin against knowledge. But I answer,

It

It is incredible that one that has an Habitual Knowledge that ſuch a thing is a ſin, ſhould not remember it is ſo when he meets with it, or is entring upon it. It is as if one had the habitual Idea of ſuch a perſon in his Mind, and ſhould not remember it is he when he meets him in the very Teeth. Nor can he judge the ſin, upon the whole matter, to be the leſſer Evil, but he muſt in the mean time remember it is a *ſin*, and ſo commit it againſt his Knowledge, only ſugar'd over with the Circumſtance of *Jucundum* or *Utile*, or both. This Compoſition, though there be *Ratsbain in the Sugar*, makes the Soul liſten to the dictate of the Animal Appetite, and let go that of Moral Reaſon, tho' they both clamour in her Ears at once. And there the Soul againſt the Underſtanding, concludes for the ſuggeſtion of the Animal Appetite, that bears her in hand, that ſuch a ſin with pleaſure and profit is better than an Act of Virtue with pain and Worldly loſs. This I conceive is the naked caſe of the buſineſs. Nor does this choice ſeem to be of a leſſer Evil to the Soul as *Intellectual*, which dictates the contrary, but as *Senſual or Animal*.

To

To your Answer to my Third Objection of Attention (or Advertency) being a *defective Principle*, That though a Man may be defective in his Attention, yet you cannot easily conceive how *Attention it self*, if duly applied, can be defective: I reply, that mere Attention of it self, in a morally corrupt Mind, let it be never so great, can no better rightly discover the Moral Object, than the vitiated Eye the Natural. It is the *Purity* of the Soul, through *Regeneration*, that enables her to behold the Beauty of Holiness, as our Saviour speaks, *Blessed are the pure in Heart, for they shall see God.* There is no seeing God but by being purified and regenerate into his Image. Ἐι γένοιο αὐτὸ καὶ ὄψει, as *Plotinus* somewhere has it, touching the *Divine Pulchritude. If thou beest it, thou seest it.* If we be regenerate into the Image of the *Eternal Pulchritude*, we then shall see it, having (if I may use the Poets Expression here)

——*Incoctum generoso Pectus Honesto.*

But, if this Principle of Life be not sufficiently awakened in us, no Attention is sufficient to make us rightly discern the Beauty of Holiness, but only a *shadowy*

Notion

Notion or *Meager Monogrammical Picture* thereof, which will not avail though you use all the Attention in the World against the Dictates of the *Animal Sense and Life unmortified*, in the Day of Trial. Whence the Defect of this Principle alone, is evident.

But, if you mean by sufficiently attending to the Beauty of Holiness, the diligent and sincere Inquisition after Truth and Holiness, which implies our serious entring into a *Method* of *Purification* and clearing our *inward Eyesight* by our resolved Progress in the Way of *Mortification*, and thereby of *real Regeneration*, whereby the *Divine Life* and *Sense* will sufficiently at length be *awakened* to counterpoise and overcome the *Sway* and *Importunity* of the *Animal Life and Sense*; the Neglect of this we shall be both agreed in, that it is the ultimate Ground of all Sin, and that we shall discern, when we seriously make trial, the Necessity of *Grace* and *Divine Assistance* to carry us thro' so weighty an Enterprise as you rightly note in this Paragraph; which I hope I have sufficiently spoke to by this. I will only add, that, what occurs, *Psal.* 48. *vers.* 5, 6, 7. seems a Figure of this *Spiritual Progress* towards the Beauty of Holiness, in Virtue of which, every one at last appears

pears before God in *Sion*, according to that Promiſe of our Saviour, *Bleſſed are the pure in Heart, for they ſhall ſee God.*

And now laſtly, for your Reply to what I ſaid, touching the *Inſtance* of *Martyrdom*, which Reply of yours is this. That he that is notionally convinced, that the denying of Chriſt is the greateſt Evil in the World, cannot poſſibly chuſe it ſo long as he continues that Judgment, there being, according to his *then* Apprehenſion, no greater Evil, for the avoiding of which he ſhould think it eligible. If therefore, he ſhould *then* chuſe it, he muſt chuſe it as a greater Evil, that is, ſimply as Evil, than which, I think there can be no greater Abſurdity, *&c.* This Reply is handſome and ſmart, but in my Judgment, not free from a fallacious Subtilty. If where the greater Evil is choſen, the Two compared Evils were of *one Kind*, that Abſurdity would be manifeſtly conſequent; but when one of the Evils is *Moral*, ſuppoſe the greateſt Moral Evil that is, the other *Natural* and very great, or the greateſt Natural Evil that is, ſuppoſe a painful torturous and Ignominious Death, in the avoiding of which is implied the ſecuring to himſelf

the natural Eaſe and ſweetneſs of this preſent Life, tho' upon this account he chuſe that which is the *greateſt moral Evil*, and is ſo eſteemed in his notional Judgment, yet he cannot be ſaid then to chuſe it as *evil*, but as the only *effectual means*, and therefore good or expedient for that End, *viz.* the avoiding the *higheſt natural Evil*, and enjoying the Sweet of that great natural Good, a Life painleſs and at eaſe. And therefore, upon this Account, he having only a *notional Judgment* of the *Moral Evil* of that higheſt Sin mentioned, but a *lively Senſe* both of the *natural Evil* and Good here ſpecified, which are the one avoided, the other ſecured by chuſing the aforeſaid Moral Evil; It is no wonder that, though retaining ſtill his notional Judgment of that greateſt Moral Evil, he yet chuſes it to avoid that horrid natural Evil, and to enjoy the Sweet of that Natural Good, *viz.* this Life with Eaſe and Safety; there being in one Scale of the Ballance, nothing but the *mere Truth of Notion*, in the other, the *urgent Weight of Life and Senſe* which will eaſily preponderate, if there be not *Life and Senſe* alſo, (which is the State only of the *Regenerate*) to weigh againſt it in the other Scale of the Ballance. So that though the Notional Judg-

Judgment be not corrupted, but that ſuch a Sin is ſtill held the greateſt *Moral Evil* that is, yet the Soul is born down to follow the Suggeſtion of the *Animal Life and Senſe* againſt the Dictate of her *notional Diſcernment*, and may truly pronounce with *Medea*.

——*Video meliora proboque,*
Deteriora ſequor.——

Nor need I proceed any further. For, what is already ſaid, I hope, will reach every Particular of the whole Paragraph which contains your Reply to this laſt Point: At leaſt it will make good, that the Soul does not chuſe Evil as evil in the preſent Caſe, which is the main String of your Argument.

That we agree in our Sentiments touching *Humility* and *Spiritual Mortification*, this Poſition of yours I eaſily believe, from reading what occurs in the latter Part of your Sermon, which is excellently good, ſolid and edifying.

And that I have ſatisfied you in my Determination concerning the Pleaſure of the *Sixth Senſe*, I am glad of that alſo. And as for this laſt Scruple you move;

whether what I have ſaid does not conclude againſt all thoſe who marry in ſuch an Age, when it is impoſſible, according to the Courſe of Nature, that this End of Propagation ſhould be ſerved, I ſay it does not ſo conclude. Becauſe there is a conſiderable End of Marriage beſides that of Propagation of Children, which in our Liturgie the Office of Marriage takes notice of, *viz.* mutual Society, Help and Comfort, which compriſeth all the handſome Adjuſtments of the Married Parties, Secular Affairs and Oeconomical Conveniences, and alſo their mutual Help to one another in Piety and devout Purſuance of fitting themſelves for the Future State, their Age reminding them that it is not far off. And in this Regard their mutual Society may be very delectable to one another while their Diſcourſes and Meditations are of the Joys of the other World, and ſo they may live chaſtly and comfortably without any *fruſtranious Abuſe* of their Bodies upon the Titillation of Luſt, which exact Chriſtian Temperance and holy Meditations and Diſcourſes together of their joyous Change into the other near approaching State ought to prevent. Sir, I have told you freely my Sentiments touching all the things you have propounded;

pounded; but I dictate nothing, but leave all to your own free Judgment, and so wishing you good Success in your vertuous Studies, I take leave and rest

Dear Sir,

Your affectionate Friend

to serve you

Hen. More.

C.C.C. Febr. 22. 168[illegible]

THE

FIFTH LETTER

TO

Dr. MORE.

SIR,

AS I cannot expreſs the *Thanks* which I owe you for your great Condeſcenſion and Civility, ſo neither can I the *Pleaſure* which I had in peruſing your ingenious and learned Anſwer. It is ſpun throughout with a very fine Thred, and richly fraught with curious and retired Senſe. But yet, tho' I was, and ſtill am exquiſitely *pleaſed*, I am not fully *ſatisfied* with it; whether the Defect be in *your Letter*, or in *my Apprehenſion* I ſhall not take upon me to determine. But ſo it is, I cannot as yet bring over my Judgment to yours, and that I do not diſſent without ſome *conſiderable Reaſon*, it ſhall be the Buſi-

Buſineſs of this Paper briefly to ſhew you.

And firſt, then I obſerve, that the *Poſtulatum* upon which I ground my Demonſtration of the Wills neceſſarily following the Dictate of the Underſtanding, is by you admitted, as indeed it is by all except only the School of the *Nominals*, namely, *that the Soul cannot will Evil as Evil.* This you admit by ſaying (Paragraph the Second) *that the Abſurdity of chuſing Evil as Evil vaniſhes*, only you deny the Conſequence of that acknowledged Abſurdity upon ſuch a Choice as is made againſt the Practical Dictate, by ſaying, *that it vaniſhes.* Here then is the τὸ ζητούμενον with the Truth or Falſehood of which I am content the Demonſtration ſhould either ſtand or fall to the Ground.

Now, to make appear that this is a true Conſequence, *that the Will, by not following the Practical Dictate would chuſe Evil as Evil*, I ſhall not add any poſitive and direct Proof to the former Demonſtration, but only conſider whether the Conſequence is any thing invalidated or evaded by what you have offer'd. You ſay, that although the Soul does not chuſe according *as the Betterneſs of the Object appears to her Under-*

ſtanding, it does not thence follow that ſhe will chuſe *Evil as Evil*, but that ſhe will chuſe a *natural Good*, and prefer it before the *Moral*. True, but unleſs this *natural Good* be in the preſent Circumſtance, all things conſider'd, judg'd *greater and more eligible* than the *Moral*, the chuſing of it will not be the chuſing of *good*, but of *evil as evil*. For a *leſs good* (whether *natural* or *any other* it matters not) tho' *good ſingly conſider'd*, yet in *Competition* with a greater does *induere ſpeciem mali*, as a *leſs evil*, tho' *evil ſingly conſider'd*, yet in *Competition* with a greater does Commence *good and eligible*. Such a Choice therefore as is here ſuppos'd, would not be the Choice of a *natural good*, nay not ſo much as of *good*, but of *Evil as Evil*. There is therefore no Choice but what is according to the *appearing Betterneſs of the Object*; which Concluſion you your ſelf ſeem unawares to ſlip into by uſing the word (*Prefer*) For what is it to *Prefer*, but to think or pronounce upon the whole matter to be *better* or *more elegible*?

And thus you ſay again concerning St. *Peter*, that he *preferr'd* the Natural Good of ſecurity from Pain, before the Moral Good of adheſion to his Lord. Well, if ſo, then however ſtrange it may ſeem, his Underſtanding did err ſo groſly, as at

that

that inſtant not to think Faithfulneſs to his Maſter to be abſolutely better than ſecurity from pain, otherwiſe his chuſing the latter would have been the chuſing of what he then thought a *leſſer good*, and conſequently of Evil as ſuch. Nor will it ſuffice to ſay, that there was wanting in that act of his denial, the *exertion of his Will* toward the *Divine Good*: That indeed is *true*, but not the *whole Truth*; for had there not been alſo a defect in his Underſtanding, there would have been nothing amiſs in his Will. As for your ἐναισθησία, or *ſenſibility of Spirit*, I have a very good liking to the Notion, and do think it a Concomitant, if not the principal part of *real Regeneration*. But whereas you ſay, thoſe that want this ἐναισθησία, tho' *right in their Judgment*, may yet ſin, and that becauſe Life and Senſe can only Counterpoiſe *Life and Senſe*: To this I reply, that the want of this ἐναισθησία, may indeed in the heat of a Temptation be the occaſion of a *wrong Judgment* (and ſo indeed 'tis neceſſary to the prevention of ſin, that *life and ſenſe* Counterpoiſe *life and ſenſe*) but it can never be the Occaſion of ſin *with a right and practically unerring Judgment*, for the reaſons above mention'd. So that notwithſtanding this ἐναισθησία, the Reaſon of the Action good or bad, will be ultimately devolv'd upon

upon the Rectitude or Obliquity of the *Judgment*. And in that reſpect only the Axiom will hold true, *Omnis peccans ignorat*.

As to the Cloſe of this your Third Paragraph, how ſinning *according to the Dictate of the Underſtanding*, and yet *againſt Conſcience*, are conſiſtent, I think they are very reconcilable. For he that commits a ſin, tho' by not ſufficiently attending to it at the moment of action either *as a ſin*, or as a *greater evil*, he comes to pronounce it eligible, and ſo to chuſe it; and ſo may be ſaid to ſin ignorantly, yet he ſins *knowingly, and againſt Conſcience too*, in as much as he does ſuch a Fact either againſt an Actual Dictate that 'tis a ſin, or an Habitual Dictate that 'tis alſo a *greater evil*, as I intimated to you in my laſt.

As to the Queſtion which in this next Paragraph you are pleas'd to put to me, whether this Attention wherein I place the ſeat of *Free Agency*, differ any thing from what is couch'd in that of the Poet,

Quid verum atque bonum quæro & rogo
& omnis in hoc ſum,

I answer that it does, and that my Notion may be more clearly conceiv'd, I shall here briefly explain what I mean by this *Power of Attention.* Whereas therefore the Operations and Powers of the Soul as Intelligent, are usually divided into these three, *Apprehension*, *Judgment*, and *Discourse* I find it necessary to add a *fourth*, that of *Attention*, which I look upon as really distinct from the other three, they being Conversant about their Objects as *true* and *false*, but this only as *Intelligible*, and is only in short, a *general power of converting the Acies of the Understanding towards any Intelligible Object, whether simple or complex*, and answers exactly to the Application of the Eye to a sensible Object, and accordingly is as distinct from either Apprehension, Judgment or Discourse as this Application of the Eye is from the very Act of Vision. In short, 'tis a kind of Openness or Wakefulness of Soul, such as I conceive to be hinted at in Scripture by such and the like expressions as these, *Watch lest you enter into Temptation*; *Awake to righteousness and sin not*; *Awake thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead*, &c. The Notion thus explain'd, I will now shew how it differs from that of the Poet. The difference is in this. That inquisition of the Poet denotes a particular Exertion and Employment of *all* the Faculties,

ties, a diligent Uſe of all Means, Methods and Opportunities, and that in order to the finding out a *Truth*, or a *Good not yet known*: But this Attention I ſpeak of, is only a *general wakefulneſs* of the Underſtanding, or *Application of Mind* to the ſpeculation of a *Truth habitually known*, which will make it *actually preſent*, and ſo determine the *Practical Judgment*, and by that the Will.

I come now to the place where you conſider my Anſwers to your Objections. And here to that diſtinction of mine of Speculative and Practical Knowledge, the latter of which I ſaid was always follow'd, though not the former; you ſay they are both Speculative and Univerſal, the firſt granted to be ſo, and the other plainly implied by the Choice of the Eligent, who in ſuch Circumſtances judges the Choice univerſally to be made. I anſwer, you may call them both Speculative if you pleaſe, I ſhall not contend with you for a word; but then 'tis to be conſider'd that there will be two diſtinct Speculative Dictates, one that is Habitual, out of the Circumſtance of action, that ſuch a thing is a Sin, and a greater Evil; and another that is Actual, in the Circumſtance of Action, that 'tis a leſſer Evil, which therefore for diſtinction's ſake I call Practical, becauſe

becauſe of the immediate influence it has upon Action. Which latter is always followed, tho' the former is not. Neither is this latter, as you ſay, made only Practical by being put into Practice, but is ſo *Antecedaneouſly*, being that which determines the Choice of the Eligent.

As to the next Paragraph, where you think it incredible that one, who has an Habitual Knowledge that ſuch a thing is a ſin, ſhould not remember it to be ſo when he is entring upon it. I Reply, that it ſeems to me moſt certain, that whoever commits ſin muſt think it ſome way or other Eligible. Now this muſt come to paſs one of theſe two ways, either by his not attending to it as ſin, or not as a greater Evil. The firſt of which in many caſes I can eaſily conceive poſſible, and the latter in all caſes I think certain. And this methinks you your ſelf run into by ſaying (*Paragraph the ſixth*) that the Animal Appetite bears the Soul in hand, that ſuch a ſin with Pleaſure and Profit is better than an act of Virtue with Pain and Worldly Loſs. For what is this but in other words to ſay, that the Concupiſcible may be ſo Strong and Rampant, that the Soul may Judge *pro hic & nunc*, the *uneaſineſs of abſtaining* to be a greater Evil than an unlawful Indul-

Indulgence, ſo as upon that Judgment to chuſe the latter.

To your next Paragraph, where you continue your Charge upon mere Attention as a defective Inſtrument towards the diſcovery of a Moral Object in a Morally Corrupt Mind, I make this ſhort Reply. That ſince for ſuch a Fact to be a ſin, or for ſin to be the greateſt Evil, are plain and obvious Theorems, I cannot conceive but that conſtant and actual Attention ſhould prove a ſufficient Directory to the Underſtanding; all the Difficulty is *to be thus actually and conſtantly Attentive*; and here (as I ſaid before) is the work of Grace and Regeneration.

And now laſtly, to your laſt Paragraph concerning the *Inſtance of Martyrdom*: Whereas I ſaid, That he who is notionally convinc'd, that the denying of Chriſt is the greateſt Evil in the World, cannot poſſibly chuſe it ſo long as he continues that Judgment, there being, according to his then Apprehenſion, no greater Evil, for the avoiding of which he ſhould think it Eligible; if therefore he ſhould then chuſe it, he muſt chuſe it as the greateſt Evil, that is, ſimply as Evil, *&c.* This Reply you ſay is not free from a fallacious ſubtilty,

ſubtilty, concerning which you thus diſtinguiſh. If where the greater Evil is choſen, the two compared Evils were of one Kind; that abſurdity would certainly follow; But where one of the Evils is Moral, the other Natural, tho' a Man ſhould chuſe the greateſt Moral Evil, yet he cannot be ſaid to chuſe it as Evil, but as the only means of avoiding the Natural Evil, and conſequently as Good. This is the ſum of your Anſwer. To which I return, that I cannot conceive how the diverſity of the compared Evils, as to their Specifick Nature, can any thing alter the Caſe, the Queſtion as to Eligibility being not concerning their Specifick Natures, but concerning their Degrees, not which is Natural and which Moral, but which has moſt of the general Nature of Evil. So that if I chuſe that which to me has the moſt of the general Nature of Evil, notwithſtanding its being an Evil of another kind, I certainly chuſe Evil as Evil. Neither can this be brought off, by ſaying that 'tis choſen as a means of avoiding the Natural Evil, and conſequently, as Good, for it can never be good to chuſe a greater Evil to avoid a leſs, that being *all over Loſs and Damage.*

And

And thus, as briefly and as fully as I could have I set down the Grounds of my Opinion, which I am ready to part with upon the first Conviction of their Weakness or Insufficiency. If you should find any thing in this Paper worth your Notice, you may return answer at your best Leasure, for I would by no means divert you from more important Concerns. I am very sensible what Interruptions I have already given you, but I hope you will easily pardon me when you consider that 'tis the peculiar Reverence I have for your Judgment which has brought this Trouble upon you from

Dear Sir,

Your most highly obliged

Friend and Servant,

J. Norris.

A N

AN APPENDIX.

CONsidering with my self that those, into whose Hands these Papers may light, may not all of them have that other Book of mine, which contains the Hypothesis here defended, concerning the *Root* of *Liberty*, and that 'tis very necessary the Hypothesis should be seen with its Defence, I thought it convenient to set it down here for the Benefit of the Reader.

The Hypothesis runs thus.

That the Will cannot be the immediate Subject of Liberty must be acknowledg'd plain, if the Will necessarily follows the Practical Dictate of the Understanding. And that it does so, I think there is Demonstration.

'Tis an unqueſtionable Axiom in the Schools of Learning, That the Object of the Will is *Apparent Good*. Now Apparent Good in other Words, is that which is judged to be good; and if ſo, then it follows that the Will cannot but conform to the Dictate of the Underſtanding; Becauſe otherwiſe ſomething might be the Object of the Will that is not apprehended Good, which is contrary to the Suppoſition.

In ſhort, the Will (as *Aquinas* well expreſſes it) is the Concluſion of an *Operative Syllogiſm*, and follows as neceſſarily from the Dictates of the Underſtanding, as any other Concluſion does from its Premiſes; and conſequently, cannot be the immediate Subject of Liberty.

But then are we not invovlv'd in the ſame Difficulty, as to the *Underſtanding*? Does not that act with equal (if not more) Neceſſity than the Will? So I know 'tis ordinarily taught.

But if this be abſolutely and univerſally true, I muſt confeſs it above the reach of my Capacity to ſalve the Notion of Morality or Religion. For ſince 'tis evident, that

that the Will neceſſarily conforms to the Dictates of the Underſtanding, if thoſe very Dictates are alſo wholly and altogether neceſſary, there can be no ſuch thing as a Τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, the Man is bound Hand and Foot, has nothing left him whereby to render him a Moral Agent, to qualify him for Law or Obligation, Vertue or Vice, Reward or Puniſhment. But theſe are Conſequences not to be indured, and therefore I conclude according to the Rules of right Reaſoning, the Principles from which they flow to be ſo too.

To clear up then the whole Buſineſs, I ſhall no longer conſider the Underſtanding and Will as Faculties really diſtinct either from the Soul it ſelf, or from one another, but that the Soul does immediately underſtand and will by it ſelf, without the Intervention of any Faculty. And that for this demonſtrative Reaſon; in ſhort, becauſe in the contrary *Hypotheſis*, either Judgment muſt be aſcribed to the Will, and then the Will immediately commences Underſtanding, or the Aſſent of the Will muſt be blind, brutiſh, and unaccountable, both which are abſurd.

This being premiſed, I grant, that as the Soul neceſſarily wills as ſhe underſtands, (for ſo we muſt now ſpeak) ſo likewiſe does ſhe neceſſarily underſtand as the Object appears.

And thus far our Sight terminates in Fatality, and Neceſſity bounds our Horizon. That, then which muſt give us a Proſpect beyond it muſt be this, that altho' the Soul neceſſarily underſtands or judges according to the Appearance of things, yet, that things ſhould ſo *appear* (unleſs it be in Propoſitions ſelf-evident) is not alike neceſſary, but depends upon the Degrees of *Advertency* or *Attention* which the Soul uſes, and which to uſe either more or leſs is fully and immediately in her own Power.

And this Indifferency of the Soul, as to attending or not attending, I take to be the only τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, the Bottom and Foundation into which the Morality of every Action muſt be at length reſolv'd. For a farther Proof and Illuſtration of which Hypotheſis, let it be apply'd to a particular Caſe, that we may ſee how well it will anſwer the *Phenomena*.

In

In the Case then of *Martyrdom*, I look upon Sin as an Evil, and not only so, but (while I attend fully to its Nature,) as the greatest of Evils. And as long as I continue this Judgment, 'tis utterly impossible I should commit it; there being, according to my present Apprehension, no greater Evil, for the declining of which I should think it eligible. But now, the Evil of Pain being presented before me, and I not sufficiently attending to the Evil of Sin, this latter appears to be the lesser Evil of the Two, and I accordingly *pro hic & nunc* so pronounce it, and in Conformity to that Dictate necessarily chuse it.

But Because 'twas at first absolutely in my Power to have attended more heedfully, there was Liberty in the *Principle*, the Mistake which influenc'd the Action was *vincible*, and consequently, the Action it self justly *imputable*. This is the *Hypothesis*.

I shall now Sum up the whole Matter in this Order of Reasoning.

1. THat a Creature, void of Liberty cannot be capable of Law or Obligation, Vertue or Vice, Reward or Punishment, is certain.

2. That Man is capable of all these, is certain.

3. That Man therefore is endow'd with Liberty, is certain.

4. That Liberty is a *Rational* Perfection, or a Perfection belonging to an *Intellectual* Nature, is certain.

5. That therefore this Liberty must be subjected either in the Understanding or Will, or (to speak more properly) in the Soul as intelligent, or in the Soul as volent, is certain.

6. That it cannot be subjected in that Part which acts *Necessarily*, is certain.

7. That

7. That the Will *neceſſarily* follows the Dictate of the Underſtanding; Or, that the Soul neceſſarily wills according as ſhe underſtands, is certain.

8. That therefore this Liberty cannot be immediately ſubjected in the Will, or, in the Soul as volent, is certain.

9. That therefore it muſt be ſubjected in the Soul as intelligent, is certain.

10. That even the Soul as intelligent ſo far as it acts neceſſarily cannot be the immediate Subject of Liberty, is alſo certain.

11. That the Soul as intelligent *neceſſarily judges* according as the Object appears to her, is certain.

12. That therefore the Soul as *judging* or *forming* a *Judgment*, can no more be the immediate Subject of Liberty, than the Soul as *Volent*, is certain.

13. That, ſince the Soul neceſſarily wills as ſhe judges, and neceſſarily judges as things appear, we have thus far no Glimps of Liberty; is certain.

14. That

14. That therefore our Liberty must be founded upon the *No-Necessity* of some certain things appearing determinately thus or thus, or that we have no Liberty thus or thus, or that we have no Liberty at all, is as certain.

15. That things appearing thus or thus (unless in self-evident Propositions) depends upon the various Degrees of *Advertency* or *Attention*, and nothing else, is certain.

16. That therefore we have an immediate Power of attending or not attending, or of attending more or less, is certain.

17. That therefore this Indifferency of the Soul as to attending or not attend-tend, or attending more or less, is the Prime Root and immediate Subject of Human Liberty, is no less certain, which was the Point to be demonstrated.

FINIS.